CONTENTS

 

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTERS

1. HADHRAMI DIASPORA, THE EARLY YEARS OF AL-IRSHAD
2. THE HADHRAMIS AND THE POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE LATE 16^TH CENTURY AND 19^TH CENTURY MALAY STATES
3. HADHRAMIS IN SINGAPORE
4. ARAB TRADERS AND LAND SETTLERS IN THE GESER-GOROM ARCHIPELAGO
5. HADHRAMI SCHOLARS IN THE MALAY-INDONESIAN DIASPORA
6. THE TARIQAT AL-‘ALAWIYYA AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE SHI ’I SCHOOL IN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA
7. REPRESENTATION OF THE HADHRAMI IN A LITERARY WORK FROM WEST JAVA
8. ARAB LANDOWNERS IN BATALIVA/JAKARTA
9. FROM YEMEN    TO    THE    SHORES    OF    MALABAR HADRAMI        MIGRANTS   TO CALICUT: A   CASE-STUDY
10. THE HADHRAMI DIASPORA, ISLAM AND MADAGASCAR, C.1750-1976
11. THE HADHRAMI DIASPORA IN SOUTHWESTERN INDIA: SAYYIDS OF THE MALABAR COAST
12. THE PATTERNS OF HADHRAMI EMIGRATION IN EAST AFRICA
13. NATURAL LEADERS OF NATIVE MUSLIMS: A PERSPECTIVE ON THE EMERGENCE OF ARABS IN COLONIAL JAVA
14. RELIGIOUS LIFE IN THE MALAYO-INDONESIAN WORLD 1850-1950: THE HADHRAMAUT CONNECTION
15. SHARING SWEET HAPPINESS AND BITTER GRIEF : ARAB HADHRAMI DESCENDENTS IN THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO
16. HADHRAMIS ABROAD IN HADHRAMAUT: THE MUWALLADIN
17. THE ARAB – CHINESE CONFLICTS IN JAVA, 1912
18. THE HADHRAMIS IN EAST AFRICA : IDENTITY, INTEGRATION AND RELATIONS WITH HADHRAMAUT
19. THE HADHRAMI ROLE IN THE ECONOMY OF THE RED SEA AND THE GULF OF ADEN C. 1830 TO 1910
20. HADHRAMI TRADE AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE
21. DUTCH COLONIAL POLICY PERTAINING TO HADHRAMI IMMIGRANTS
22. ISLAMIC MODERNISM IN JAVA”THE EARLY YEARS OF AL-IRSHAD, 1914-1922
23. HADHRAMI RIVALRIES AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: WORLD WAR I AND ITS AFTERMATH
24. MIGRATION IN WADI ‘AMD AND WADI DAW’AN AFTER THE WORLD WAR II. ECONOMICAL AND CULTURAL AFFECTS.
25. THE HADHRAMIS AND THE POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE LATE 18TH CENTURY AND 19TH CENTURY MALAY STATES

 

TITLE OF THE PUBLICATION –

HADHRAMI DIASPORA LOOKING EAST

 

INTRODUCTION

 

Relations between India and beyond that to South East Asia with the Arab World began when traders carried their goods from the Arab world and travelled to West India by sea. They reached the coastal regions of India such as Gujarat, Mumbai and Kerala where they stayed for months to sell their goods and to rest. When they finished selling their goods, they bought Indian products such as incense and spices and travelled again by sea towards South-East and South Asia especially to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and back home.

The Arabs for the first time reached India times immemorial. The facts indicate that Arabs came to India before Islam on their way to visit “Adam’s Foot” in Sri Lanka. There is a bridge that connects India with Sri Lanka called “Adam’s Bridge”. This indicates that Asian-Arab relations were established in early past times; it is known that “Adam” is an Arabic name.

We find the influence of Arabs and Arabic everywhere in South and South East Asia including India. When Islam came to India, people welcomed, accepted and preferred it more than any other religion. For this, Muslims chose the Islamic way and applied it to all aspects of their lives. They changed their local names with Arabic and Islamic names. They changed their traditions, culture and customs to Islamic ones. They also borrowed Arabic words and added them to their language; used Arabic alphabets and used the Arabic calligraphy for their love for Islam.

Many South and South East languages were written with Arabic alphabets such as Punjabi and Bengali. Urdu, Malayalam in India and Malay in South east Asia have still been written with Arabic alphabets. 

Arabic is one of the most important languages in south Asia including India and South East Asia including Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. It is taught in hundreds of universities and colleges in Kerala, Bengal, Assam and many other states in India; it is also taught in Aceh in Indonesia. Islamic schools teach Arabic as a course in addition to Quran and its interpretation.

Arabic was the official language in many South and South East Asian countries for a  period of time when the Umayyad Caliphate ruled the Islamic World, but it is still used as language of science and scientists; and many authors have been writing their books using Arabic.

When British occupied countries of South Asia and South East Asia, they did not ignore Arabic. Institutions and schools for teaching Arabic were established; books were published in Arabic, Persian, Urdu and Malay languages.

Books written in Arabic were published in India before the Arab World. India was interested in Arabic manuscripts; some South Asian and South East Asian libraries have unique and important Arabic manuscripts.

The first weekly newspaper in Arabic “Al-naf’ Al-‘ad’eem” was written in India. There were more than ten newspapers and magazines written in Arabic in South Asia and South East Asia starting from nineteenth century onwards.  

 

 

 

HADHRAMI DIASPORA, THE EARLY YEARS OF AL-IRSHAD

 

Jamiyah al-Islah wa'l-Irshad al-'Arabiyah (al-Irshad) was established by Hadhrami migrants in Java jn 1914. Today it remains an active organisation, run largely by descendants of Hadhraml migrants in Indonesia.

Previous scholarship has regarded al-Irshad as a vehicle established by non-sayyid Hadhramis in order to challenge the power and dominance of the sayyids.. Scholars have seen it as a political organisation preoccupied with power relations within the Hadhraml community in Java and in Hadhramaut. Although they have acknowledged al-Irshad's espousal of Islamic modernist ideas, it has been attributed to pragmatic motives and the credentials of the Irshadis as genuine religious reformers have been questioned.

The al-Irshad leaders were among the most influential Hadhrarmis in Java, wealthy traders and property-owners whose world-view was that of the modern Dutch colony. The primary aim of the organisation was to provide-modern-style education for Hadhraml and other Muslim children which would enable them to compete and progress in the society of the Indies. In this respect it was following the example of reformist Chinese and Indonesian organisations established in the colony during this period. A secondary aim was the promotion of the ideas of Islamic modernism within the Muslim community. While al-Irshad was vehemently opposed to customs which implied veneration of the sayyids, this, opposition should not be interpreted in terms of a struggle for power.

The misunderstanding of al-Irshad to the tendency of previous scholars to assume that the social conditions in Hadhramaut were replicated in the diaspora communities, and a resulting lack of independent research into the prevailing conditions of, the Dutch East Indies. The study of the communities of the Hadhrami diaspora should be more firmly rooted in an understanding of the societies in which those communities existed than has previously been the case.

 

 

The role of Hadhramis in processing Muslim modernist ideas in their Southeast Asian environment during early decades of the 20th century, and ultimately importing these ideas to the Hadhramaut itself after Indonesian independence in the late 1940s.

In the Hadhrami communities of eastern Africa there has been a complex play of demographic , social, economic and political factors which have led migrants to free themselves from certain prohibitions and restrictions pertaining to their society of origin.

 

The social origins of migrants largely determined how they were accepted into local societies from the moment of their arrival. It influenced the roles the Hadhrami played (religious and sometimes political in the case of the higher categories, essentially economic for the others).

 

Despite a similar assimilation process, the identity of Hadhrami migrants has been affected differently.

 

The role Hyderabad Hadhramis played in the politics of their own homeland in the nineteenth century. A small yet significant number of Hadhrami migrated to the south-central Indian state of Hyderabad, ruled by the Nizams, a Muslim dynasty of Turkoman descent from the 18th-mid 20th century. As Hadhrami Arab chiefs of Al-Quaiti, Al-Awlaqi, and al-Kathiri families acquired important positions in the Nizams army and amassed huge fortunes as a result of land grants and money lending, they turned their attention to empire-building schemes in native Hadhramaut. Consequently, a long drawn conflict ensued involving the Hyderabad authorities, the British colonial government, and others. It resulted in the eventual triumph of the Al-Quaitis manifested by their control of major towns in Hadhramaut.

 

Arabs have played an important part in Javanese coastal towns long before the arrival of the Dutch at the end of the 16th century. They were merchants and mixed rather easily with the local population. Though most Arabs frequented east Javanese harbours, there have been some Arabs in early Batavia, but not much is known about them.

 

 

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century Arabs from Hadhramaut arrived in ever greater numbers. These Hadhramis were small traders living in the moorish quarters of Pakojan and Krukut area and after becoming a bit wealthier moved to Pasar Baru and Tanah-Abang kampongs .They engaged in batik and cotton trade, money lending, retail business, small exports-imports with Arabia, renting out houses and in coasting activities. Some Arabs ventured into agriculture, but very few of them became farmers.

 

Hadhrami emigration throughout the Indian Ocean represents one of history’s most important mercantile and cultural diasporas.  It is remarkable, therefore, that it has been all but ignored in modern studies of migration, such as Philip Curtin's stimulating work, Cross-cultural trade in world history. This inattention is all the more surprising considering the relatively small population of the Hadhramaut and the economic and cultural influence that Hadhramis exerted in countries throughout the Indian Ocean extending from the East African coast to the Philippines. The impact of Hadhrami immigration is comparable to but more dispersed than that of Indian commercial migration that spread Buddhism into Central Asia and China or the broader movement into insular and mainland southeast Asia that produced the "Indianized" states of the region, the Buddhist-Hindu monument of Angkor Wat, and the Hinduised culture of Bali. 

 

Though the emigration of the Hadhramis outside their country has been for a long time, still there is no detailed investigation of this problem.

 

The normal list of professions mentioned by the informants included that of builders, traders, carpenters, workers, cooks, servants. Among completely new occupations of the muhagirin from wadi ’Amd and wadi Daw’was named the profession of car drivers, that was not character before the War.

 

From the beginning of the fifties along with the direct remittances to their relatives at home wealthy muhagirin, began to invest money in the local infrastructure – roads, hospitals, schools, etc.

 

Three main directions of the migration : 1) emigration abroad; 2) emigration into the big cities in South Yemen - Aden, Muk traditional micro migrations within the wadi Hadhramaut itself.

 

The West Indies - Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore – were the main migrant destinations before the WW II, meanwhile it was in the fifties, and Saudi Arabia faced the main flow of the muhagirin.

 

Another direction of migration was to the big industrial and trade centres of the country that was comparatively new for Hadhramaut, as the big cities before the war were used only as a transit point on the way to other countries.

 

 

The Hadhramis migrated to Singapore at the beginning of 19th century, mostly from Indonesia. They were wealthy immigrants and had considerable influence from their wealth, religious status and links/intermarriages with Malay royalty. The Hadhrami wealth was held in wakfs.

 

The Hadhramis of Singapore maintained links with the homeland by sending their children back to Hadhramaut for a period. The independence of South Yemen in 1967 and the decline of Hadhrami wealth in Singapore put a stop to this practice. This has resulted in the new generation not able to speak Arabic and not having a sense of affiliation to Hadhramaut.

 

 

This paper deals with the treatment of the Arabs, almost all Hadhramis, by the Dutch colonial administration as well as on the response of the Arab community and the issues that led to great indignation in Arab circles: the quarter system, the system of passes, and the immigration rules. The quarter system obliged vreemde oosterlingen to live in their own quarters in trading towns. In order to settle in the countryside one needed special permission. The system of passes meant that one had to request passes from the local authorities for traveling by land and by sea. Both systems seriously restricted the mobility of the Asian foreigners, who as traders were highly dependent on traveling from place to place. These regulations were deemed necessary to protect the material welfare of the indigenous population.

 

The restrictions were more strictly applied to the Hadhramis than to other vreemde oosterlingen, even though the Arabs only made up 6% of the total number of Foreign Orientals. There were three reasons for this. First, economically the Hadhramis were supposed to be more harmful than other groups. Secondly, the government feared their influence in religious matters. Thirdly, as supposed adherents of pan-Islamism, the Hadhramis could undermine Dutch authority. Although, these prevalent ideas were in no way in accordance with reality, they were detrimental to the Arab community.

 

 

Arab commercial superiority over Chinese and Europeans appears to have been briefly achieved in the 'Maluku zone' of eastern Indonesia, at least in Minahasa in the 1870s. The Hadhramis exploited a 'window of opportunity' which opened up in the 1850s and gave them a temporary advantage over other communities, notably for the sale of textiles and the purchase of peasant produce. But some features of Arab penetration of the 'Maluku zone seem not to fit the picture generally drawn of Hadhrami economic activity in Indonesia and Malaya. The prevalent tone of relations with other commercial communities was one of co-operation rather than hostility. The great majority of Arabs in eastern Indonesia appear to have had little interest in spreading Islam. This may have reflected the fact that the 'Maluku zone' was a frontier region. For all the ancient Arab historical connections with the fabled spice islands, the Hadhrami were obliged to 'recolonise' the region all over again in the nineteenth century. As newcomers, few in number, they stuck to specialities adapted to a rather remote and backward part of the Dutch colony, notably trade and shipping, and their lack of established bases forced them into close relations with other communities.

 

Although many Muslims of the Hadhrami diaspora eagerly embraced the reformist salafi ideas emanating from Egypt and Syria, it did not make much headway in the conservative metropolis. On the one hand, the reformist emphasis on the equality of all Muslims threatened the interests of the Hadhrami "noble" lineages, which consequently resisted its incorporation into the traditional Hadhrami Gedankenwelt. This resistance, aided by the policies of the Dutch and British colonial authorities of South East Asia geared to keeping in check anti-colonial agitation, frustrated the efforts of the reform-minded Hadhrami emigrants to graft reformist ideas onto the local religious discourse. In the struggle between the reformers and the conservatives, the cult of saints became a symbol of the old values as against the new world-outlook advocated by the Muslim modernists. The scholastic fray over the veneration of saints and their shrines obfuscated the underlying conflict between Hadhrami clans and interest groups.

 

 

 

The technological and political changes at the moment of the incorporation of India into the British Empire radically changed the rhythms of economic life in the Indian Ocean. These changes can be be summed up in terms of fire-power, modern capitalism, modern colonisation and the industrial revolution. The Hadhramaut is however a very small and statistically insignificant element in the Indian Ocean basin, and it is generally recognized that the Hadhramis made a disproportionately great contribution to the development of the Indian Ocean. The Hadhramis profited from the transformation of the Indian Ocean which resulted from the growth of the British Empire, while on the other hand their success can be traced back to the temporal extension of an outmoded way of life, only marginally modified to adjust to changed realities.

 

People from Hadhramaut played a significant and often neglected role in the profound alterations experienced during the nineteenth century economic boom in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Developments directly or indirectly linked to the introduction of the steamship were mainly responsible for these changes, notably in the aftermath of the opening of the Suez Canal In 1869. The rapid growth in the Muslim pilgrimage further shaped the region's economy, notably by setting off a construction boom in Jidda and Mecca. The demand for labour form maritime and urban jobs soared in highly unpredictable ways, necessitating a greater recourse to slave labour. The Hadhrami often captained sailing ships, and were employed in port related labour onshore. They were deeply involved in the Red Sea slave trade, including bringing slaves to Yemen from Zanzibar. The Hadhrami also accumulated capital in the coffee trade of Yemen. Hadhrami traders thus came to be among the wealthiest merchants and financiers in the Red Sea region. They challenged the predominance of Indians by the end of the nineteenth century, with the backing of the Ottoman and Egyptian authorities.

 

 

 

 

THE HADHRAMIS AND THE POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE LATE 16^TH CENTURY AND 19^TH CENTURY MALAY STATES

 

Most of the Arabs who are settled in Malaysia today trace their roots from Hadhramaut, a piece of land situated at the southern extremity of the Arabian Peninsula. Arabs of whatever origin, however, were perceived by Malays as the descendents of the Prophet, a genealogical link which elevated them to a noble ancestry, supernatural powers and an inherited missionary role. With this perception, the Arabs managed to gain the respect of the Malays, and this enabled them to play a prominent role, from the early days of their presence, in the politics and administration of the Malay states.

The political and administrative roles played by Arabs were noticeable in virtually all the Malay states, with their history of dominant involvement particularly evident in Kedah and Negeri Sembilan.

Apart from Kedah and Negeri Sembilan, the Arabs also played a significant role in the politics and administration of other Malay states.

The Arabs were actively involved during the Pahang rebellion (1891-1895) both in support and opposition to the intervention. The Arabs were also found to have been actively involved in Selangor’s politics., particularly when the Civil War of the 1870s in Kelang was fought between Tunku Kudin and Raja Mahadi.

Despite the fact that the Arabs had played an active role in the politics and administration of the Malay states, varying in intensity from one state to another, their role gradually reduced when the British administration in these states became increasingly dominant, following the intervention. Even though now Arabs are no longer an influential factor in the politics of the Malay Sultanates, compared to their role in the late 18^th and the 19^th centuries, they have managed to retain Perlis as the only Malay state where the Sultan is of Arab descent until to the present day.

 

                      -----------------------------------------------------

 

 

“NATURAL LEADERS OF NATIVE MUSLIMS: A PERSPECTIVE ON THE EMERGENCE OF ARABS IN COLONIAL JAVA”

 

While Dutch colonial travel and residential restrictions led to physically separate Arab enclaves the association of Arabs with Islam formed the basis of articulating an Arab culture. Not only did the association of Arabs with Islam shape Dutch policing of Arabs, it was also fundamental to Arabs’ very own efforts at creating a more exclusive culture self-definition.

As the 19^th century drew to a close, a leadership of the variegated communities classified as Arab arose from the corps of headmen, landowners, and wealthy traders in Java. Driven by a desire for education and progress, this leadership gravitated towards Istanbul, then the centre of Islamic civilization and modernity.

 The orientation towards Istanbul was only a precursor to complex developments in which the pattern of Arabs’ self-determination as leaders of native Muslims replaced itself. The construction of Arab culture by Arab elites directed Javanese Arabs away from their tendency towards hybridity in daily life, political ideas and religious beliefs. In this context, the challenge issued by members of the reformist Islamic organization Al-Irsjad to sayyid claims of a privileged social status ought not to narrowly viewed as a simple importation of tensions that historically existed in the Hadhramaut.

 

THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF HADHRAMI ARABS IN THE ‘MALUKU ZONE’ OF EASTERN INDONESIA c. 800 to c. 1914

 

Arab commercial superiority over Chinese and Europeans appears to have been briefly achieved in the ‘Maluku zone’ of eastern Indonesia, at least in Minahasa in the 1870. The Hadhramis exploited a ‘window of opportunity’ which opened up in the 1850s and gave them a temporary advantage over other communities, notably for the sale of textiles and the purchase of peasant produce. But some features of Arab penetration of the ‘Maluku zone’ seem not to fit the picture generally drawn of Hadhrami economic activity in Indonesia and Malaya. The prevalent tone of relations with other communities was one of cooperation rather than hostility. And finally, the great majority of Arabs in eastern Indonesia appear to have had little interest in spreading Islam. For all the ancient Arab historical connections with the fabled spice islands, the Hadhrami were obliged to ‘recognize’ the region all over again in the 19^th century.  

‘The Chinese and the Arabs’ is a recurring stereotype in the economic history of Indonesia in the 19^th century.

The Arab community of Indonesia, originating in its overwhelming majority from Hadhramaut, was numerically smaller than its Chinese counterpart, but van den berg pointed out as long as 1886 that Hadhrami merchants and financiers were at certain times and in certain places in a superior economic position to that of their Chinese colleagues. ¹

The ancient Arab commercial contact with the Maluku zone was greatly restricted by the Portuguese in the 16^th century, and even more by the Dutch United East India Company (VOC) in the 17^th century.

For all the growth of ‘legitimate commerce’ from around 1850, the involvement of Arabs in clandestine trade persisted in marginal areas beyond the effective reach of the Dutch authorities in the mid 1860s. Arabs were said to be closely associated with Bugis in a continuing vigorous slave trade in the Tomini Gulf, where there was no Dutch administrative presence beyond Gorontalo.

The Arabs were also active in the particularly lawless and chaotic frontier area of western New Guinea, where the Dutch official presence remained exceedingly weak for a long time.

For all the persistence of clandestine forms of trade, the real break-through for the Arabs came as a result of the slow and faltering growth of ‘legitimate commerce’. One of the effects of the British occupation of eastern Indonesia at the beginning of the 19^th century was to allow Arabs to settle once in places like Banda, at the heart of the former VOC monopoly.

The gradual liberalization of the economy from the late 1840s led to a great surge of Arab immigration into the Maluku zone. Many Arabs came initially for a trading season. Even when they became resident, they typically stayed only for few years before returning with their savings and being replaced by newcomers. ²

 

The key to Arab commercial penetration in the Maluku zone in 1850s was the development of steam navigation.

 

Textiles were by far the most important commodity sold by Arab traders in eastern Indonesia, and European made textiles in the 1880s were worth more than every other item put together in Arab sales throughout the archipelago.

The quality and pricing of textiles were crucial to Arab success in both Ambon and Manado, particularly in comparison to those which the Chinese obtained from Manila.

Hardly any mention is made of Arabs lending money in eastern Indonesia, even though the Hadhramis were reputed to be formidable moneylenders in java and elsewhere.

Shipping was another traditional Hadhrami activity, but the Arabs were severely shaken by the transition from sail to steam in the archipelago. The ‘golden decades’ were from the mid 1830s to the mid 1850s, when the mainly ‘European-rigged’ sailing ships of the Hadhrami had taken over a large proportion of the archipelago’s coastal carrying trade. But the diffusion of more efficient steamers posed a radical threat to this activity.³ The Arabs were further affected by the persistence of Dutch legislation banning entry of ‘European-rigged’ ships into small ‘native’ ports.

Pearling was closely linked to shipping in Arabian waters, so as it was not surprising to find Arabs active in this field. Arabs were similarly involved in the pearl banks off eastern Halmahera and western" New Guinea, where mother of pearl for the Paris market was especially important.

Fewer Arabs were employed in agriculture than seems to have been the case in the larger colonies of western Indonesia and the Malay peninsula. Arabs were almost certainly among the 'Foreign Orientals' who snapped up plantations put up for sale by banks which had been obliged to foreclose.

Arabs were equally little in evidence in what may loosely be termed the 'professions'. There is no evidence of any Arab having been a tax farmer or official, and this was generally true in Indonesia as a whole.

The relationship between Arabs and other commercial communities was sometimes portrayed by officiåTs as antagohistic_vThus, a Manado report for 1856 complained that 'sly Arabs' were taking over trade, at the expense of both Chinese and Europeans.

            

 

Official observers considered that there was much symbiosis between Arabs and other trading communities. Arab relations with the peoples of south-western Sulawesi, notably the Bugis, were particularly close, cemented by the strong Muslim faith of both parties. The Resident of Manado also stressed that Arabs co-operated closely with the Chinese in their trading operations in the 1870s. There was no significant différence between the prices at which Arabs and Chinese bought cocoa in the early 1880s, and much cocoa purchased by resident Arab traders was sold to Chinese merchants coming from Manila. Arabs joined Chinese traders, and indeed European ones, in calling for the pacification of the lawless marches of western New Guinea in 1888.⁴

 

Even Arab relations with European merchants appear to have been quite close. In 1875, the Resident of Ternate opined that the Arabs had good contacts with the European population, on whom many depended for their livelihood. The Resident of Manado in 1876 noted that the Arab traders cooperated some extent with Europeans, and that one Arab was purchasing tobacco not only for his countryman in Surabaya, but also for the European firm of Reis & Co. Arabs may also have been employed by Europeans, although examples this come from outside the Maluku zone.

The Arab position appears to have been eroded from the 1880s by the growth of Western enterprise, in context of revived Dutch imperialism and protectionism.

Non-European competition also became stronger from the early 1880s.

It is most unlikely, however, that there was any actual reduction in Arab economic activity in the Maluku zone. According to the statistics available, the number of Arab residents continued to grow substantially. Moreover, the Arab position in the trade of Ambon, Ternate and Gorontalo seems to have held up better than in that of Manado up to around 1920. The Arabs remained dominant in cloth sales until the late 1930s in Ternate and Ambon. And in 1929, it was a leading Arab of Ambon, al-Amudi, who made a prolonged attempt to make peace between the Alawi and Irshadi factions within the Hadhrami community in Indonesia.⁵

It may be that the Maluku zone was simply a raw frontier region. For all the ancient Arab historical connections with the fabled spice lands, the reality was that the Hadhramis were obliged to ’recolonize’ the region all over again in the 19th century. As newcomers, foew in number, they stuck to specialities adapted to a rather remote and backward part of the Dutch colony, notably trade and shipping. Their lack of established bases forced them into relations with other communities, for example when delaing with an unfamiliar product like cocoa, which was only consumed on any scale in the Philippines. But to test this hypothesis, it would be necessary to find other sources with which to investigate the history of the Arabs in eastern Indonesia in later years, when the community had become more mature.     

 

REFERENCES

1. Berg 1886, p. 134, For Pekalongan, see also Vudy 1985, pp. 106-9
2. Crab 1862, p. 53; ANRI, 30, 156, F Schenck MO 10 July 1873
3. Berg 1886, p. 148; Campo 1992, pp. 367;386
4. Campo 1992, p.194
5. Jonge 1993, p. 82

 

HADHRAMIS IN SINGAPORE

 

The Hadhramis migrated to Singapore at the beginning of the 19^th century, mostly from Indonesia. They were wealthy immigrants and had considerable influence from their wealth, religious status and links/intermarriages with Malay royalty. The Hadhrami wealth was held in wakafs. The Hadhrami status and wakafs diminished as a result of four factors; AMLA, Rent Control, Land Acquisition and professional trustees. 

 

The Hadramis of Singapore maintained links with the homeland by sending their children back to Hadramaut for a period. The independence of South Yemen in 1967 and the decline of Hadhrami wealth in Singapore put a stop to this practice. This resulted in the new generation not able to speak Arabic and not having a sense of affiliation to Hadhramaut. An identity crisis emerged among the Singapore Hadhramis and measures were taken in 1990s to tackle the identity crisis.

The Arab community in Singapore is virtually all made up of Hadhrami immigrants.

The economic conditions in Singapore and political conditions in Hadhramaut has resulted in the severance of the ties with Hadhramaut resulting in a loss of language and culture.

The British wanted to build Singapore into a cosmopolitan trade centre. The new Singapore was founded in 1819 by Sir Stamford Raffles, who hoped to attract the Arabs to Singapore. The Arabs had played a dominating role in Southeast Asian trade since the fourteenth century. By 1824, there were 15 Arabs out of the 10,683 inhabitants of Singapore. Raffles had anticipated a rapid growth in Arab immigrants into Singapore. His blueprint for Singapore included the provision for an Arab district.

The first Arabs to arrive in Singapore in 1819 were two wealthy merchants from Palembang inSuamtra.

Their numbers gradually increased and in 1846 there were five important Arab merchant houses. The Al-Junied family in Singapore grew to be a large wealthy influential family, along with the Al-Kaff, and Al-Saggoff.

One distinctive characteristics of Hadhrami immigration into Singapore was that it was a re-immigration from Indonesia rather than direct from Hadhramaut.

The Arabs in South East Asia, by the time they came to Singapore, already enjoyed respect as religious scholars who brought Islam to the Malays. An example of the influence and status the Hadhramis enjoyed in Singapore, is the publication of a monthly periodical in 1906; "AL-IMAM".

The founders, editors and writers of AL-IMAM were mainly of Hadhrami origin.

The Hadhramis in  Singapore  were substantial landlords, the large families had substantial properties held in wakafs.

 

The Hadhrami wakafs were substantial in value. Most of today's central business district real estate in Singapore was owned by Hadhrami families.

In present days one of the larger Arab family settlements (wakaf khas) is valued_at over SGD300 million. This value however does no justice to the extent of Arab wealth in the past, as Arab wakafs have lost considerable value due to Singapore government policy on land usage.

The Four Factors:

 

There has been four factors in the recent history which affected wakafs and undermined the status of the Arabs in Singapore. The first three factors are more substantial and have been a direct result of government policies. The first is; the enactment of the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA 1968).

The second factor to look at is the Rent Control Act 1947. Rent on pre-war properties were controlled, virtually froze. As Arab wakafs were mostly pre-war properties, income of Arab families diminished. The decline of income from the wakafs resulted in Arabs economic influence diminishing.

The third factor was the Land Acquisition Act.

The land acquisition Act empowered the government to acquire land required for urban renewal, and compensation was paid according to a predetermined formula. The government embarked on a major acquisition campaign in the 70s and 80s. Pre-war properties were the main target for acquisition as Singapore underwent a modernization program. These pre-war properties were subject to rent control and had tenants that could not be removed. The Wakafs were hence not in a position to develop these properties. Significant properties owned by Arab wakafs were acquired and minimal compensaiton paid. This eroded the Arab wealth and influence. It also diminished the Arab identity as substantial landlords. In the present day Singapore, the Arabs are no longer considered as main land owners. Many Singapore Arabs regard the land acquisition policy as the main reason for Arabs losing their status and identity as well. 

The fourth factor was having professional trustees manage the wakafs instead of fmaily members. Most of the large wakaf khas had problems of mismanagement or breaches of trust and legal disputes.

During the earlier period, in the heydays of Arab wealth, the Arabs in Singapore maintained close links with Hadhramaut. A lot of moneys were sent back to Hadhramaut. The wealthy Arabs of Singapore built homes in Hadhramaut. The Arabs in Singapore practiced sending their boys back to Hadhramaut for a period of time. This was meant to enhance their identity as Hadhramis and increase their affiliation to Hadhramaut. This practice ensured that the Arabs in Singapore mantain their culture and language. The effect of this practice is also evident in Hadhramaut where certain Malay words are used in colloquial Arabic spoken there. Hadhramaut was regarded, by the Singapore Arabs, as a cultural training ground. The elders viewed the period spent in Hadhramaut as the final preparation ground for manhood.The youth returned from Hadhramaut proud of their heritage and familiar with the culture. There is a well known saying among the Hadhramis; "Rouh albald gah rija'l ergahe imsak dokhan" (which means: go to the homeland become a man, return and take control of the shop). The saying best illustrates the sentiments of the practice.

During the Second World War the Hadhramis could not go back to Hadhramaut. After the war, the practice resumed. The Rent Control Act affected the wealth of the Singapore Hadhramis and it also signalled to them that income from tursts were semi frozen and it might not be sufficient for the furture generation. Families took a keener interest in educating their children. The wealthier families sent their children to London to study. Singapore also started an industrialization program and education became more important. The practice of spending time in the homeland resumed, though now more were working in Aden, instead of being in Hadhramaut all the period. The affiliation, culture link and language were still maintained.The 1960s saw a major change; by this time Arab wealth in Singapore had somewhat dwindled and was further diminished in the 70s and early 80s with the acquisitions. Independence in South Yemen in 1967 and the subsequent communist rule resulted in the stop of the Singapore Hadhramis going back to Hadhramaut. The improtance of English language and education became more and more significant in Singapore. The new generation of Hadhramis in Singapore did not speak Arabic and started to loose affiliation with Hadhramaut and lost their sense of identity.

 

The 70s saw the economic boom in the Middle East. The Singapore Arab youths started going to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States for employment.This has served in the same way as going back to Hadhramaut. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States had first generation Hadhrami immigrants. The Hadhrami traditions and culture were very visible among the Hadhrami community in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. The economic boom in Saudi Arabia slowed down in the 80s and cheap English educated workforce was being brought in from India, Pakistan and Philippines. At the same time in late 70s/early 80s Singapore was enjoying an economic boom. The Singapore youth therefore found it more beneficial to remain in Singapore rather than spend a few years in Middle East. By this time a lot of the Arab properties have been already acquired. The Arab wealth diminished through rent control, land acquisitions and the increased number of beneficiaries of wakaf khas. The Hadhramis could no longer fall back on their wakaf income and started to search for new careers.

 

The "homeland trips" i.e. the practice of returning to Hadhramaut ensured affiliation to Hadhramaut and also ensured that language was maintained. The political conditions in Hadhramaut, coupled with the decline of the Arab wealth in Singapore has put a stop to thia practice. The new generation, most of them have not been to the Middle East and do not speak Arabic. The sense of identity has also almost disappeared.

The Arabs in Singapore are currently facing an identity crisis. In 1986, the government, in an attempt to ensure Malay representation in the elected parliament, combined electorate constituencies, into a single large constituency called GLC.

The new Singapore government of the 90s had a genuine desire to involve the communities in the decision making process.

Certain members of the Arab community felt that the community needs to better organize themselves and establish their identity as an ethnic group in Singapore. The Arabs in Singapore have an  Association; AlWehdah, which by early 90s was losing appeal to the younger generation.

 

December 1991 saw the launch of a bi-monthly magazine for the Arab community in Singapore; "AlShorouq". The name AlShorouq, meaning the ’rising of dawn’ was chosen to imply that a new era has begun for the Arab community in Singapore. It was successful in tis mission among the younger generation but unfortunately for lack of funding the magazine ceased publication in November 1993. ¹

In early 1992, a Malay Language Singapore Television documentary program depicted Arabs as Malays.

The Hadhrami community in Singapore is now facing an identity crisis. The younger generation does not speak Arabic and lost affiliation with Hadhramaut. This is partly because the Hadhramis stopped the practice of sending their children back to Hadhramaut for a period. The Arab community and AlWehdah have recognised the lack of knowldege in Arabic language as a main factor in loosing identity. The challenge facing the Hadhrami community in Singapore is to ensure that the new generation maintain their identity. The link with Hadhramaut needs to be re-established and travel to Hadhramaut should be encouraged.

 

REFERENCE

1 AlShorouq was entirely funded by its founders and advertisements. The foundation and editors were Kaled Abed Talib, a journalist in his late 20s.

 

 

 

ARAB TRADERS AND LAND SETTLERS IN              THE GESER-GOROM ARCHIPELAGO

 

 

The Banda zone, of which, the Geser-Gorom archipelago is one small but structurally significant part.

 

The Moluccas have been part of the global trading system for something in excess of two thousand years, their high value commodities moving through the markets of South Asia to the Mediterranean and to the eastern markets of the north-western Pacific rim: China, Japan and Korea.

The Banda group is a key central place in the trading world of the Moluccas. Historically, it was the production point of most nutmeg and mace reaching the rest of the world, but it was also an important feeder for trade further eastwards. One of the key links (perhaps the key link) in the trading chain east of Banda was with the Southeastern tip of Seram and the off-shore Geser-Gorom archipelago. The significance of this trade has over the centuries attracted many groups of outside traders,including Arabs.

 

There is a long history of Arab contact with the Moluccas.

 

The most important change in the position of Arab traders on Banda, and one with permanent consequences, came with the second English occupation of 1810-17, following the annexation of the Netherlands to the Napoleonic empire. This resulted in ’the permanent settlement...of new and more numerous Chinese and Arab merchants from Surabaya and Batavia, Bombay and Calcutta, Bencoolen and Penang'. Whatever the precise demographic picture, late nineteenth century traveller's descriptions begin to indicate vividly the role of Arab traders. In April 1882, for example, on Neira, Anna and Henry Forbes viewed Bin Salen's bird of paradise and other New Guinea bird skins, which were being dispatched to the Paris markets, and who appeared also to run a religious school.             From this period onwards Arabs, and families of mixed Arab descent, became prominent in the non-European Bandanese elite.

There is no direct evidence of Arab traders operating eastwards of Banda before the late 19^th century, though it is quite plausible that they did so.     In the 19^th century various new ethnic groups - Bugis, Chinese, Butonese and Arabs began to operate in the Geser area.

 

The establishment of Geser as a stapling and administrative centre in the 1880s [Ellen 1987: 57]  marked a major change in the organisation of local trade, and was followed by the arrival of more Chinese and Hadhrami Arab migrants.  Present families of Arab descent in the Geser-Gorom archipelago are mainly a result of migration from the Hadhramaut at this time, or shortly afterwards.

We can identify several patterns of Hadhrami settlement and assimilation.  Firstly,  there are those families in the larger trading centres (such as Geser) who support themselves entirely through trade. Secondly, and outside the main trading centres, individual Arab males have married local women. In this way, Arab families have begun to take on the characteristics of indigeneous descent groups, or etar. The fact that most etar – non-Arab as well as Arab are represented as incomers of some kind in historical and mythic narratives in a sense serves to legitimate their status.

 

If traders of Arab descent in the Banda zone once had an obviously different niche in the market, or an immediately distinctive mode of operation, then this is no longer the case. At the present time, they operate using social networks which are largely indistinguishable from those used by the most important other local reference group, Chinese; and deal in much the same range of commodities. Apart from the residual traditional Arab dealing in pearls, they no longer feature in the trade in marine produce. As a group, they are economically less powerful than the Chinese, and tend to focus on smaller enterprises.  This, perhaps, has made them vulnerable, and more likely to move out of trade in part, or altogether, where opportunities arise.

It is, however, unusual for Indonesian Arabs to move out of intermediary trading in the way they appear to have done in Kwamar, but a possible explanation for it can be found in the economic and cultural strategies open to Chinese immigrants.

During the colonial period the communal participation of Arabs was constrained in ways which were relaxed following Indonesian independence.  Arabs were, in theory anyway, as "foreign orientals', subject to different judicial rules from local Muslims were subject until 1919 to a regime of required residence and were treated as a collectivity for certain administrative purposes.

The special status accorded to Arabs was abandoned with the post-independence era and most Arabs have additionally taken on Indonesian citizenship. Moreover,the period between 1900 and the Pacific War had already seen significant changes in Arab social consciousness in the context of the Netherlands East Indies. The old closed and hierarchical Hadhrami social order which had typified many immigrant communities during the 19^th century was replaced by a more open organisation in which orientation tended to be much more to the Indies than to the Hadhramaut. What has always made this process of reorientation easier, and what has in general facilitated cultural integration, has been adherence to Islam. Commonality of religion amongst natives and 'foreign orientals' was under-played in Dutch administrative arrangements - possibly quite deliberately - who preferred to use non-religious ethnic categories. Nevertheless, one of the enduring cultural consequences of the presence of the Arab migrant community in the Geser-Gorom area has been in the area of religious practices.

As in other parts of Southeast Asia, it is difficult to separate Muslim tradition from Arabic cultural practice, and of ten things Arabic introduced to indigenous Muslims were acceptable and encouraged because they were thought to be more authentically Islamic. Persons of Arabic ethnicity - particularly if they have the title sayid,  indicating them to be descendants of the Prophet - are often perceived as more religious and more fit for religious office.  So, in the Geser-Gorom area we find that families of Arab descent often provide the imam, even if the majority of the population is not ethnically Arab. We have already noted the situation in Kwamar where Arab families are dominant. However, in Geser also the imam is of Arabic descent (Al Hamid), and formerly this family also provided an ulama.

 

Religious position therefore brings status and power. The same cultural privilege extends to particular kinds of ritual practice, and throughout this area we find local evidence of Shia customs presumably a consequence of Arabic influence.

For these and other reasons of perceived ethnic similarity, Arabs, unlike Chinese, have had no particular difficulty in obtaining Indonesian citizenship, although they encounter the same bureaucratic obstacles and requirements for payment in the Police and sub-district offices. Intermarriage has been relatively easy, and anyway as a smaller group than the Chinese they were forced to marry into the local community to survive. Such advantages have provided Arabs with a security net which they can fall back on, and since, on the whole, Arab traders have less capital than the Chinese, this has often been important.  Apart from cash and stored goods, Arab capital generally takes the form of the shop itself and transport facilities. Different Arab families vary in the amount of capital they have.

Economically, therefore, Arabs are more vulnerable to economic decline in the intermediary trading niche. Their numbers are small, their ethnic-based networking consequently more precarious, with fewer opportunities to raise capital and ride out troughs in the business cycle. In a paradoxical way, their capacity to be absorbed into local indigenous populations has not provided them with the incentives to maintain the kinds of linkages and infrastructures required for a wholly trading way of life. In other words, opportunities to deploy cultural risk-reducing strategies have lessened the likelihood of _their engaging in intermediary trading activities as a sole means of livelihood. The community in Kwamar, therefore, presents us with, in every sense, an image of - to use Huub de Jonge's apposite phrase - 'a predominantly Indonesian-oriented group with an Arab signature'.

 

 

Bibliography

 

Ellen, R. F. 1983: Social theory, ethnography and the understanding of practical Islam in South-East Asia. In Islam in South-East Asia. 50-91, (ed.) Hooker, M. B. Leiden : E. J. Brill.

 

Forbes, H. O. 1885: A naturalist’s wanderings in the eastern archipelago : a narrative of travel and exploration from 1878 to 1883. London: Sampson Low, Martson, Searle and Rivington.

 

Hanna, W. A. 1978: Indonesian Banda: colonialism and its aftermath in the nutmeg islands. Philadelphia : Institute for the Study of Human Issues.

 

 

HADHRAMI SCHOLARS IN THE MALAY-INDONESIAN DIASPORA

A Preliminary Study of Sayyid Uthman

 

The Hadhrami diaspora in the Malay-lndonesian world has been a subject of several Studies. The most important among are L.W.C. van den Berg's classic study, Le Hadhramout et les Colonies Arabes dans l'Archipel Indien (l886);        Syed Mohsen al-Sagoff’s The Al-Sagoff Family in Malaysia, AH 1240 (AD 1824) to             AH 1382 (AD 1962) ; Mahayudin Haji Yahaya's Sejarah Orang Syed di Pahang             (l 984); Hisyam Ahmad's Masyarakat Keturunan Arab di Kota Pekalongan (1977); H.A. Talib's "Masyarakat Keturunan Arab di Pekalongan: Studi tentang Asimilasi" (1977); and C. Vuldy's Pekalongan, batik et Islam dans une ville du nord Java (1987).

 

It must be admitted, however, all of these studies paid attention mostly on the social, economic and political conditions of the Hadhramis in the archipelago. Some attention has been, given to their religious life in general, particularly with regard to their special position given their Arab origins, among the Malay-Indonesian Muslim population. Furthermore, so far as the Hadhrami religious life is concerned, some later studies are devoted to the so-called "sayyid and: non-sayyid" controversies among the Hadhramis.

 

Thus, it may seem surprising that there is no single study, so far, devoted to Hadhrami scholars (’ulama’) in the archipelago, particularly after the period of the 18th century, during which the emigration of the Hadhramis to this part of the world began to gain momentum. There is of course some mention of certain Hadhrami 'ulama’ in various studies mentioned earlier but they throw very little light on this matter. We have only very brief mention and very sketchy account of the presence and role of Hadhrami ‘ulama’ in the historical course of Islam in the archipelago.

 

 

Predecessors of Hadhrami ’Ulama’

 

The history of Hadhrami 'ulama^’ in the early course of Islam in the archipelago was obscure. Although there has been a lot of discussion on the role of the Arabs in the spread of Islam to this part of the world, there is no clear reference to the involvement of Hadhrami scholars, both in the conversion of the local population to Islam and in the development of Islamic learning in the area.

 

 

 

 

It is interesting to note that a Hadhrami scholar named Sayyid Zayn bin 'Abd Allah Alkaf as cited by Muhammad al-Baqir (1986:45) maintained that Hadhrami ’ulama', or more precisely preachers, played a crucial role in the spread of Islam in the archipelago. Alkaf asserted that most of the prominent early, preachers of Islam in Java, collectively, known as the "Wali Sanga" ("Nine Saints") were in fact Hadhramis. They included Mawlana Malik Ibrahim, Sunan Ampel, Sunan Bonang, Sunan Drajat, Sunan Giri, Sunan Kudus, and Sunan Gunung Jati. Hamka, the late chief of the Indonesian Council of the 'Ulama', who had a special interest in Islamic history, without mentioning the genealogical origins of some of the Wali Sanga also maintained that some descendants of Ahmad bin Isa al-Muhajir and Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Faqih al-Muqaddam were ’ulama' who played an important role in the preaching of Islam in the Malay-Indonesian world (Hamka,1983:406-7).

 

Considering the opposition of many Hadhrami scholars to Sufism, it is worth mentioning in passing that al-Faqih al-Muqaddam was the first sayyid to turn to Sufism in the early 7th/13th century. It is to him is ascribed an injunction to the sayyids to abandon arms for the pursuit of religious and moral aims, and from him the 'Alawi tariqah of which he is the qutb (pole), has continued to the present day (Serjeant, 1956:19).

 

Some of the Wali Sanga are known for their religious tendencies to Sufism; they even mixed it with local beliefs and practices. Though we are aware of the Arab origins of some of the Wali Sanga; but there is no hint whatsoever from other sources that they originated from the Hadhramaut. Local historiographies such as Hikayat Raja-raja Pasai, and Sejarah Melayu, for instance, do tell us about the Arabs who came to the archipelago to convert local rulers and their population to Islam; but they are said to have come from either Jeddah, Mecca or Baghdad, not from Hadhramaut (Azra, 1992: 35-8).

 

 

It is likely that Hadhrami scholars were yet not on the scene during this early history of Islam in the archipelago; or at least we do not have realiable accounts of their presence. In the 17th century, however Hadhrami scholars began to appear in the picture. The best known among them, though he was mostly regarded as a "Malay" scholar, was Nur al-Din bin Ali bin Hasanji al-Humaydi al-Aydarusi al-Raniri (d. 1068/1658). Al-Raniri was of course one of the most prominent ’ulama' in the whole archipelago in the 17th century; and he was also one of the most controversial ’ulama' with regard to his strong opposition to the so-called "Wujudiyyah" Sufism during his sojourn in the court of the Acehnese Sultanate (Azra, 1992: 346-484).

 

 

In the eighteenth century we encounter several Malay-Indonesian ’ulama’ of Arab stocks, though not necessariiy of Hadhrami origins. One of them, a leading ’ulama' of the period, was Sayyid Abd al-Samad bin Abd al-Rahman al-Jawi, better known as Abd al-Samad al-Palembani. Despite his sayyid title, Arabic accounts of his life mention no place of his origin (al-Ahdal, 1979: 138-42; al-Baytar, 1963:II, 851-2), but a Malay source asserts that his father was a Yemeni and his mother was a Palembang woman. With no explicit mention of his ethnic origin, we are on weak gound to say that al-Palimbani was a real Hadhrami. Like al-Raniri, al-Palimbani has attracted a great deal of attention from many modern scholars and, therefore, there is no need to repeat lengthy discussion on their life and thought here.

 

We have little information on Hadhrami scholars in the subsequent periods despite the fact that the migration of the Hadhrami in large numbers to the archipelago took place towards the end of the eighteenth century. As a result, they were able to establish some main "colonies" in Palembang, Pontianak, Batavia, Pekalongan, Surabaya, Sumeneg, Kedah, Melaka and Penang. Some of Hadhrami immigrants, who claimed to be sayyids, rose to important political positions in certain local courts in the archipelago (van den Berg, 1886: 104-22; de Vries, 1937: 145-7; Andaya, 1989: 44; Andaya and Ishii, 1992: 558).

 

Apart from their influence in the political field, it appears that there was no significant increase of the appearance of Hadhrami ’ulama^’ and, therefore, their role in developments of Islam in the archipelago. This should not be a surprise, since the most important aim of Hadhramis in general to come to this part of the Muslim world was to trade, not to preach Islam. In other words, the main motive to migrate was to improve their economic position and accumulate wealth.

 

Van den Berg has listed several names of Arab ’ulama’ from the end of the 18th century onwards, though not all of them were Hadhramis. The first Hadhrami ’ulama' was Sayyid Husayn bin Abu Bakr al-Aydarus who died in 1798 in Batavia where he taught for many years. It is reported that after his death he won a reputation as a man of keramat.

 

 

 

During his lifetime, it is also likely that Sayyid Husayn was visited by a great wandering Hadhrarni scholar, Abd al-Rahman bin Mustafa bin al-Aydarus. who died in Egypt in 1194/1780. He was a teacher of many young  ’ulama’ in the Middle East; and he travelled to many parts of the Muslim world, including the archipelago. Apparently he was not interested in spending his scholarly career and the rest of his life in the Malay-lndonesian world, and instead returned to the Middle East (Azra, 1992: 359). This is also the case of Sayyid Abd al-Rahman bin Abu Bakr al-Habshi who came from Hadhramout to Batavia in 1828 and returned to his homeland in 1853 (van den Berg, 1886: 163).

 

Another Hadhrarni scholar worth mentioning was Salim bin 'Abd Allah bin Sumayr. He came from Hadhramout via Singapore to Batavia in 1851. Like most other Hadhramis, his migration was mainly motivated by economic reasons. He had been living in Singapore for several years before he finally moved to Batavia where he died in 1270/1854. Ibn Sumayr gained his livelihood chiefly from trade; but he also spent his time in teaching and writing. One of his works was a little book entitled Safinat al-Najah which deals mostly with various regulations of the fiqh ibdah, that is, matters of prayers, fasting, Haj pilgrimage, etc. This book appears to have some popularity in the archipelago; it was among the books used in the pesantren (Islamic traditional boarding schools) in Java and Madura in the 19th century (van den Berg, 1886b).

 

Ibn Sumayr wrote a special work which was later expanded by Sayyid Uthman himself. But according to Sayyid Uthman, in this work Ibn Sumayr delineates not only some proper ways to enter tariqah, but also some distinctions between the true and false tariqahs. (Sayyid 'Uthman, n.d., [a]: 2-3; 1891: 9). As far as Sumayr's attitude to Sufism is concerned, he was apparently not content with only writing that book. He even carried some kind of "heresy hunting" against those who spread and preached tariqahs to common Muslims (van den Berg, 1886: 164; Snouck Hurgronje, 1886: 82). This reminds one of similar "heresy hunting" against the Wujudiyyah followers in Aceh during the time of al-Raniri's sojourn in the 17^th century.

 

 

 

 

SAYYID 'UTHMAN

(1238-1331/1822-1913)

 

 

Betawi Mufti and Adviseur Honorair: A Brief Biography

 

 

 

There is no doubt that the most prominent Hadhrami scholar in the archipelago in the late 19th and early 20th century was Sayyid ‘Uthman. His prominence lies not only in his extraordinary scholarly career but also in his important position in the Dutch colonial administration in the Netherlands East Indies.

 

According to his short biography, compiled from two other biographies, the Qamar al-Zaman and Suluh al-Zaman, which was published in 1353/1933, Sayyid 'Uthman was the Mufti of Betawi (Batavia) (Plano Sayyid ‘Uthman). There is no confirmation, however, whether or not his lofty religious position as “Mufti Betawi”, confirmed by the Dutch, was also recognized by other leading 'ulama’, especially Malay-lndonesian 'ulama’, in the period. Apart from that, he occupies a special place in the Dutch administration. He was an adviseur honorair to the Dutch East Indies government for the Arab affairs which in fact often included the native and Islamic affairs as well. He was a close friend of the famous Snouck Hurgronje; and the latter rightly claims that Sayyid was "een Arabisch bondgenoot der Nederlandsch Indische regeering (an Arab ally for the Netherlands East Indies government).

 

It was ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Misri who took over the responsibility to raise Sayyid ‘Uthman from the time his father returned to Mecca when he was 3 years old. Therefore, Sayyid 'Uthman acquired his early Islamic education from his grandfather.

 

After having studied in Mecca for 7 years, Sayyid ’Uthman returned to his land of origin, Hadhramout, where he studied with several leading 'ulama' such as Habib ’Abd allah bin Husayn bin Tahir, Habib ’Abd Allah bin ’Umar bin Yahya, Habib Hasan bin Salih al-Bahr, Habib 'Alawi bin Saqqaf al-Jufri and others. It is said that he spent most of his time for studying. On the request of one of his teachers he married a sharifah. But when some of his teachers died, he felt uneasy to stay longer in the Hadhramout. Thus he returned to Mecca and later went to Medina as well.

 

Like many ’ulama’ in the history of Islamic learning, Sayyid ’Uthman travelled a great deal.

 

Finally he returned to Batavia by way of Singapore in 1279/1862 where he spent the rest of his career and life.

 

 

The biographical accounts of Sayyid 'Uthman claim that the main purpose of his travels and sojourns in those countries was to pursue Islamic knowledge.

 

 

 

Returned to Indonesia, Sayyid ‘Uthman devoted his life to teaching, preaching and writing. After only three months in Batavia, he is said to be one of the most sought after teachers in Batavia.

 

Sayyid ‘Uthman was an ardent defender of the purity of the sayyid blood. In his work Kitab al-Qawanin al-Shar ‘iyyah li Ahl al-Majlis al-Hukmmiyyah wa al-Ifta‘iyyah (1312), Sayyid ‘Uthman strongly opposes the marriage between a sharifah and non-sayyid man, either Arab or non-Arab. Although a sharifah or his wali (guardian) is willing to marry a non-sayyid man, it is the obligation of all other sayyids to oppose that marriage, for a obligation of all other sayyids to oppose that marriage, for a sharifah is exclusively reserved for a sayyid ‘Uthman claims that all sayyids and ‘ulama’ in Mecca had declared that the marriage between a sharifah and a non-sayyid man was null and void; the couple involved in the marriage of this kind should be separated by force (fasakh). Sayyid ‘Uthman puts forward long arguments citing some hadiths and authorities among Hadhrami and ahl al-Bayt 'ulama’; that the marriage between a sharifah and a non-sayyid man is a humiliation to the Prophet Muhammad, his daughter Fatimah and their descendants. Therefore, all the AhI al-Bayt 'ulama' have ruled that it is absolutely unlawful (haram mutlaq) for non-sayyids to marry sharifah (Sayyid Uthman, 1312: 97-101).

 

The issue is not new and Sayyid 'Uthman's position on that is not unique either. According to Sarjeant, the kafa'ah issue was an old issue among the Hadhramis. All Hadhrami sayyids were united that there must be kafa’ah between sayyid couples; and wherever they went they sought to maintain their interpretation of kafa'ah (Serjeant, 1957: 21-3).

 

It appears that Sayyid Uthman was the first scholar who brings the issue of kafa’ah in the  discourse of Islam in the archipelago. His writing on this issue is the first found in Islamic literatures in the archipelago. Several studies devoted to the sayyid controversies among the Hadhramis, have failed to include Sayyid 'Uthman response to this particular matter.

 

Sayyid ‘Uthman was not a quietist. He was involved in various polemics with other scholarsin both religious and political matters. His strongest attack and criticism
were directed to Shaykh Isma’il al-Minangkabawi and Shaykh Sulaiman al-Affandi, both  lived mostly in Mecca, whom he held responsible for inducing common people to tariqahs; and he almost singles out the Naqshbandiyyah tariqah as having led Muslims astray.

 

Sayyid ‘Uthman was also very critical of the Wahhabis. He is reported to have written a special work in 1909 entitled l’ anat al-Mustarshidin ‘ala ‘ljtinab al-Bida’ fi al-Din, in which he condemns the Wahhabi religious teachings and attitudes. He describes Wahhabism as the most horrible firaq (splinter group).

 

 

 

 

According to a list of his works written by himself, he wrote around 100 works mostly in Malay, only a few of them in Arabic. Most of Sayyid ' Uthman's works are short treatises dealing with matters regarding fiqh-both ’ibadah (rituals) and mu 'amalah (religio-social matters like marriage, inheritance), kalam ("theology"), tawhid (knowledge on the Unity of God), (ethics), Sufism, "history" of some of the prophets, tafsir (commentaries) on certain chapters of the Qur’an), hadiths, du’a (supplication) and Arabic (Sayyid ’Uthman, n.d. [b]: 1-16; van den Berg, 1886: 165-7; Brill Catalogue, 1980; 1-6).

 

Van den Berg (1886: 164) claims that Sayyid ’Uthman was regardecl as a respected authority in the "shari’ah and kalam ("theology") not only by the Hadhramis but also by some Indonesian Muslims. It is difficult, however, to gauge the influence of Sayyid 

‘Uthman among Indonesian Muslims, or even among Hadhramis. One might wonder why he makes no mention at all of Sayyid ‘Uthman; it is unreasonable that he is unaware of Sayyid ‘Uthman’s scholarship and learning. Therefore, it is tempting to guess that there is some kind of bad feeling, even among the Hadhramis, to Sayyid ‘ Uthman because of his collaboration with the Dutch East Indies government.

 

Sayyid ‘Uthman was officially appointed by the Dutch as an " adviseur honorair voor Arabische zaken”. His appointment to this post was undoubtedly recommended by Snouck Hurgronje who appeared to have known him well before this Dutch scholar came to Indonesia.

 

 

 

Political Attitude

 

The accomodationist attitude of Sayyid ^’Uthman to Dutch government is not a unique phenomenon. Many important works on the Hadhramis have shown that the Hadhramis in the Dutch East Indies were generally favorable to non-Muslim rule over Muslim lands, including even their own homeland or Hahdramout. The Hadhramis in the Dutch East Indies ignored Dutch oppression of the indigenous Muslims as long as their interests were not in jeopardy.

Van den Berg has a long list of Hadhrami leading sayyids who supported the Dutch in their attempts to suppress various riots and rebellions among local Muslims throughout the  Indies.They included Sayyid ’Abd al-Rahman bin Abu Bakr al-Qadri in Sumba, Sayyid ’Abd al-Rahman bin Hamid al-Qadri in Banjarmasin, Sayyid ’Abd Allah bin Mansur al-’Aydarus in Batavia, Sayyid Abu Bakr in Palembang, and Sayyid 'Urnar al-Habshi in Surabaya. They in many cases were awarded honorary titles from the Dutch for their service (van den Berg, 1886: 180-2).

But there are  a few Hadhrami leaders who supported their Indonesian co-religionists in their conflicts with the Dutch. The best known among them was Sayyid ’Abd al-Rahman bin Muhammad al-Zahir in Aceh. After carrying a series of long diplomatic attempts to protect the survival of the Acehnese Sultanate, he finally surrendered to the Dutch (Reid, 1972: 37-59: Alexander, l 880: 1008-20) But his support to the cause of the Acehnese was opposed by another Hadhrami, Sayyid Muhammad bin Abu Bakr 'Aydid. He rendered a great service for the Dutch in their wars againts the Acehnese.  ’Aydid later moved from Aceh to Batavia, where he was appointed as an "Arab captain"; and in 1877 Dutch government awarded him with honorary titles of "mayor" and "pangeran" (van den Berg, 1886: 180).

Thus the accommodationist attitude of Sayyid 'Uthman has its historical precedent. Not only that, Snouck Hurgronje argues that Sayyid ’Uthman erudition in Islamic learning to accept the non-Muslim colonization of Muslim countries. Sayyid ’Uthman even regarded it as a historical necessity.

Another reason of Sayyid ’Uthman's accommodationist attitude is given by ’Ali bin Sayyid ’Uthman. He maintains that one of his father's main concerns was the prevention of political disruption and maintenance of law and order (Ali bin Sayyid  ’Uthman, 1343/1924:21). Therefore, it is not surprising that Sayyid  ’Uthman does not sanction rebellion and wars (jihad) against the Dutch.

The strong opposition of Sayyid 'Uthrnan to jihad was timely indeed. It is worth recalling that during the later part of the nineteenth century, the appeal for jihad against the Dutch was gaining momentum resulted from the intensification of Islamic feeling among Indonesian Muslims. One of the peaks of the intensification was the so-called "the peasants' rebellion of Banten" in 1888. Kartodirdjo has convincingly shown that one of the main factors of the Bantenese jihad was the religious revival in the area indicated by the ever growing numbers of hajjis who spread Sufi tariqahs and established pesantrens after their return from pilgrimages to their villages (Kartodirdjo, 1966).

It is not very clear whether or not in response to the Bantenese jihad that Sayyid ’Uthman in his work entitled Minhaj al-Ustiqamah fi al-Din bi al-Salamah, published  in 1367/1889-90, touched the issue of jihad. But he explicitly points out that jihad as carried out in Banten was a ghurur (misunderstanding) the true teaching of Islam; the real meaning of jihad had misunderstood by what , he calls "orang-orangyang yang jahil pada bab jihad" (ignorant people on the matters of jihad}. As a result, they believed that jihad they had launched was in accordance with Islamic teachings on holy wars. In fact, what they did, according to Sayyid 'Uthman, was not true jihad, but was simply disruption and disorder of peaceful life (Sayyid ’Uthman, 1890: 24-5).

In Sayyid ’Uthman’s view, jihad which had been launched by these ghurur Muslims led only to the misery of the whole population both individually and socially. What they had been done was not sanctioned by the true teachings of shari ’ah about jihad. They even had dishonored the purity of Islam. He even goes lurther to accuse those who waged holy-wars following the shaytan (evil), for they had discredited the true and genuine teachings of Islam by launching  jihad withoul fulfilling its necessary requirements. The  shari ’ah has laid down that there are several requirements and conditions. If all of the requirments are not met then the jihad is unlawful (Sayyid ’Uthman, 1890: 24).

Based on this arguments, Sayyid 'Uthman explicitly points out that political disorders and rebellions in Cilegon (Banten) and Bekasi were not jihad or perang sabil (holy wars). On the contrary they contradicted the precepts of the shar ’ah. For that reason, those who were involved in this kind of jihad were subject to severe punishment from legal authorities. Here Sayyid ’Uthman cites a case in Jeddah in 1858, where the ruler punished a number of Muslims who were held responsible for the killing of some Christians in the name of (unlawful) jihad (Sayyid ’Uthman, 1890: 24).

Sayyid ’Uthman further argues that none of many great ’ulama^’ either of Arab origin who came to the archipelago or of Javanese and Malay origins from the time immemorial several hundred years ago said anything about jihad. Despite their erudition in Islamic teachings, they did not teach Muslims in this region to wage jihad againt the unbelievers. What they did teach was to how to perform correctly all the obligatory rituals of lslarn and to conduct marriage and division of inherintance according to the shari ’ah. If Muslims fully follow the teachings and examples of these great ’ulama' then they would live a happy life (Sayyid 'Uthman, 1890: 25).

So why was Sayyid ' Uthman so bitter to Muslims who opposed the rule of the unbelievers-in this case, the Dutch - by launching  jihad. Snouck Hurgronje insists that the reason is that like other Hadhrami sayyids, Sayyid ’Uthman committed himself only to the strict rules of the shar ’ah (Snouck Hurgronje, 1886: 78). But it is also clear that Sayyid 'Uthman understands and propagates the shari'ah in a more strict sense. In his view, shar ’ ah concerns only with Islamic rituals; like his close friend, Snouck Hurgronje, he disengages any political connotation from the shar ’ah.

But does this mean that Sayyid 'Uthman was a or non-political person? His personal stand in the issue of unbeliever rulers and of jihad makes it clear that he was not a non-political person at all. In other words, he was not indifferent so far as political issues are concerned.

This is also obvious in his response to the phenomenal rise of the Sarekat Islam (Sl-lslamic Association), the first Islamic proto-nationalist movement in Indonesia, which was founded in 1911. For some, Sayyid 'Uthman's response to the Sl might be surprising. Sayyid 'Uthman was or could be a close ally of the Dutch, but he did not make it secret that he was also an ardent defender ofthe Sl which was, from its  establishment, a challenge or even a real menace to the colonial political and economic status-quo. But one might still wonder, why Sayyid 'Uthman defended the Sl so passionately. Does it have something to do with the fact that among the original supporters of the Sl were Arab merchants?

Sayyid 'Uthman wrote at least two works specially devoted to defending the Sl from its opponents: Sinar Isterlam pada Menyatakan Kebenaran Syarikat Islam (16pp), and Selampai Tersulam pada Menyatakan Kebajikan Syarikat Islam (8pp), both written in 1331. It seems that he wrote the Selampai Tersulam first, since his arguments in it are concise. In contrast, he provides a quite extensive religious arguments in the second work.

As explained in his introduction to the Sinar Isterlam , he wrote this work as a response to questions posed to him, or more properly, allegations made by some people against the Sl. There are three allegations; firstly, that the Sl has religiously gone astray; secondly, that the Sl (members) drank the Christian water (sic), or followed the way of the Christians; and lastly, that the Sl created only evils among the population. With respect to these allegations, Sayyid ’Uthman was asked to give religious consideration (Sayyid ’Uthman, 1331 a: 2).

Sayyid ’Uthman maintains that the rise of the Sl was in accord with Islamic injunctions for one of its aims was to enjoin people to do good and prevent them from evil. It was an organization of mutual help (ta awun). There is is nothing in the Sl that would lead Muslims to crimes and evils. And the statute of the Sl was also in agreement with government regulations. He concludes that those Muslims who understand Islamic teachings properly would happily accept the SI; only wicked people who would give the Sl bad name (Sayyid ’Uthman, 1331b: 4-6).

Moreover, Sayyid ‘Uthman devotes a substantial part of the sinar isterlam to providing religious arguments based on the Qur'an and hadith in his defense of the Sl. For instance, he cites a verse of the Qur'an, ta’ ‘awan 'ala al-birr wa al-taqwa to support his argument that the Sl was a vehicle for mutual benefit among Muslims. Thus, the Sl was an implementation of Islamic teachings. Becoming more critical to to the opponents of the Sl, Sayyid ‘Uthman maintains that the allegations against the Sl were not based on proper understanding of Islam, but from kejahilan (ignorance). Those who accused the Sl of evil were, in his opinion, deadly wrong (Sayyid 'Uthman, 133 1a: 4-5, 10).

As for the allegation that the Sl had followed the Christians, Sayyid ’Uthman cites a famous hadith of the Prophet Muhammad which states that those who accuse other Muslims of being unbelievers (kafir), then it could be themselves were kafirs (Sayyid ’Uthman, Ibid: 11).

In his fervent defense of the Sl, Sayyid ^’Uthman concludes that the rise of the Sl had resulted, firstly, in the intensification of practical implementation of Islamic teachings, that is, more people performed prayers and other obligatory rituals; secondly, in the establishment of more buildings devoted for religious purposes and more Muslim shops; and lastly, in the decrease of thieves and robberies. Finaliy, he prays for the longlasting life of the Sl and the improvement of its good deeds (Sayyid ’Uthman, 1331a: 12; 1331b: 8).

 

 

Bid’ahs: Opposition to Local Beliefs and Practices

As suggested earlier, Sayyid 'Uthman possesses religio-intellectual tendencies of being a very shari’ah-oriented ’alim, or  even a puritanist scholar. One may also clearly see this in the bibliography of his works; a good part of his works deals with the intricacies of the shari’ah, or more precisely fiqh. But as a puritanist, Sayyid 'Uthman concerns not only with the fiqh, but also with the fundamentals of Islamic belief (’aqidah).

With these distinctive characters, it is not surprising therefore that Sayyid ’Uthman was also a bitter enemy of all things he considered (wicked, unlawful) bid ’ahs (religious innovation) (Cf. Fierro, 1992). He strongly condemns a good number of Muslim beliefs and practices, either originated from additional Islamic practices or from local traditional beliefs and practices. For this purpose he devotes a long section of his Minhaj al-lstiqamah.

 

The starting point of Sayyid ’Uthman's opposition to various kinds of unwarranted bid'ahs - to be explained shortly - is the obligation for Muslims to follow the correct and true path of the Prophet Muhammad in every act of their religious rituals and devotion. He points out that by following (mutaba ’ah) the Prophet, Muslims will keep themselves apart from all unacceptable bid'ahs. Mutaba'ah to the Prophet will prevent Muslims from going astray (Sayyid 'Uthman, 1890: 6-10).

The Sayyid 'Uthman cites a famous hadith of the Prophet: kull bid’ah dalalah fi al-nar, every bid' ah is error and every error is in hell. Then he dwells on explaining that those who created bid'ahs are condemned by God, angels and pious people and that their works (’amal) would not be accepted by God and, as a result, he would be put in hell. Sayyid 'Uthman goes further to quote Shaykh Muhammad Arshad al-Banjari, a leading Malay-lndonesian 'alim in the 18th century, who in his book Tuhfat al-Raghibin points out that the people of bid’ah (ahl al-bid ’ah) are the most wicked creation on earth (Ibid: 12).

Before we go much further on Sayyid 'Uthman's condemnation of Muslims who practised bid'ahs it is important to delineate his detailed exposition of various kinds of bid' ahs. Unlike the widely held distinction among Muslims that bid'ahs are of two kinds, that is, bid ’ah hasanah (good or lawful innovation) and bid ’ah dalalah (wicked or unlawful innovation), Sayyid 'Uthman divides bid'ahs into five kinds.

The first is the forbidden bid'ahs (bid ’ah yang haram) which will lead those Muslims who practised them to unbelief (kufr) and heresy (murtad). The bid'ah haram includes every innovation or addition to Islamic rituals that contradicts the Qur'an, hadith, ijma’(consensus) and athar (practices) of the companions and successors of the Prophet Muhammad (Ibid: 14).

The second is the reprehensible bid'ahs (bid ah yang makruh), that is, all practices that are makruh according to the shari'ah. Citing the Fath al-Mubin of Ibn Hajar, Sayyid 'Uthman points out that among bid ’ahs of this kind is decorating mosques or the Qur'an with artistic flowery motives and the like.

The third is the permissible bid ‘ahs (bid ‘ah yang mubah). The bid ‘ah of this type includes having delicious meals or drinks, or widening the sleeves of one’s shirt. All these practices, according to Sayyid ‘Uthman, did not exist during the Prophet’s lifetime; and it is permissible for Muslims to enjoy delicious meals or drinks, or to widen the sleeves of their shirts (ibid: 15-6).

 

The fourth is the recommended bid ‘ahs (bid ‘ah yang sunnah) which, in Sayyid ‘Uthman’s view, are the same as the bid ‘ah hasanah. Among bid ‘ahs of this kind are establishing waqf houses for the Sufis and seekers of knowledge; and other good deeds that were not practiced during the time of the Prophet (Ibid: 16).

The last is the obligatory bid ‘ah (bid’ ah yang wajib). Sayyid ‘Uthman argues that this type of bid ‘ah is among the fard al-kifayah (collective obligation) of Islamic devotion and rituals. The bid ‘ah wajib includes deeds like studying the ‘ilm alat such as Arabic grammar for the purpose of understanding the Qur’ an; opposing the ahl al-Bid ‘ahs such as the Qadrites, Jabrites, Murji’ites, and the Mujassimites (Ibid:17).

 

In Sayyid ‘Uthman’s discourse of the bid’ahs is his long list of a great number of the bid ‘ah haram. He even devotes  a special chapter of the work to give detailed examples of the forbidden bid ‘ahs which were (and some still are) practiced by some Muslims in the archipelago. Sayyid ‘Uthman’s accounts of the bid ‘ah haram; is a reflection of the prevalence of un-Islamic beliefs and practices among Muslims in the Malay-Indonesian world during his time.

 

What is interesting in Sayyid ‘Uthman’s list of the forbidden bid ‘ahs is the absence of such hotly debated issues- whether or not they are bid ‘ahs – in the subsequent periods of Islamic history in the archipelago especially among the “modernists” (represented by the Muhammadiyah) and the “traditionalists” ( represented by the Nahdatul ‘Ulama-NU) as the qunut (additional supplication in the Subh prayer), the talqin (teaching the newly buried Muslim how to answer questions posed by angels in his burial place), or the number of rak ‘ah (sections in the prayer) of the Tarwih prayer. So far his discussion of the bid ‘ah haram is concerned, Sayyid ‘Uthman’s main objective is to purify Muslims’ ‘aquidah from any mixture with un-Islamic beliefs, which can result in the associationism of God (shirk). And, shirk is ofcourse one of the cardinal sins in Islam.

 

 

 

The Ahl al-Tariqah : Criticism to Sufism

 

As a puritanist Sayyid ‘Uthman has a very strong reservation, not to say opposition, to Sufism. Even in many of his writings he devotes pages and pages to criticizing people who claim themselves or are regarded by others as the ahl al-tariqah-people of mystical brotherhoods. In the Minhaj al-Istiqamah, for instance, he argues that people who claim to be the ahl al-tariqah are in fact ahl al-bid ‘ah. And he includes them in his of forbidden bid ‘ahs (Sayyid ‘Uthman, 189:48).

 

One should not be surprised by Sayyid ‘Uthman’s attitude to Sufism. Several studies have shown that many Hadhrami scholars in their diasporas, particularly in the Indian sub-continent and the Malay-Indonesian archipelago were opposed to Sufism as understood and practiced by local Muslims. They considered Sufism that was practiced by local Muslims. They considered Sufism that was practiced by local Muslims as ‘unorthodox’ or even ‘heretical’ (Eaton, 1978:127-9: Azra, 1992:356-7).

 

Sayyid ‘Uthman, however, more than any other Hadhrami scholars in the archipelago in his times, was indeed a bitter enemy  of what he called orang yang mengaku ahli tariqah (people who claim to be the adherents of the tariqah). This attitude may originate from his genuine leaning to a more pristine and shari ‘ah-oriented Islam in the strict sense mentioned earlier. In other words, he could have inherited a long-held tradition among many Hadhrami scholars of opposing Sufism which they regarded as being contradictory to the Shari’ah teachings.

It is clear that Sayyid ‘Uthman’s attitude to tariqahs is that of puritanist one. His emphasis on the importance of thorough knowledge of Islam and total commitment to the shari’ ah before one enters the tariqah is not new in the whole history of Islamic mysticism. But it is important to note that the tone of his language is by and large very harsh. His insistence on what he calls orang jahil pada tariqah (ignorant people on the matter of tariqah), or more appropriately suspection of Sufi shaykh for being only pseudo-sufi seems to be overemphasized.

 

So far his attitude Sufism is concerned, Sayyid ‘Uthman asserts that Muslim predecessors in Jawi lands, who had more understanding of and more commitment to Islamic teachings, had never taught tariqahs, nor claimed themselves as having entered them (Sayyid ‘Uthman, 1891: 16). Sayyid ‘Uthman was wrong in this respect; most of Malay-lndonesian 'ulama before his time were sufis and propagators of the tariqahs. In fact, they were the first scholars who introduced a more-shar ‘ah oriented Sufism in the archipelago (Cf. Azra, 1992).

 

Sayyid 'Uthman might be one of the most controvereial figures in the history of Islam in the archipelago. Apart from his accomodationist political position vis-a-vis the Dutch, his contribution to Islamic discourse in the region can not be ignored. Sayyid ’Uthman was among the leading exponents of Islamic reformism (tokoh gerakan pembaharuarn) in Indonesia in the late 19th century. His "reformism" lies of course in his ceaseless attacks on what he regards as bid ’ahs and un-shar ’ah tariqahs.

 

 

      

 

 

 

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

- Ahmad, Hisyam, 1977, “Masyarakat Keturunan Arab di Kota Pekalongan”, Bandung: Lembaga Kebudayaan Universities Pajajaran.

 

- Andaya, Barbara W., 1989, “The Cloth Trade in Jambi and Palembang Society during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, Indonesia, 48: 24-44.

 

- Hamka, 1983, Hamka Membahas Soal-soal Islam, eds. H. Rusjdi & Afif, Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas.

 

- ’Ali bin Sayyid ’Uthman, 1343/1924: 3-5; Piano Sayyid ’Uthman.

 

- Haikal Husain, 1986, "The Incident of Sala (Syekh Ahmad Syurkati and Sayyid's Leadership".

 

- de Jonge, Huub, 1993, "Discord and Solidarity among the Arabs in the Netherlands East Indies 1900-1942", Indonesia, 55: 73-90.

 

- van den Berg, L.W.C., 1886, Le Hadhramout et les Colonies Arabes dans l'Archipel Indien, Batavia: Imprimerie du gouvernement.

 

- al-Sagoff, Syed Mohsen, n. d., The Al-Sagoff Family in Malaysia, AH 1240 (AD 1824) to AH 1382 (AD 1962), Singapore: Mun Seong Press.

 

- (Snouck Hurgronje C., 1886, “Een Arabisch Bondgenoot der Nederlansch-Indische Regeering”, Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 14-16 October; repr. In Mededeelingen van wege het Nederlandsche Zendelinggenootschap, 31 (Rotterdam, 1887); and in Verspreide Geschriften, IV1, Bonn & Leipzig; Kurt Schroeder, 1924, 69-85.

 

- Yahaya, Mahayudin, 1984, Sejarah Orang Syed di Pahang, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka.     

 

THE TARIQAT AL-‘ALAWIYYA AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE SHI ’I SCHOOL IN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA

 

The recent emergence and current development of the Imami Shi ‘i school in Indonesia and Malaysia can only be understood against the backdrop of the early history of the Shi ‘a, as well as that of the history of the Islamization of the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago. The common factor that binds these three historical processes together in a remarkable case of “conversion” within islam is the ‘alawiyya sufi orfer (al-tariqat al-alawiyya).

The tariqat al-alawiyya is the path of the bani ‘alawi sada. The ‘alawi sada (sing. sayyid), of the Shafi ‘i madhab (school of jurisprudence), originate from the Hadhramaut, Yemen and played a major role in the Islamization of East Africa, Southern India, and the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago. The sayyids of Hadhramaut share a common history with the Shi ‘i school and to some extent it is this commonality that caused Shi ‘i elements and tendencies among the ‘alawiyyin to resurface, particularly after the Iranian Revolution of 1978. Today, the descendents of Hadhrami sayyid immigrants throughout the Malay-Indonesian world continue to play a role in the religious life of the region. With this in mind, it is important and interesting to observe that the ‘alawiyyin ‘ulama’ in particular and community in general is becoming differentiated into a number of orientations vis a vis the Shi ‘i school. To date, the literature on Islam in Indonesia, Malaysia and the rest of the region has not taken note of this phenomenon, with the exception of a few journal articles and a handful of newspaper and magazine items. Even then, these works falsely labour under the assumption that the rise of the Shi ‘i school in the region is symptomatic of the current wave of Islamic fundamentalism, being a result of the establishment of a Shi ‘i republic in Iran in 1979. It would be more accurate to say that the Iranian revolution had resulted in whatever Shi ‘i tendencies that had already existed among the ‘alawiyyin of the Malay world being articulated with greater clarity, fervour and sense of mission.

The Origins and Development of Shi ‘a Islam            

The division of the umma into its Sunni and Shi ‘i branches emerged originally as a result of irreconcilable political differences over the succession of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and the leadership of the community. It is only much later that further differences in terms of belief systems, philosophy and jurisprudence emerged.

There are several theories on the rise and early development of Islam, their propounders being Muslims as well orientalists, historical materialists, and a number of other Western scholars.

The Muslim explanations of the origins of early Islam broadly fall into two groups, the standard Sunni and Shi ‘i¹ versions. In addition, there are also critical accounts that are based on both Sunni and Shi ‘i sources.

Apart from standard Muslim perspectives, modern scholars of Islam have also attempted to account for the rise and early development of Islam. Many of these theories locate the rise of Islam around the theme of Mecca as a centre of caravan trade in the Arabian Peninsula.

Whatever the role of trade, ecology and various sociological factors in the rise and subsequent development of Islam, it is equally plausible to view these developments in Khaldunian terms, for which the concept of ‘asabiyya is of paramount importance.

 

Sunni and Shi ‘a : Principle Divergence

 

Muslim scholars and laymen alike are often quick to point out that the differences between the ahl al-sunna wa al-jama ‘a and the Shi ‘a are minor and that both groups co-exist in Muslim brotherhood (ukhuwa al-islamiyya). While this form of brotherhood is true historically as well as at the present, this must not lead us to underestimate the differences in philosophy and outlook between the two.

The Subbu-Shi ‘i divide is perceived in terms of jurisprudence and the principles of jurisprudence and in fact, this is the area where the differences between the two are the least. Thus, it is important not to reduce the ahl al-sunna and Shi ‘a to schools of jurisprudence (madhahib) as if they differ along only on these lines.

In fact the principle divergences between the Sunni and Shi ‘a exist across the whole spectrum of the belief system. While the initial differences concerned notions of justice and the question of succession, the two groups that evolved separately as a result of these differences developed distinct traditions in political theory, philosophy, theology, mysticism, and jurisprudence.

The ‘aquida can be utilized as an organizing principle with which we may develop comparative dimensions to view the Sunni-shi ‘a divide. In a more restricted sense, ‘aquida refers to article of faith, the formulation of doctrine or dogma, or even a formula that seeks to define the stance of a scholar or individual usually with respect to theological issues. In a more general sense, ‘aquida refers to epistemological and other philosophical issues and, therefore, approximates the total outlook or belief system of a individual or school. This would of course, be in keeping with the modern rendition of ‘aquida as ideology, at least in the Arabic language.

          

 

 

 

The Sunni and Shi ‘i ‘aqaid, therefore, differ across the whole spectrum of doctrines, concepts, theories and rulings.

 

Of paramount importance is the question of historical consciousness. The event of the Saqifa, the murder of Sayyidna ‘Ali, and the tragedy of Karbala are historical events about which Muslims cannot be neutral. The average Sunni is unaware of these events and, therefore, lacks an historical dimension to the question of justice and truth in Islam. What has prevailed or truth is that which is held by the majority (ahl al jarma'a). The degree to which this historically early majority were ahl al-sunna as well is a matter of contention from the           Shi ‘i point of view. The proclamation of majority status by those claiming to adhere to the sunna of the Prophet resulted in the definition of historical reality through silence and falsification, it has been claimed. As standard Sunni interpretations of early Muslim history took root, their legitimacy was boosted by the fact that these views were held by the majority. This reminds us of Alexis de Tocqueville's theory of democracy where he spoke of the tyranny and degradation of the majority.

 

The different notions of justice and truth are also reflected in the political theories to which the Sunnis and Shi ‘as subscribe, that is, the theory of the caliphate (khilafa) on the one hand and the theories of imamate (imama) and wilayat al-faqih on the other.

 

There are, of course, the well-known differences in the areas of jurisprudence and its principles, concerning the five schools as well as the question of madhab ahl al-bayt.

 

Concerning the rational and intellectual sciences (al-‘ulum al-'agliyya), namely kalam (theology), falsafa (philosophy), and tasawwuf (sufism), the Sunni and Shi ‘a fall into different categories as well.

 

In philosophy, the Sunni tend to be mashsha ‘in (Peripatetic, dedudionist), whereas the Shi ‘a tend to be ishraqi (illuminationists), combining rational deduction (istidlal) and demonstration (burhan) with asceticism, mystical experience, purification of the soul, and experiential wisdom (hikmat                     al-dhauqi).

 

In theology, the Sunnis tend to be either mu ‘tazila or followers of Ash ‘ari. The Shi ‘a belong to their own school of theology, while borrowing from the             mu ‘tazila.

 

In tasawwuf, the tariqa is seen by the Sunnis as irfan, involving a near total rejection of rational deduction while the Shi ‘a combine rational deduction and the Sufi spiritual path (tariqa).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From Imam to Sayyid: The Tariqat al-‘Alawiyya, the Islamization of the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago

 

Having observed the differences between the Sunni and Shi ‘a Islam in terms ‘aqida, we are now in a better position to locate the tariqat al-'alawiyya in Shi ‘i history and in the history of Islam in the Malay world.

 

 

The persecution of the descendants of the Prophet during Umayya and ‘Abbasiyya times led to their retreat from political activism. One of the members of the House of the Prophet (ahl al-bayt) , Imam Ahmad b. ‘Isa b. Muhammad b. ‘Ali al-Uraydhi b. Ja ‘far al-Sadiq, also known as Ahmad al-Muhajir, left Basra as a result of persecution by the Karmathians (Qaramita) in 317 AH, with the aim of performing the haj in Mecca. He was finally able to perform the haj in 318 AH/ 930 AD, after which he went to Yemen with his second son ‘Ubaydallah and two descendants of Imam Musa al-Kadhim, Salim b. Abdallah and Muhammad b. Sulayman.²

 

Finally, in 340AH/952AD, Imam Ahmad al-Muhajir settled in Hadhramaut which at that time, according to Hadhrami accounts, was dominated by the ‘Ibadhia. Imam Ahmad, with the support of the inhabitants of Wadi Dau 'an, sympathizers of the ahl al-bayt, began the process of conversion of Hadhramaut to the Shafi ii school.

 

Most Hadhrami Sayyid ‘ulama’ maintain that Imam Ahmad belonged to the Shafi 'i school. Nevertheless, there had been some debate in this century between ‘Alawi b. Tahir al-Haddad, the Hadhrami mufti of Johor and various historians of Saiwun, Hadhramaut, in which it was suggested that Ahmad al-Muhajir was an Imami Shi ‘a. The fact that Imam Ahmad was of the 8th generation from Imam ‘Ali and the 4th generation from Imam Ja ‘far al-Sadiq lends credence to this view. Since, it was dangerous to hold Shi ‘i views in an ‘Ibadhia-dominated area such as Hadhramaut it is possible that Shi ‘i views were held under conditions of taqiyya (dissimulation) while Shafi ‘i views were openly propagated. In this case, Imam Ahmad disseminated the Shafi ‘i school but had the historical consciousness of the Shi ‘a.

 

The grandson of Imam Ahmad, ‘Alawi b. ‘Ubaydallah was the only one among his brothers Basri and Jadid to leave male issue and it is he who gave his name to the clan of the Hadhrami Sada, variously known as banu 'alawi, ba ‘alawi, or bani s ada 'alawiyya.

 

‘Alawiyyin ‘ulama' divide the historical development of the ‘alawiyyin into four stages.

 

During the first stage, which lasted from the third century to the 7th century, AH, ‘alawiyyin leaders such as Ahmad al-Muhajir and his grandson ‘Alawi b. ‘Ubaydallah were mujtahids and carried the title of Imam. They were not followers of any particular madhhab or tariqa. While it is true that a great deal of their ijtihad was in line with Imam Shafi ‘i, this may have been partly due to the circumstances in Hadhramaut.

 

Having laid down their arms and given up political struggle, the ‘alawiyyin became the carriers of a Sufi tariqa when Al-Ustadh al-Adhham Muhammad al-Faqih Muqaddam of the 13th generation from Imam ‘Ali obtained the ijazat al-khirqa from Shaykh Abu Madyan Shu ‘aib b. al-Husayn. It is interesting to note that during this first stage that the names Abu Bakr, ‘Omar and Uthman were not given to the ‘alawiyyin. In the Sisilah of Al'Attas, the first time that any of these names appear is in 992H when the first al-'Attas, of the 27th generation from Imam Ali, was named 'Umar.

 

 

The second stage, then is that of the development and consolidation of the tariqat al-lalawiyya, which lasted from the seventh century to the eleventh century AH.

The tariqa is a simple one without khalwat that stressed worldly activities while at the same time denouncing materialism. It was a tariqa dunyawiya, based on the simple formula of ‘ilm, ‘amal, tahalli, takhalli. It is the only order in which nasaba and tariqa come together, and this is where the importance of ‘asabiyya is evident.

 

The third stage in the development of the ‘alawiyyin lasted from the 11th century to the I4th century AH. During this period, the ‘alawiyyin ‘ulama' and awliyya came to be known by the title of habib. This was the period of emigration to India and Southeast Asia.

 

For more than fifty years various theories have been presented as attempts at delineating the causes and modes of conversion to Islam as well as the consequences of the coming of Islam to the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago. Many authors stressed the fact that Islam was brought to the region by traders from Arabia, Persia, India and China. Although it was clearly through trade that Islam was initially introduced into the archipelago it is extremely doubtful that the large-scale conversions to Islam can be explained simply in terms of these early trading contacts. Theories that suggest other modes of conversion to Islam need to be considered. These theories explain large-scale conversion in terms of economic and political motives, rivalry between the Muslims and Portuguese, inter-marriages, and Sufi proselytization.

 

It was van Leur, among others, who stressed the significance of political factors in the Islamization of Indonesia. His reading was that Islam was adopted as a political instrument against Indian trade, Siam, China, and the Hindu Majapahit regime in Java. Several objections can be made to this view. One is that even if it was established that rulers in general converted to Islam for political and economic reasons, one cannot leap to the conclusion that the whole archipelago did so for the same reasons. Also, if the logic of conversion for economic and political reasons was operating, why were there no conversions to Chinese religion during the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries when China was a regional power in the archipelago?

Schrieke had discussed the conversion to Islam in terms of Muslim-Portuguese antagonism in the archipelago. Although he was fully aware that the large-scale conversions to Islam began in the 13th century before Portuguese dominance he nevertheless insisted that it is "impossible to understand the spread of Islam in the archipelago unless one takes into account the antagonism between the Moslem traders and the Portuguese."

The theory that the conversion of the archipelago resulted from inter-marriages between members of royal and merchant families received special attention by Harrison who referred to the ability of the marriage institution to spread Islam from Melaka to the north in Pahang and Kedah, and to the south in Sumatra. Before Harrison, Veth had referred to the marriage factor in the advent of Islam in the archipelago. This view of Islamization seems rather unconvincing as there were only a relatively small number of foreign Muslim merchants who had settled

in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago during the period under consideration. They were sporadically settled along coastal areas and mostly transient. While inter-marriage was probably a means of Islamization, it would only explain coversions in the coastal areas.

The view that Sufism was responsible for the conversion of Indonesia to Islam was propounded by Johns. He pointed out that the Sufi "interpretation of Islam was certainly suited to the background of the Indonesians..." and that the "conversion of Indonesia to Islam was very largely the work of the tarikas- even though they are ungratefully spurned at the present day". While it is very true that Sufis were involved in the proselytization of Islam in the archipelago, there is little mention of the tariqat al-'alawiyya in this respect, although the role of the Hadhrami Arabs in the Islamization of the region is well-known. Works that discuss Islamization had generally neglected the contribution of this community in the conversion of Southeast Asia to Islam, The view that Islam had spread in the archipelago largely as a result of marriages between royal and merchant families, or as a consequence of Sufi missionary activities, are mere speculation or, at best, incomplete unless supported by empirical studies on the histories and genealogies of the various Hadhrami Arab as well as Indian Muslim families, many of which were assimilated into the indigenous societies in the archipelago. Hadhrami Arab and Indian Muslim traders had been engaging in trade and missionary activities in the region for centuries and constituted an integral part of the Muslim trade diaspora which stretched from Egypt to the Malay world.

In the last century, European scholars had held that Islamization was brought about as a result of direct contact with Arab traders, a thesis which was first rejected by the Dutch scholar Pijnappel. Pijnappel ascribed the spread of Islam in the region to the work of Arabs from Gujarat and Malabar. After Pijnappel, it was Snouck Hurgronje who developed the view of Islamization from India.

In a lecture on Arabia and the Netherlands Indies delivered at Leiden University in 1907, Snouck asserted that the view that colonies of Arab traders were established in Java and Sumatra before the 16th century was incorrect. Here Snouck suggests that all things of Arab origin that made their way to the Malay Archipelago passed through India and that Islam was introduced to the region through the intermediation of India. Decisive Arab influence as far as the spread of Islam in the Malay world is concerned was only after the 16th century AD and this came out of Hadhramaut in South Arabia and Mecca. The Hadhrami influence in Southeast Asia is, of course, evident from the large numbers of Hadhrami settlers who have become permanent additions to the demographic landscape of the Malay world.

Earlier, in 1883, Snouck proposed the thesis of the South Indian origins of Indonesian Islam but, as Drewes point out, fails to identify the region of South India from where these proselytizers came. In addition to this, Snouck did not specify the region in Arabia that the Arabs, coming via India, originated from.

 

The large-scale Islamization of the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago which began in the 14th century AD was carried out by Indians as well as by Indians of Arab origin and Arabs who came to the region via India. The Indo-Arab origins of Islam in Southeast Asia must be understood in the context of the modes of conversion such as trade, marriage, and the role of the Sufi tariqas. What has been conspicuously absent in the literature on the history of Islam in Southeast Asia, especially with regard to the period in question, is recognition of the role of the Hadhrami tariqat al-‘alawiyya in the process of conversion. In other words, the question of who were the Arabs who traded, intermarried, and established tariqas in the region comes to mind. A prominent case in point is that of the so-called legend of the nine saints (wali songo) of Java.

The Babad Tanah Jawi, a generic title referring to several Javanese manuscripts, attributes the conversion of Java to the work of the walisongo.3 These manuscripts contain some historical records but are, for the most part, legendary accounts on the Islamization of Java. The accounts of the nine saints are usually couched in fantastic terms with descriptions of their magical powers. This had led many scholars to regard the legends more as insights into how the Indonesians viewed the process of Islamization rather than as historical records of conversion to Islam. In some cases, the specific Hadhrami origins appear to be unknown to some authors. For example, Raffles refers to some of the walis as originating from Arabia but does not refer to their Hadhrami origins nor to the fact that many were settled in India prior to coming to Southeast Asia. Arnold refers to one of the walis, Malik Ibrahim, as a descendant of a grandson of the Prophet, Zayn al-‘Abidin and a cousin of the Raja of Chermen. According to Veth, Chermen is located in India while Rouffaer places it in Sumatra. Majul refers to these walis as being Indians or Arabs originating from Arab settlements in India. Indonesian works, however, know these walis to be historical personalities. Furthermore, Hadhrami sources contain the genealogies of these walis who lived in Java during the 15th and 16th centuries. It is from these genealogies that it is known that many were Hadhrami Arabs who had come to the Malay Archipelago via India. The names of the walis of whom there were more than nine can be listed as follows:-

(i) Al-Imam Jamal al-Din al-Husayn b. al-Amir Ahmad Shah Jalal b. al-Amir ‘Abd Allah Khan b. ‘Abd al-Malik b. ‘Alawi ‘Am al-Faqih b. Muhammad Sahib Marbat b. ‘Alawi Khali’ Qasam b. ‘Alawi b. Muhammad b. ‘Alawi b. ‘Ubaydallah b. Ahmad al-Muhajir b. ‘Isa b. Muhammad al-Naqib b. ‘Ali al-Uraydi b. Ja ‘f ar al-Sadiq b. Muhammad al-Baqir b. ‘Ali Zayn al-‘Abidin b. Husayn al-Sibt al-Imam ‘Ali Karamallah Wajhu b. Abi Talib (Wajuk Makasar).

(ii) Ibrahim Zayn al-‘Abidin al-Akbar b. al-Imam Jamal al-Din al-Husayn (Sunan Nggesik of Tuban) .

(iii) Ahmad Rahmat Allah Sahib Ampel b. Ibrahim Zayn al-‘Abidin al-Akbar (Sunan Ampel of Surabaya).

(iv) ‘Ali Murtada b. Ibrahim Zayn al-‘Abidin al-Akbar (Raden Santri of Gresik) .

(v) Maulana Ishaq b. Ibrahim Zayn al-‘Abidin al-Akbar.

(vi) Muhammad ‘Ain al-Yaqin Sahib Giri b. Mualana Ishaq (Sunan Giri of Gresik) .

(vii) Ibrahim Sahib al-Tuban b. Ahmad Rahmat Allah Sahib Ampel (Sunan Bonang of Tuban) .

(viii) Ahmad Hisam b. Ahmad Rahmat Allah Sahib Ampel.

(ix) Ja ‘far al-Sadiq Sahib al-Quds b. Ahmad Rahmat Allah Sahib Ampel (Sunan Kudus) .

1. jx) Zayn al-‘Abidin Sahib Demak b. Ahmad Rahmat Allah Sahib Ampel (of Demak).

(xi) Hashim Sahib Darajat b. Ahmad Rahmat Allah Sahib Ampel (Sunan Drajat of Lamongan) .

(xii) Hidayat Allah b. ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Ali Nur al-‘Alam b. al-Imam Jamal al-Din al-Husayn (Sunan Gunung Jati of Cirebon).

(xiii) Hasan al-Din Sultan Banten b. Hidayat Allah.

(xiv) Al-Malik Ibrahim b. Barakat Zayn al-‘Alam b. al-Imam Jamal al-Din al-Husayn (of Gapura) .

In addition to the above, Chehab lists Babulloh b. ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Ali Nur al-‘Alam b. al-Imam Jamal al-Din al-Husayn but the Khidmat al-Ashira does not list Babulloh in this genealogy.

The question of Hadhrami origins is important not merely for the sake of historical accuracy but because it laid the foundations for the tariqa which was firmly established by Hadhramis later and partly explains the Shi ‘i tendencies to be found in Indonesia today.

There are a number of derivatives of the tariqa al-alawiyya such as the aydrusiyya taifa founded by Abu Bakr b. ’Abd Allah al-‘Aydrus (d. 914 AH/1509AD) in Tarim which spread to East Africa, India and Indonesia. There is also the tariqa al-attasiyya which established itself in the Indian sub-continent and Burma.

 

 

Elements of Islamic Culture in Indonesia

 

 

Any discussion on the presence of Shi ’i Islam in Southeast Asia must distinguish between the Shi ’i school of jurisprudence on the one hand and

Shi ’i culture on the other. To be sure, both are found although there are differences in their genesis and development. While the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims belong to the Shafi ’i madhhab aspects of Shi ’a Islam can be found in their culture and mores, these having been implanted in the region centuries ago. It is only in this century, particularly after the Iranian revolution of 1978, that there has been a consciousness and awareness of the Shi ’a and their history, which was sometimes accompanied by "conversion" to the Shi ’i school, but more often resulted in the study and spread of Shi ’i teachings without necessarily involving a change in madhhab.

 

One, the vast majority of Indonesians are unaware of the presence of Shi ’i customs and norms in their practice of Islam.

 

Two, the Shi ’i influences in Indonesian Islam are both the result of direct contact with Shi ’i communities in India and West Asia as well as the ’alawiyyin factor in the Islamization of the Malay world.

 

The Shi ’i customs to be found in Indonesia can be listed as follows:

 

1. The commemoration of ^’ashura' (Ind. perayaan asyura), on the anniversary of the matyrdom of Imam Husayn at Karbala.This takes place in Aceh, Palembang, Minangkabau Bengkulu and includes a procession of the tabut of Husayn, drawn in procession by an ornately designed catafalque. This ceremony resembles that of the ta 'ziya of Iran and the subcontinent.

 

2. ’Ashura¹ porridge. Known as bubur suran in Java and kanji acura in Sunda, this porridge is made from rice and other certals with coconut milk and is offered to neighbours during the month of Muharram.

 

3. Various literary works give a special place to Imam ^’Ali and his family. For example, in the Hikayat Rala Khandaq. ’Ali is aided in battle by the angle Jibril. In the Hikayat Mohammad Hanafiyah Muhammad Hanafiyya dreams that the Prophet orders him to revenge the deaths of Hassan and Husayn.

 

4. The lavishly decorated tombs (maqam) and the practice of ziara is seen as more as an element of Shi ’i Islam that found its way into Indonesia.

 

 

 

 

These Shi ’i elements in Indonesia are possibly a result of Shi ’i influence from West Asia as well as India. They are also a result of the influence of the ’alawiyyin in Indonesia.4 The madhhab of the ’alawiyyin, though formally Shafi ’i, is also referred to as madhhab ahl al-bayt because of the genealogical link of the practioners of the tarigat al-'alawiyya with the Prophet (peace be upon him) . Nevertheless, it is incorrect to say that the ’alawiyyin, including the vali songo, introduced Shi ’a Islam to Indonesia, as suggested by some, because the ’alawiyyin have always been strict                Shafi ’is, regardless of their Shi ’a scent (berbau Syl'ah).

 

The Rise of the Imami Shi ’i Among the ’Aiawiyyin

 

It has already been mentioned that there are Shi ’i tendencies among the ’alawiyyin, the main reason for this being the genealogical convergence between the ’alawiyyin and the Shi ’a.

 

So far we have said nothing of the actual practice of the Shi ’a or Imami or Ja'fari madhhab among the ’alawiyyin. This is something that took place in the fourth stage of the development of the ’alawiyyin which began in the 14th century H, that is, the period of acculturation and assimilation in the Malay world of Southeast Asia.

 

The actual "conversion" to Shi ^’i Islam took place generally after the Iranian revolution of 1979. Nevertheless, throughout the history of the bani 'alawl there have been instances of practitioners of Shi ’a Islam both among the wilayati and the muwalladun.

 

One ’alawiyyin scholar, about whom it is uncertain as to what extent he was a Shi ’a, was Muhammad b. ^’Aqil al-’Alawi (1863-1931 AD) of the al-Yahya house.

 

Muhammad b. ’Aqil was born in Hadhramaut in a place called Masila ’Ali Shaykh, lived part of his life in Singapore where he did some writing, and finally settled in Hudayda, Yemen. He had written a number of historical works on the early history of the Shi ’a, some of which were published in Iran and some in Jakarta.

 

Worth mentioning in this connection is Sayyid Abu Bakr b. ’Abd al-Rahman b. Shahab of Tarim, Hadhramaut whose writings were in defense of Muhammad b. ’Aqil's views and of Shi ’a Islam in general.

 

Nevertheless, it has been mainly among the muwalladun, particularly in Malaysia and Indonesia, that we have a renewed interest in Shi ’a Islam. There are three major reasons for which this happened.

 

One is the perceived general lack of development among the ’alawiyyin with respect to the other religious and ethnic communities in Southeast Asia.

 

Another was the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the heightened awareness of neo-colonialism, and cultural dependency that it brought.

 

Thirdly, and just as crucial was the fact that the leader who emerged in the revolution, Imam Khomeini, was a sayyid himself. It was at this time that the genealogical convergence between Shi ’i madhhab and the ’alawiyyin became apparent to the ’alawiyyin of Indonesia and Malaysia. It was therefore in the 1980s that interest in Shi ’i fiqh and ’usul al-fiqh, falsafa, ’ilm al-kalam, and social thought developed. This is reflected in religious education in the madrasa, as well as in informal education (majlis ta'lim, pengajian) and in the range of books translated from Arabic and Persian as well as original works written in Malay and Indonesian.

 

Nevertheless, the renewed interest in Shi ’a Islam does not necessarily take the form of "conversion" to the Shi ’i madhhab. In fact five different orientations among the ’alawiyyin to Shi ’a Islam can be discerned:-

 

(i) Anti-Shi ’a. These are a minority who are not only strict Shafi ’i, but who regard the Shi ’a as having strayed from the path and are not considered as being on an equal footing with the four Sunni madhhabs. These are views that are held by non-’alawiyyin in Southeast Asia as well and have attracted some attention in the media. A case in point is the work of Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad of the now banned Arqam organization in Malaysia. He referred to the Iranian revolution as not a revolution of Islam, but a revolution of the Shi ’a and holds the view that the Shi ’a are politically strong in Iran because they "sell the name of Islam".⁵ The book discusses various aspects of the "deviations" of the Shi ’a. There are also statements in the media expressing concern over the "Shi ’a threat" and questioning the ’aqida of the Shi ’a.

 

(ii) The Ja’fari school as the fifth madhhab. The majority of the ’alawiyyin see the Imami Shi ’a as belonging to a fifth madhhab which is seen to be on an equal footing with the four Sunni schools.

 

(iii) Shafi ’is with Shi’a sympathies. This group is very interesting in that they believe in following the Shafi’i school as far as the ibada is concerned, in line with the teachings and practice of the ajdad, but they are one with the Shi ’a with regards to historical consciousness, especially when it comes to the interpretation of early Muslim history, the events of the Saqifa, the tragedy of Karbala, and so on. They also approach the question of the validity of hadith with the same caution that the Shi’a do. In fact, they regard the tariqat al-'alawiyya to be the way of the ahl al-bayt as much as the Ja’fari school is. The fact that the one follows Imam Shafi’i and the other Imam Ja^’far al-Sadiq is not an issue of consequence as far as iman and iman are concerned.

 

(iv) ’Alawiyyin Shi’a. These are the ’alawiyyin who have made the total switch to the Shi’i school in term of ’ibada as well as worldview. They take the position that the madhhab of the ahl al-bayt can only be the Ja’fari school and no other and that it is better (afdhal) for the ’alawiyyin as descendants of the Prophet, to be direct followers of Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq. Nevertheless, these "converts" retain the customs and mores of the Hadhrami ’alawiyyin for the most part.

(v) Anti-’alawiyyin Shi’a. This is a minority who no longer maintain the appearance of the being ’alawiyyin in terms of the acts of worship and culture. For example, they do not attend the Friday noon prayer, they do not participate in the weekly ratib sessions and read, instead, the do'a kumayl, and they consider zafin as a prohibited (haram) practice in Islam. It was even reported that members of this group were of the opinion that those ’alawiyyin ’ulama’ who did not pass out of Shi’a centres of learning, should not be given the respect that is normally accorded to them, such as the kissing of the hands.

 

As far as the development of Shi’a Islam in Indonesia is concerned, it is the third and fourth groups that are the most important. Each group operates according to a different logic of argumentation in'their debates with each other. The third group is more concerned with the social consequences of school switching while the fourth group is preoccupied with the juridical question of following the "right" madhab. For the Shafi’i with Shi^’a sympathies, while all the schools of jurisprudence are egual and legitimate, the social consequences of switching from one to another may be adverse in the sense that it results in highlighting differences in daily religious practices that were previously not there. In fact, many ’alawiyyin families are split between Shafi’i and Shi’i "factions" characterised by protracted social conflicts, some more benign than others.

 

This list of orientations towards Shi^’a Islam only scratches the surface of the process of "conversion" and reaction to the Shi^’a school and worldview and is the basis of more elaborate work which is on-going.

 

  REFERENCES

 

1. Ibu Ishaq; ‘Ali b. Husayn al Mas’udi, Muruj al-Dhahab, Beirut, 1966; Ahmad b. ‘Ali Ya’qubi, Al-Tarikh, 1960.

 

2. Muhammad b. Ahmad b. ‘Omar al-Shatri, Adwar al-Tarikh al-Hadhrami, Jidda: ‘alam al-Ma’rifa, 1403AH/1973AD, p.160.

 

3. Ramlan, trans., Babd Tanah Jawi, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka, 1975.

 

4. Muhammad al-Baqir, “Pengantar”, p. 51.

 

5. Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad, Bahaya Syiah, Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Shoutul Arqam, 1987, pp. v-vi.

 

 

 

 

 

Representation of the Hadhrami in a Literary Work from West Java

 

 

Raden Tjandrapradja's Wawacan Rusiah Nu Geulis (The Verse Tale of the Secrets of a Beautiful Woman) appeared in 1921, from the press of the largest and most prestigious of publishers in West Java, M.I. Prawira-Winata of Bandung. The tale is a realist narrative played out among the petty nobility of West Java, with its physical setting reflecting the Muslim world of Bandung, the capital of the province during the early decades of this century.

 

The work has a place in the Sundanese literary canon. The Sundanese-Indonesian writer, Achdiat K. Mihardja (b. 1911), a nephew of  R. Tjandrapradja, remembers witnessing an oral performance of the text and attests to the popularity the work enjoyed in its day. He is also of the opinion that it faithfully reflects Sundanese attitudes of the time (personal communication, Canberra, 1994).

 

The author of The Secrets of a Beautiful Woman lived and wrote in Sumedang, a regency district in the eastern part of the Priangan highlands that are the home of the literature and the arts of West Java. Sumedang's relative closeness to Central Java, under whose political influence and artistic tutelage the courts of the Priangan came during the 17th and 18th centuries, predisposes it towards a respect for all things Javanese. Tjandrapradja's father, one Haji Abdulsalam, was a writer before him, and Tjandrapradja served out his apprenticeship transliterating his father’s manuscript works from Arabic letters into Roman script and preparing them for publication in book form. Reference to this fact was made by the publisher in his advertisement of the work. Nothing else, however, is generally known of the provenance, or the inspiration of The Secrets of a Beautiful Woman.

 

This paper consists of three readings of the work, They are, in turn, a reading following the conventions of the genre; the second, an examination of the social and cultural dimensions and finally a placing of the work in its historical context.  At every level, the figure of a Hadhrami, Sheikh Abubakar bin Ma'rup al-Attas, is pivotal.

 

Two: The Text and its Genre

 

Most early Sundanese novels, apart from a small stream of political works, deal with morality within marriage. The events portrayed in them are concerned exclusively with fidelity and falsehood in sexual relations. Plots turn on the perfidy of one of the partners. The stories begin with an established couple: a happy marriage is destroyed when one of the partners proves unfaithful, or a betrothal founders when one of the partners prefers to marry another. The wronged party is faced with a choice: to assuage his/her pain by taking to vice and pleasures, or to meet the loss with patient forbearance. The errant party for a time enjoys his/her new union, until the force of morality, under the narrator's hand, takes hold. The initial act of perfidy gains momentum, as it is repeated, or as, new vices are embraced. Ends awaiting men are gaol, and women, the lot of common prostitution. To both men and women, destitution brings public shame, illness and death, while suicide is a frequent plot solution. Meanwhile, the individuals who have been virtuously patient are rewarded with a new, happy and socially respectable union. The didactic closure of the texts evident in these strong plot solutions makes clear the message that vice does not go unpunished nor virtue unrewarded.

 

The Secrets of a Beautiful Woman complies with this basic structural pattern. Nyi Raden Ayu Lasmana, a beautiful young divorcee of Sekar Arum, Bandung, and Raden Maja-Sutisna, bachelor, are in love and have secretly promised to marry. Lasmana learns that Agan Mariam, an Indian girl of unattractive appearance has made known her wish to marry Maja-Sutisna. Her father, the Head of the Kaum (the mosque quarter) and the leading Muslim clerical dignitary of the city, has used his influence to extract a promise from Maja-Sutisna's father. Agan Lasmana and Maja-Sutisna elope, and their flight ends in a Dutch hotel in the northeastern city of Surabaya, but they are found by Agan Lasmana's elder brother and Lasmana is brought back in disgrace to his house in Magelang, near Jogjakarta in central Java. Maja-Sutisna flees to Banjarmasin, Borneo, to wait until the scandal dies down.

 

 

Meanwhile Ence Tamin, a Muslim scholar and merchant from Palembang, South Sumatra, requests Agan Mariam's hand in marriage. She accepts with delight and the nuptials are celebrated on a lavish scale. Ence Tamin settles down in the city and opens a shop.

 

Returning from Magelang to her father's house by train, Agan Lasmana makes the acquaintance of a young man, Raden Prawira-Supena, and quickly enters a liaison with him. News of this reaches Maja-Sutisna and he returns immediately to confront his rival. The two young men, however, discover that Lasmana has deceived them both and they sever their association with her for all time. Later Maja-Sutisna marries a young noblewoman in Sekar Arum, and his wedding is extravagantly celebrated under Lasmana's eye, the wedding procession passing in front of her door, doubling her pain and disappointment. She retreats once more to her brother's protection in Magelang, in which city she encounters a Hadhrami Arab, Sheikh Abubakar, in his carpet shop. Struck by her beauty, he asks for her hand and marries her forthwith. But Lasmana is desperately miserable in the Arab's house and repulsed by his foreign way of life. She commits suicide by drowning herself in a river. Sheikh Abubakar is charged with cruelty to his spouse and sent to six years' exile gaol on the island of Ambon. Despite the objections that we readers of today would find in a synopsis even as brief as this, the message of the text in its time was of Agan Lasmana's culpability lay in her perfidy and conceit, her sexual hubris which had to be brought down.

 

Yet The Secrets of a Beautiful Woman departs from its genre in two important respects. First, one of the most striking stylistic features of texts of this type are passages of admonitions or advice directed to the young people in perplexity. These appear at crucial stages in the plot, mostly in the form of conversations between characters, where they are intended as a moral corrective. They also may be proclaimed by the narrator in formal prologues and epilogues set aside from the story proper, in which case they are addressed directly to the reader, restating the moral import of the plot. They may occupy as much as ten percent of the 'textual space’ of a work. Apart from a small bracket of admonitions delivered to Raden Maja-Sutisna and his bride during their wedding (v.1270-1279, p.156-157), none of this direct didactic discourse is found in The Secrets of a Beautiful Woman. The author has deliberately eschewed the moralising strain in his composition in favour of his own more urgent concerns.

 

Second, since the conflict of the plot generally arises out of the moral choices of the major characters, external agents of evil are seldom represented in these stories. Yet the Hadhrami Arab Abubakar bin Ma'ruf is a memorable villain, in whom the heroine, Agan Ayu Lasmana meets her match. He is the husband who puts an end to her capricious life and matches her pride with his own sinister sexuality. Once married, he maintains Agan Lasmana as an Arab women, confined to his shop and compound in social seclusion and maddening cultural dislocation. Deep-dyed villain that he is, his villainy must be understood through the stain of the author's own prejudices - or those of the time - for his portrayal is one of a derogatory stereotype.

 

Perceptions of Hadhramis among the indigenous population of the Indies are fairly well known.  Immigrants to the archipelago since the 9^th century, the facts both of their foreign apartness and yet ready integration into Muslim host populations stand side by side. A number of littoral kingdoms, such as Banten and Ceribon in West Java, Banjarmasin and

Pontianak in Borneo and Siak in Sumatra boast Hadhrami founders, while Hadhrami names appear in the genealogies, of many a noble house throughout the archipelago (Van den Berg 1886:195-204; Roff 1974: 40-41).

 

At a popular level, as Arabs, they were seen as the highest representatives of Islam; they received the name of ‘cucu Nabi’, 'grandsons of the Prophet’, whether in fact they could claim sayyid descent or not. Sayyids enjoyed deference and respect from the native-born; for example, it was their due to receive the taqbil, the kissing of the hand as a greeting and to be importuned for blessings by the common people (Solomon, forthcoming). The graves of Arabs are still renowned places of pilgrimage and many are considered to be saints possessing the power of intercession for others (Van den Berg 1886: 162-163; Noer 1980: 67).

 

On the other hand, in our period, Hadhramis had also earned a reputation for venality; in Sundanese literary representations they are portrayed almost always as usurers who preyed cruelly on native farmers an small traders.

 

This discrepancy in the images of the Hadhramis rests upon an historical basis; the first perception dates, no doubt, from the time of conversion to Islam in Southeast Asia, from the 9th to the 15th centuries of the common era, when it was possible indeed that many Arab traders in the archipelago were pious men, whose proselytising won genuine converts (Drewes 1986: 440-441). The second is due - it cannot be otherwise - to the results of a period of sustained migration from the Hadhramaut during the last century and Hadhrami vigour as an immigrant community. The Hadhrami population of the Netherlands East indies increased from around 8,000 in 1800 to 71,885 in 1930 (Van den Berg 1886: 105-110; Report 1937: 44-45). There were around 76,000 Hadhramis in the Netherlands and British archipelago possessions altogether – about 0.01% of the total population (Roff 1974:39-40). Among these new-comers who were successful, fortunes were made in trade and finance, from the local village level up to that of higher mercantile systems, more often than not at the expense of their less sophisticated competitors. Singapore, where great wealth was amassed, flourished as staging post between the Hadhramaut and the farther islands. In Java, Hadhramis were large land-owners and inter-island merchants; in Sumatra they owned plantations. Under Dutch colonial law, as ‘Foreign Orientals', they enjoyed a legal status almost equal to the Europeans, certainly elevated above the native peoples.

 

Three:   The Cultural Sub-Text

 

The Secrets of a Beautijul Woman carries a sub-text of cultural antagonism, that between the older traditions of Java, represented by the character of Agan Ayu Lasmana (her title, 'Agan Ayu’ is Javanese) and contemporaneous cosmopolitan Islam, of whom the Hadhrami Abubakar bin Ma'rup is the embodiment.

 

            

 

Four: Cosmopolitan Muslims, Palembang and Islamic Reform in West Java

 

Within the perceptions of the indigenous populations of Indonesia and Malaysia, the term 'Arab' has come to indicate any cosmopolitan Muslim. Newly-arrived Hadhramis and their kin longer established in the archipelago, no matter how diluted their Arab blood by native Indies ancestry, were of course the main group designated, but usage has widenedto include people from the Indian sub-continent as well (Roff 1974:41). Again, history can explain the heterogeneity of this community. It is generally accepted that Islam was brought to Southeast Asia by merchants hailing from ports along the trade route from Arabia to China - by Gujratis, Malabaris, Tamils from the South of India, possibly Bengalis as well, rather than through direct contact with Arabia (Drewes 1968: 445-447). Representatives of a Muslim trading network could still be found in the major cities of the Indies.

 

In The Secrets of a Beautiful Woman, the same theme of antagonism to the foreign Muslim is taken up at the level of sub-plot, in the unflattering portrayal of Agan Mariam, daughter of the leader of the Kaum, who is of Indian descent. Her portrait is starkly in contrast to that earlier of Agan Lasmana, who, in addition to her arresting beauty seen above, is a young woman of accomplishments.

 

There is also reference to the South Sumatran port city of Palembang. Lying half-way between Java and Singapore along the northwards route through the Straits of Malacca, it was an old trading settlement with long-standing, integrated Arab elite community (Van den Berg 1886: 161,227). At the turn of the 20th century, it was a centre for lithographed and printed religious literature, second only to Singapore as a source of dissemination of ideas from the Middle East among Malay-speaking people (Roff 1974:45). The people of Palembang, like the Hadhramis, are identified with an ignorance of the modem world, but also with religious piety and the possession of riches. The opulence of their lives is illustrated in the description of the marriage delegation of gentlemen from Palembang, when Ence Tamin marries Agan Mariam.

 

Finally and ironically, The Secrets of a Beautiful Woman, through these very images of backwardness and ignorance, makes an unconscious reference to Islamic reform. The Islamic modernist movement, based on the ideas of Muhammad Abduh of Egypt, came late to West Java, well after its propagation in Sumatra and in Singapore. This is rather surprising, since the Sundanese are recognised as one of the most religiously observant ethnic groups of the archipelago. It is also surprising, given that the capital city of the province, Bandung, was a hub of nationalist activity in the early decades of this century. The Sarekat Islam, the first nationalist mass organisation, founded in 1912, was active in the Sundanese countryside, while the modernist Muhammadiyah, set up in the same year to promote a programme of religious reform through schools and charitable institutions, had its branches there.

 

West Java's own reformist organisation, the Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union) or Persis, was founded in Bandung in 1923, two years after the appearance of our text, among the very community painted in such a bad light: people from Palembang and a Tamil Indian with Hadhrami connections. Persis was begun as a study group to discuss religious issues by an affiliation of three families from Palembang who had been resident in Bandung for two generations. It gained its direction as an organisation proper, and its intellectual leadership, when Ahmad Hassan, the son of a Tamil father from Singapore and a Javanese mother from Surabaya, took over its leadership. Persis was able to claim its position in the forefront of the reformist movement in West Java when Hassan came under the influence of Ahmad Soorkattie, at that time representing the Hadhrami organisation al-Irsyad, and possibly the earliest champion of reformist ideas in Java. Always a venue for informed debate and the exchange of ideas rather than a popular movement, Persis published numbers of tracts and pamphlets advocating modernism (Federspiel 1970: 12-16; Noer 1980: 73-80; 95-98; see further the paper by Mrs. Natalie Mobini-Kesheh).

 

If there can have been a personal dimension - perhaps some discomfitting incident? - behind R. Tjandrapradja’s attitude towards foreign Muslims it is pointless to speculate. Wealth will always excite envy, and difference suspicion. On its most significant level, The Secrets of a Beautiful Woman is a rare and outspoken example of one of the lesser explored facets of a cultural contest in the Indies. It sheds valuable light on the slender history we have available of the Hadhrami Arabs in their Southeast Asian diaspora.

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

- Achdiat, K. Mihardja (1949), Atheis (An Atheist). Jakarta: Balai Pustaka. (Fifth printing 1969).

 

- Dewes, G.W.J. (1968), ‘New Light on the Coming of Islam to Indonesia?’ Bijdragen tot de taal, Land-en Volkenkunde 124, 433-459.

 

- Roff, William R. (1974), the Origins of Malay Nationalism. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya.

 

- Tjandrapradja, R.. (1921), Wawacan Rusiah Nu Geulis. Bandung: R.I. Prawira-Winata.  

 

 

ARAB LANDOWNERS IN BATALIVA/JAKARTA

 

 

 

Arabs have played important part in Javanese coastal towns long before the arrival of the Dutch at the end of the 16^th century. They were merchants and mixed rather easily with the local population. Though most Arabs frequented east Javanese harbours, there have been some Arabs in early Batavia, but not much is known about them. The VOC certainly was not favourably inclined towards their presence in its eastern capital. But an indication among others that there must have been Arabs is the strong degree of Islamic orthodoxy of the kaum Betawi already before the early 19^th century.¹

 

Since the beginning of the 19^th century Arabs from Hadhramaut arrived in ever greater numbers. These Hadhramis were small traders living in the moorish quarters of Pakojan and Krukut area and after becoming a bit wealthier moved to Pasar Baru and Tanah-Abang kampongs. They engaged in batik and cotton trade, money lending, retail business, small exports-imports with Arabia, renting out houses and in coasting activities. Some Arabs ventured into agriculture, but very few of them became farmers.

 

There are two conflicting views about Arabs and landownership. The first view holds that a great amount of land in and around Jakarta was owned by big Arab landowners. The opposite view regards the Arabs mainly as buyers of land - even estates - to rent them out or to make profit by selling and buying landed property.² There seem to be only very few Arabs in the said period who themselves owned and cultivated their estates, which was more common among the Chinese. Only a few times the Arab owner of an estate is mentioned by yearly published Regering-Almanak voor Nederlandsch Indie between 1884 and 1904 also as administrateur of his proprieties.

 

 

During the 19^th and the first half of the 20^th century a few Arabs owned some particuliere landerijen or estates in the vicinity, of Batavia/Jakarta. In every respect they were a small minority: Among their countrymen, among the class of landowners and according the comparative size of their landed property. It seems that the Arab landowners of Batavia regarded their estates as a good source of income from the people living on the land (houses) , especially on the smaller estates close to the town, from people planting and cultivating parts of the land and from buying and selling land/estates. Nothing is left from these estates, - no country-houses, no landed gentry, no literature ... - only the names now used for areas within the big metropole of Jakarta and the confused memory of former tuan tanah Arab.

REFERENCES

1. Milone, Queen City of the East: Metamorphosis of a Colonial Capital, Univ. of California, Berkeley, PhD. 1966, pg 211 f.
2. d. Berg, pg.97

 

 

 

FROM    YEMEN    TO    THE    SHORES    OF    MALABAR HADRAMI        MIGRANTS   TO CALICUT: A   CASE-STUDY

 

 

Even before the mission of the Prophet in Arabia in the 9th century A.D., many Arabs must have settled on the coast of South India for purposes of trade.¹ In the 8^th and 9^th  centuries, the Indian Ocean became an "Arab Mediterranean, and the Arab or Muslim trading diaspora along the coasts became predominant. Port towns in Malabar like Quilon and Calicut were important stopovers for Arab ships on their way to China. From the 8^th  century onwards, colonies of Arab and Persian Muslims were definitely becoming settled in Malabar.

 

The sea-port of Calicut attracted merchants and traders world over. Ibn Battuta describes it as one of the largest harbours in the world. The Muslims of Gujarat, the Arabs from the Red Sea and other traders from the north came to Calicut to buy pepper and transported it without hindrance. Calicut has been the focal point of maritime activities since 1000 B. C. Early trade began between Greece and Malabar and then with the Roman Empire. From the 7^th to the 12^th centuries, China became the chief market for Malabar products. Between the 12^th and the 15^th centuries, Arabs dominated the port. At the end of the 15^th  century, Calicut was the busiest seaport in India where ships from the East and the West anchored and exchanged goods.

Trade and commerce, between Yemen and Malabar, dates back to ancient times, Safar in Hadhramaut being its chief centre. It is said that betel, betelnut and coconut were carried from Malabar and first planted in Hadhramaut.² Around the middle of the 18^th century Arabs from Hadhrami centres like Tarim and Mukhalla in South Yemen sailed to the shores of Malabar. In Calicut, they landed as merchants and missionaries. Dealing chiefly in timber , pepper and other spices, these merchants received the patronage of the Zamorins of Calicut.

 

The Hadhramis in Calicut consider themselves to be the highest status group in the social scale. They can be classified into four categories - the Baramis, the Jifris, the Sayyads and the Themims . The 16^th century travel accounts of Duarte Barbosa mentions two distinct types of Muslims in Malabar - (a) the Pardesis - composed of wealthy, expatriate and largely Arab Muslims and (b) the Mappillas. The Pardesis had once represented the trading elite of coastal Malabar, particularly in Calicut, but most of them had returned to their homes in West Asia because of constant Portuguese attacks on their shipping. ³ By Pardesis Barbosa probably meant the Hadhrami groups in Calicut.

 

The Baramis trace their origins to Mukhalla in Hadhramaut. They claim to be the descendants of the Prophet. They can also be found in Egypt and Indonesia. Sheikh Ali Barami was the first to land in Calicut in the mid-18th century as a shipbuilder. As timber merchants and shipbuilders, the Baramis flourished on this seaport. Their centuries-old houses and warehouses stand witness to show that they settled near the coastal fringe to facilitate their trading and shipbuilding activities.

The descendants of Ali Barami are the sole shipbuilders among the Hadhramis in Calicut. The Barami timber merchants have also involved themselves in the educational progress of the Muslim community. Some of them even represented the governing body of the Malabar Educational Society in Calicut in the encouragement and improvement of the religious and secular education of Muslim youths.⁴

 

The Hadhramis in Calicut occupy the topmost rung in the social ladder as a status group - yet, they do not constitute a monolithic social group. They exhibit varying levels of among themselves. For example, the Baramis as rich merchants, traders and shipowners have always been economically superior to the Sayyads and the Jifris. The Sayyads and the Jifris, as priests and saints consider themselves to be spiritually superior to the Baramis, the Themims and the other Muslims. Except for the Sayyads and the Jifris, all the other groups intermarry with the local Koyas. However, their peculiar social organization, customs and religious practices are manifestations of their varying degrees of adaptation, acculturation, synthesis and syncretism which are reflective of the local indigenous influences. Therefore it is one of the immediate concerns of historians and anthropologists to honour and place the Muslims of Hadhrami origin in a separate chapter in the pages of the rich history of Malabar and the Islamic world.

 

REFERENCES

1. Logan, William, Malabar. Vol .1 (Reprint Trivandrum, 1980) p.230
2. Parappil, Koya P.P.M., Kozhikottu Muslimingalude Charitram. (Calicut, 1994) p.90
3. Dale, S. F., ‘Trade Conversion and Growth of the Islamic Community of Kerala, South India,’ International Conference of Islamization in South Asia. (Oxford, 1989) p.10
4. Petition from the Malabar Educational Society to Pentland, dated July 1918. KA/Revenue/June 1918.

 

The Hadhrami Diaspora, Islam and Madagascar, c.1750-1976

 

Origins of Arabs in Madagascar

By the mid 18^th century, there existed ‘Arab’ settlements in three regions of Madagascar; on its north-east, south-east and north-west coasts.  Today, the Anjoaty, or ‘Arab’ peopled of the north east coast number approximately 10,000, concentrated on the region between Cap d’ Ambre and Ampanobe.

A tradition amongst the Antaimoro (Vohipeno) states that they descend from 30 men who sailed directly to Madagascar from Mecca during the 14^th century.  Also, Grandidier claims that the Anteony originated from Mecca, which they left in the 7^th century, and that the Anjoaty, Antambahoaka and Talaonaro Antanosy were founded by the karmathians, an Arabic sect strongest in Oman and Yemen, that sailed to North East Madagascar from Mangalore in India in c.1100 AD, segments of whom subsequently migrated south.  He further notes a tradition that in c.1000 AD, Egyptians were sent by a fatimite Khalif to settle West Madagascar. However, there is no archaeological evidence to back such claims, or any evidence to suggest direct migrations to Madagascar from either Arabia or India.¹

 

Arabs most probably migrated to Madagascar via East Africa and the Comoro Islands, so that the history of Arab settlement on the latter are probably paralleled in Madagascar. The earliest archaeological evidence for human settlement in Madagascar is at Irodo, on the north east coast during the 9^th-10^th century.  These could well have been pre-Islamic Arabs who carried with them pre-Islamic traditions of astrology, divination, soothsaying, magic, calendar computation, and teaching of the Devil and of the fallen angel.  Grandidier believes that the first semitic settlement of Madagascar was by Yemenite Jews, expelled by Caliph Omar in the mid 7^th century, but again there is no proof of this.  A subsequent wave of Arabic immigrants might well have known of the prophet Muhammed and of the Koran, but were ignorant of Allah.  The first concrete evidence of Islamic settlements are on the islands of Mahilaka and Ambariiotelo in Ampasindava Bay in North West Madagascar.  It is probable that, as on the Comoro Islands, Ampasindava experienced Shirazi settlement in the 12^th century and Hadhramaut influence during the 13^th century.  Certainly the presence there of 14^th century yellow Hadhramaut pottery indicates trading links to East Africa and the Hadhramaut.  Traditions amongst the Antalaotra (“those from beyond the ocean’), the ‘Arabic’ peoples of Iboina, in North West Madagascar, refer as a point of origin to both Malindi and a sunken island called Mojomby, that is said to have existed somewhere between the Comoro Islands and Madagascar.  Lombard claims that the Antalaotra were Shiites of Arabic origin, but that they later joined the Sunnites when the later became the dominant Islamic group on the East African coast.

Probably, it was these groups who subsequently migrated to the north east and, in smaller numbers to the South East.  The Arab-Swahili civilization in Madagascar peaked from the 14^th to 17^th centuries, but Sakalava expansion in West Madagascar, and a dramatic increase in European contact with the east of the island from the mid-18^th century, led to a contraction of ‘Arab’ settlement, and a rupture in relations between the three regions where ‘Arab’ settlements remained.  In the case of the settlements on the north east and south east coasts, this resulted in an assimilation of Malagasy culture, but the Arabic settlements of North West Madagascar maintained strong links with the Arab-Swahili community elsewhere in the Western Indian ocean, with the result that they remained ’Arab’ – or rather Swahili – in culture.  However, whatever their origins, the different Arabic elements in the North West fused.  Thus the distinctions made were between Arabs, meaning visitors from East Africa and Arabia, and Antalaotra, meaning a local (including Anjouan) Arab-Swahili-Malagasy community who ascribed to Islam. By the early 19^th century, the Antalaotra were subdivided into the Hounzati, a general term for Antaloatra in Iboina, and the Mazanghi of Mahajanga.  Thus, although it is clear that the Hadhramaut diaspora included Madagascar, it was by the mid 18^th century no longer possible to differentiate between the Hadhramaut and non-Hadhramaut elements in the Arab Islamic community there.  Nevertheless, it might be possible that the same pattern initially developed in North West Madagascar as developed in the Comoros where groups claiming Shirazian origin formed the elite of the Islamic community, whilst the remainder comprised those of Arab origin, mixed Arab-African descent and Islamised Africans and Malagasy.

 

The Islamic renaissance in Madagascar, c.1750-1895

The Islamic renaissance in Madagascar has to be seen in the light of the general revival of Islamic fortunes throughout the Western Indian Ocian from the mid 18^th century.  There were two general causes for this; the expansion of the slave export trade and the establishment of Pax Brittanica in East African waters.

The East African slave trade was given an enormous fillip from the mid 18^th century by the development of a plantation economy on Mauritius and Reunion.  From 1769-93 some 80,000 slaves entered the Mascarenes, most from the Comoro Islands and Madagascar. ²  Demand for slaves on the Mascarenes increased from the 1820s as a result of the wholesale conversion to sugar cane cultivation.  Slave exports were simultaneously boosted by demand from the Americas and from Madagascar and the growth in demand from Madagascar probably more than compensated for the decline by 1860 of the Americas as a market for East African slaves.

 

Arab-Swahili elements throughout the region seized the opportunities provided by this upsurge in the slave export trade which, by the late 18^th century, they dominated in all bar two regions; parts of the Portuguese controlled Mozambique coast and the east coast of Madagascar where indigenous Malagasy middlemen controlled the trade.

The 1820 Britanno-Merina treaty effectively prohibited slave exports from regions of Madagascar under Merina control – which from 1825 included the entire eastern littoral.

The Antalaobtra were in essence a maritime commercial community whose focus was the Western Indian Ocean.  In technical terms, their network was maintained because of their maritime expertise.  Not only did they possess an intimate knowledge of the coastlines on both sides of the Mozambique Channel, but were also fully conversant with its system of winds and currents which, unlike the monsoon system that affected the Swahili coast, was complex and variable.

Their commercial network linked Madagascar, the Comoro Islands and East Africa, notably Mozambique; from the late 1790s, trade with Quitangonha particularly grew tremendously.

Antalaotra influence suffered due to the decline of Sakalava power after the death of queen Ravahiny in circa 1798.  This in turn was associated with the rise of the Merina polity, and the enormous dislocation of trade resulting from the Napoleonic wars and internecine strife on the east coast.3

The chief business of the Antalaotra remained slave trading.  Although the 1844 arrete declared the emancipation of slaves on Nosy Be, and led to a Sakalava revolt in 1849 that Prud’ homme claims to have been ‘Arab’ instigated, slavery and the slave trade under the guise of the engage system continued. ‘Engages’

Whereas local Mascarene merchants, battling to break the Antalaotra monopoly referred to them as ‘cette caste maudite qui entrave beaucoup les Europeens qui habitant ou qui passent sur cette cote, ⁴ French authorities recognized that they played a crucial role in stimulating the economy of the French islands.

Despite Merina expeditions that devastated large tracts of the interior, Antalaotra trade flourished in Ambongo from where Antalaotra boats sailed to Mozambique, Zanzibar, the Comoro Islands and Nosy Be.

Pax Britannica

The first impact of the Pax Britannica that was established throughout the Western Indian Ocean from the end of the Napoleonic Wars, and which lasted until the late 1870s, was negative for the ‘Arab’ elements in Madagascar.  The initial manifestation for them of British predominance was the incorporation of Madagascar into a British informal empire that included Oman, the Swahili coast and, through Britain’s hold over Portugal, Mozambique.  In 1820, a Britanno-Merina treaty was concluded that established a British agent at the Merina court, and supplied the Merina with technical assistance to conquer the other peoples of the island and exploit its resources.

British backed Merina expansion ousted the Antalaotra from their capital of Mahajanga on the north west coast and from trade on the north east coast, between Cap d’ Ambre and Toamasina.  They transferred their capital to Ambanoro, on Nosy Be, and extended their commercial network in alliance with local Sakalava chiefs down the Ambongo and Menabe coasts which remained essentially independent of the Merina.  However, they also slowly recovered their position in the Merina Empire.

With the closure of imperial Merina ports to Americans and Europeans from 1845-53 and the eclipse of American traders from the region from 1861-1865, the Muslims hold on foreign trade tightened.

By the late 1880s, the Antalaotra had also re-established their traditional hold over the growing commerce of the north east coast to the annoyance of European traders who accused them of fraudulent practices that enabled them to beat completion from European and Mascarene traders.5

The Antalaotra also benefited from Pax Britannica because the later permitted the revival of the commercial fortunes of Indian merchants who provided the financial backing for ‘Arab’ trading operations in the region.

The Indian position as capitalists was for most of the nineteenth century unassailable in a region devoid of stable banking organizations.  From the posts of North West Madagascar, the Karany, as the Indians were known locally, played the vital role of financing trading activity along much of the western littoral and interior of Madagascar.

From the ports of North West Madagascar, the Karnay, as the Indians were known locally, played the vital role of financing trading activity along much of the Western littoral and interior of Madagascar.

It has been argued that the arrival of large European firms like O’Swald, from the mid 19^th century, spelled the death of the Arab trader.  As in Zanzibar, European and American firms in Western Madagascar.

Indian and Arab merchants did take advantage of the increased European competition and falling freight rates to ship their good directly to Europe.

Conclusion

Although the Hadhraumaut figured largely as a source of origin for much of the Arabic migration to Madagascar, the actual origin of Arabic settlers had, by the mid 18^th century, become largely a matter of myth.  Three ‘Arabic’ colonies then existed in Madagascar, all on the coast; one to the north east, another to the South East, and the third to the North West.  Of these, only the latter two had any significant role in the period under question.  ‘Arabic’ elements from the South Eat played a critical role in supplying the ideology of kingship for both the Sakalava and Merina dynasties, and also played a less vital role as migrant lobourers.  The ‘Arabic’ community of Iboina, in North West Madagascar, played a more vital role, notably in the period 1750-1895.  During this period, assisted firstly by the rise of the East African slave trade, and secondly by the revival of Indian commercial fortunes in the Western Indian Ocean, they came to dominate as middlemen the foreign trade of the entire western littoral of Madagascar.  The ‘Arabic’ role in trade declined sharply from the I World War.  Thereafter, the significance of ‘Arabic’ elements in Madagascar, derived from the Comoro Islands but their influence declined sharply from independence in 1960, and was largely halted following the 1976 anti-Comorian riots in Mahajanga in which thousands died, and which caused most Comorians to leave for their home islands or for Reunion.

 

 

REFERENCES

 

1. Pierre Verin, The History of Civilization in North Madagascar (Rotterdam * Boston: Balkema, 1986), 67-8.
2. Malyn Newitt, The Comoro Islands (Colorado, 1984), 21.
3. Campbell; Guillain, Histoire politique du people Sakalve (Paris, 1845), 42.
4. Edmond Samat, ‘Renseignements sur la cote oust de Madagascar depuis Nossi be jusqu a Crosker Cap Ste Marie – Nossi-be 6 mai 1852 in Adrien Boudou, ‘La cote Ouest de Madagascar en 1852’, BAM 15 (1932), 62.
5. Martineau, Madagascar (Paris: Ernest Flammarion, 1894), 332-3

 

 

THE PATTERNS OF HADHRAMI EMIGRATION IN EAST AFRICA

No work dealing with East Africa mentions the contemporaneous and mass arrival of Hadhramis.  However, if migratory movements have resulted merely from the acts of isolated individuals, they are no less significant, nor recent.  Indeed, Hadhrami ‘Africans’ owe their existence in Africa to several centuries of migration by merchants, mercenaries and men of religion.  Today, although highly inter-bred, the Hadhrami represent a large proportion of the Arabs (the others being the Omani) who came to settle in Eastern Africa from the southern part of the Arabian peninsula.

 

An historical view of the migrations

 

Although it is still difficult to determine precisely when and how the Hadhrami came to Africa, it would seem that their migrations, affirmed by centuries of commercial networks in the Indian ocean, continued uninterrupted until the end of the Second World War.

However, East African history suggests that certain periods were more favourable than others to Hadhrami immigration.  According to several authors, e should distinguish at least two (the first from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century, the second from the eighteenth to the beginning of the twentieth), each of which highlights the arrival of migrants of different social origins.

The first acknowledged arrivals were Sayyids or Sharifs, or Mashirifu in Kiswahili, that is, descendants of the Prophet whose role and influence over East African Islam has been indisputable since the thirteenth century.  In the nineteenth century, when the Omani, who belong to the Ibadi sect of Islam, took power over the coast, Hadhrami religious authority, by then established, persisted, despite the political and economic superiority of the new conquerors.

But these prestigious migrants were not the only ones to leave the Hadramaut.  Indeed, the presence of Hadhramis of various origins is even more evident in the interesting literature of more recent periods (of the nineteenth and twentieth century’s) and in the colonial archives.

It appears that, today, the whole of the Hadhrami social hierarchy is represented in Africa.  At the top of the social strata the Sharifs are incontestably the most well known.  Almost them, the Abu Bakar bin Salim, Jamalil Layl, Aidarus, Ba’Alawi, Saqqaf, Haddad and Bafaghi are famous for the roles, religious above all, but also political that some of their members played in the history of the East African Coast.

Although the presence in Africa of all the Hadhrami social groups is confirmed, it is very difficult to evaluate and compare their representation respectively to that in the Hadramaut.  Several studies of migratory movements in southern Arabia lead us to thank that the most willing to leaver were city dwellers who were less attached to their territory than were peasants and nomads.

The Sayyids are, however, the most evident.  This might lead us to think, undoubtedly erroneously, that they made up the greatest number of immigrants, when in fact they represent only a small percentage of the population of their country of origin.

Enumeration of Hadhrami communities, complicated by intermixing and wide geographical dispersal, is difficult.  Existing colonial period censuses are hardly usable.  The Hadhrami are either excluded “owing to their ignorance of the purpose of the census”, or included under the general rubric of Arabs.  Since Hadhrami immigration ceased after the Second World War, the rise in population is now due to natural growth.

 

The Nature of Migrations

While accepting that some immigrants returned to Arabia during the economic depression between the two World Wars and in certain other isolated cases, one of the characteristics of Hadhrami migrations is their permanent nature.  Though it is too soon to give the various reasons for this de facto situation, we may well deem that the economic, political and social success of certain Hadhramis has been a determining factor in their preference for a country which brought them what they had gone there to seek.  On the other hand, the persistent poverty of others could equally have discouraged their return to the Hadramaut despite having left it for the same reasons.

Besides economic, political and social factors, family ties formed on the spot have, without doubt, contributed to the permanent settlement of Hadhramis in Africa.  In general the migrants arrived alone or with one or two other male members (brothers, sons, cousins) – but rarely females – of their family.  Indeed, although there are no statistics on the sexual division in very small number.  This almost exclusive masculine bias to Hadhrami emigration has had a logical and irreversible effect: an emigrant did not delay in taking a wife, even though he had already been married in the Hadramaut.

However, for some decades, migrations in the opposite direction, usually brief and recurrent, have taken the place of long-term migrations.  More and more young African Hadhrami leave home for a short while for industrialized, avove all oil-producing countries (Saudi-Arabia and the Gulf Emirates).  There the amass some savings before returning to Africa.  The Hadhrami’s economic situation, now less flourishing, encourages these trips, and according to certain informants, the discovery of oil resources in the Yemen may well provide some of them with an excellent reason for returning to their country of origin.

Another characteristic of this emigration is the wide geographical dispersal of the Hadhrami.  Today, the existence of Hadhrami communities on the whole of the East African Coast is witness in itself to the diversity of places settled by the migrants.

The places they chose were in the main those coastal towns which most favoured the spread of their activities, which were basically religious and commercial.

Hadhramis sometimes settled straightaway in one of these towns, its choice often determined by the already strong establishment there of a relative or compatriot who could render their social and economic integration easier and more rapid.

Social integration

The welcome given to Hadhramis in the cities which were already structured and organized, differed according to their social origins and the place of settlement.  In many places, a distinction was made between Sharifs who were awarded great respect, and non-Sharifs who, to the contrary, were shown little esteem.  This distinction arose from discrimination by local populations between poor Hadhramis and those descended from the prophet who, being literate and pious men, were more representative of respectable Arabia.

The reception given to Hadhramis of more modest origins was incontestably less warm.  These arrived on the eastern coast of Africa shortly after the Omani came to colonise it, in particular the island of Zanzibar, at the beginning of the fourteeth century.  They therefore found themselves in already structured and stratified societies in which political and economic power was in the hands of a local aristocracy and another Arab elite, the Omani.  The Hadhrami were marginalized by the dominant groups and had to settle on the edge of towns where, before building their own sections, they stayed amongst foreigners and slaves.

The little information provided on these groups by the colonial administration confirms their marginality.  It is effectively through commercial activities that the Hadhrami have been able to assure their economic situation.  Wherever the Hadhrami settled, they went in for commerce above all else.  Very dynamic, they did not hesitate to take steps to make their products available to surrounding African populations.  Their fortunes accomplished, they kept their wealth hidden or used it for economic ends, in contrast to the socially dominant categories (Omani and local aristocracies)who considered the ostentatious display of their possessions as the way to express their social rank.  Then the latter’s decline, after the 1845 and 1897 Treaties between the British and the Sultan of Zanzibar forbidding the trade in slaves and then abolishing slavery, gave the Hadhrami the opportunity to become the strongest economic group.

Inspite of their lack of capital – and despite competition from the Indians – the Hadhrami succeeded in controlling a large part of retail commerce on the East African coast and, to a lesser extent, the wholesale and and them, through commerce that the Hadhrami, thanks to their personal qualities (toughness where work was concerned and moral scrupulousness) and ability to adapt, succeeded in making a name for themselves in the economic domain and, at the same time, asserted their social position. 

It appears, then, that the roles played by the Hadhramis have varied according to their social origin: the role of the Sharifs has been essentially religious and sometimes political, while that of the others has been above all economic.  The economic role played by the Hadhrami is now acknowledged and is still important.

Cultural integration: influence and reciprocity

Through the interplay of marriages, the Hadhrami rapidly formed complex groups linked to their culture of origin (or, to be more exact, to that of their ancestors) and immersed into the local culture through their family milieu.  This duality between two cultural poles soon became blurred and has now completely disappeared among the descendants of the first immigrants.  They have broken off all relations with their country of origin in favour of rapid and often total social and cultural integration within two or three generations.

In order to do this, the Hadhrami have adopted ne cultural ways.  They have abandoned their own language in favour of the local one.  Today, the maternal language of the Hadhrami is Kiswahili.  They have re-oriented themselves economically towards commerce.  Thus the farmer has become grocer, the nomad butcher.  They have adopted customs, in particular music and dance.

In this process of cultural integration the Hadhrami role has not been a passive one.  It they have adopted certain local traits, then they have also helped transform the society into which they have been received.  Their contribution has been firstly religious, notably through introducing Koranic schools, maintaining mystic orders (tariqah), the cult of Saints interpreting Islamic law and translating scholarly works on Islam.  They have also played an important role in the development of Swahili literature, in particular poetry.  The most ancient examples of Swahili writings are works by Sharifs.  They have also introduced visible cultural features, particularly in clothing through the introduction of the veil (buibui) for women and in social behaviours (the discreetness of women’s public life).

Hadhrami influence, then, has contributed widely to what Trimingham calls “the Arab racial myth” : “It was essentially the emigration of Hadhrami Shafi’i leaders rather than of ‘Umanis (‘Ibadi) which was responsible for remoulding Swahili culture and imprinting it with the dominant stamp it bears today’

Although these phenomena of reciprocal acculturation have greatly contributed to the integration, both social and cultural, of the migrants, there are structural affinities between Hadhrami and Swahili societies which are not alien to such assimilation.

The migrants found themselves in societies where the dominant values were similar, thus compatible with those of their countries of origin.  As in the Hadramaut, it is the values of Sunni Shafii Islam, that is, their Islam, which are advocated.  The laws of marriage and of repudiation, the inheritance system and patri- or virilocal residence (excepting in the Comoros) are, among other things, identical.

The Hadhrami are now linked to other social groups of the East African coast both through common cultural patterns and forms (not lest language ) but also through religion, its social and judicial laws.

And if in certain countries like Kenya and Tanzania the Hadhrami still make up a specific social category, they have rendered their way of life consistent with that of the local populations.  In this sense they can be assimilated with Swahili populations since they cannot be differentiated by any fundamental cultural feature.

Conclusion

These few insights into the Hadhrami communities of Eastern Africa show that a complex play of demographic, social, economic and political factors has led migrants to free themselves from certain prohibitions and conditions pertaining to their society of origin.  We know that not all Hadhrami reacted in the same way and with the same intensity to the enticements of their new environment.  Nevertheless, their adaptation is discernible through their capacity to adopt new social and cultural ways (language, economic orientations, techniques) and in the specific case of marriage strategies.  These structural transformations and the acquisition of a new system of values contributed without doubt to Hadhrami integration.

It should be noted that, despite the same assimilation process, their identity has been affected differently.  In Kenya and in Tanzania the Hadhrami still maintain a range of characteristics ( concentration within the economic sphere, residential areas often separated, a greater cohesion within the community) which, more than is the case in the Comoros, gives them a specific identity within the different Swahili-speaking groups.  Doubtlessly because of the initial tendency to segregation by the majority of inhabitants and, perhaps because of the large number of migrants, the Hadhrami became integrated as a group.  The result today, in Kenya and Tanzania, is that the Hadhrami, just like other groups, constitute a social category with ing the stratification of Swahili.

In the Comoros, because they have been widely scattered among the population, the Hadhrami no longer have any distinctive characteristics which could set them off as a group.  Their integration, now fully realized, was favoured by the receiving society which was open to migrants, and absorbed them as individuals.

This difference in the partial or total loss of Hadhrami identity shows to what extent the social and cultural context has influenced the transformation of migrants and to what degree the roles offered and marriage alliances made possible have affected their destiny in an ineluctable way.

References:

 

1. The migrants were a good cross section of the population of Hadramaut … peasants, merchants and mercenaries kept company with men of the local holy families” (B.G. Martin;, The Arab Migrations to East Africa in Medieval Times, The International Journal of African Historical Studies 7,3, 1974:3676-390, 371)
2. See B.G. Martin: Arab Migrations to East Africa in Medieval Times, op.cit. and Notes on Some Members of the Learned Classes of Zanzibar and East Africa in the Nineteenth Century, African Historical Studies, Boston, IV, 3, 1971:525-545; see also Faouk Topan: Reseaux religeux chez les Swahili, Les Swahili entre Afrique et Arabie, op.cit:41-43.
3. The Arab population is quite as heterogeneous as the native… furthermore, many of the local Arabs have intermarried with natives and it is difficult to draw a dividing line between the interests of the two people … when any division by races is attempted under such conditions, anomalies are inevitable…”DC/MSA 1/3, Political Record Book, 1930.
4. The main decreases in Arab and native population are owing to the exodus of the Shehiri and the Hadhramas to Arabia”, R.C. Dickson, DC/MSA, 1/3, Annual Report, Mombasa District, 1925.
5. The closure of maritime traffic during the Second World War must have been one reason for the definitive settlement of certain Arab merchants, navigators or sailors obliged to stay put.
6. See Ysol Talib, Les Hadhrami et le monde malais, op.cit:68, and Farouk Topan, Les Reseaux religieux, op.cit.
7. J. Spencer Trimingham, Islam in East Africa, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971:22.

 

 

 

Natural Leaders of Native Muslims: A Perspective on the Emergence of Arabs in Colonial Java

 

A good deal of the scant scholarship on Indonesian Arabs has placed special emphasis on the community's significance to the history of Islam in the region, and particularly the Alawi-Irsjadi conflict that arose at the turn of the century. Undoubtedly, Arabs' place in the modern-day rise of Islamic movements and indeed the earliest proselytizing of the religion in this region deserve attention. The association of Arabs with Islam by Dutch scholar-bureaucrats carried over to the Indies the long tradition of European Orientalist scholarship that has been eloquently elucidated by Edward Said. Within the context of the Indies, however, Dutch concern about Arabs arose not so much because of Arabs themselves but because of the official belief that they exerted an insidious influence on a naive and gullible native Muslim population. ¹

With the imposition of restrictive travel and residential regulations (the pass and quarter system) by the Dutch led to the rise of physically separate Arab enclaves, the association of Arabs with Islam formed the basis of articulating an exclusively Arab culture. Not only did the association of Arabs with Islam shape Dutch policy toward Arabs, it was also fundamental to Arabs' very own efforts at creating a more exclusive cultural self-definition. The elite Javanese Arabs by orienting themselves towards the Ottoman Empire in the late 19^th century, initiated the articulation of something culturally "Arab" within the stratified and racialized world of colonial Java. The Alawi-Irsjadi conflict and other developments in the ensuing decades can thus be located historically in terms of contesting articulations of Arabness. Categorized with the Chinese as Foreign Orientals, Arabs occupied the middling political, economic and social position between the Dutch and the Javanese. Besides asserting the significance of the Dutch colonial context for the emergence of Arabs in Java it is believed that the study of Indonesian Arabs would gain from comparisons with the Chinese. Certainly, being Muslim, Arabs relationship to native Muslims requires special attention. However, it is important to remember that the emphasis placed on Arabs' significance to the politico-religious lives of Javanese Muslims is of relatively recent vintage. Historically, particularly in pre-colonial times, notions of ethnicity and Islam were far more fluidly constructed and gave rise, for instance, to intimate and valued relationships between Chinese Muslims and Javanese rulers.

 

 

As the 19th century drew to a close, a leadership of the variegated communities classified as Arab arose from the corps of headmen, landowners, and wealthy traders in Batavia (present-day Jakarta), Surabaya, Semarang and other major cities in Java. This emergent leadership found common cause in their opposition to the intensified and systematic mistreatment at the hands of the colonial officialdom. Rigid political control of Chinese and Arabs followed the economic depression of the middle 1880s. As travel and residential restrictions for Foreign Orientals were applied with much greater ferocity, there were widespread charges of ill-treatment of Arabs and corruption in the ranks of the petty officials who administered the pass and Quarter system.

 

The political awakening of Javanese Arabs was not solely a response to intensified policing and declining economic opportunities. As the century drew to a close, the signs were everywhere of a promising age and every aspect of life was undergoing change. Travel, communication, knowledge, even seeing, reading and listening, were being revolutionized.²

Driven by a desire for education and progress, Javanese Arab elites gravitated towards Istanbul, then the centre of Islamic civilization and modernity. Signs of a new orientation towards Istanbul among Javanese Arabs appeared in the last quarter of the 19^th century.

 

Limited for the most part to Singapore and Batavia, Ottoman political representation and influence in the region increased towards the end of the 19^th century. Besides the hope of seeking redress for their problems under Dutch rule by the diplomatic intervention of the Ottoman government on their behalf, the efforts of Arabs to create link between the archipelago and Istanbul also reinforced their position of leadership in native Muslim communities. Their economic and politico-level status in the Dutch and British colonies had already placed them far above natives. However, the relationship with the Ottomans provided new avenues to achieve their own aims while consolidating their position as an esteemed Muslim elite. The consolidation of Arabs’ position of leadership went hand in hand with the general rise of an Islamic political consciousness among urban-based Muslim trading groups at the time.

Arabs’ emergence as a pseudo-racial group as well as their prominence in urban Muslim milieus resulted from the institutionalization of racial difference and Islam in the colonial political economy, and the measures taken in response by Javanese Arabs themselves. On the whole, Arabs who assumed positions of leadership were from well-known Sayid families who were as much a colonial elite as a Muslim elite. They held administrative posts in Batavia and Singapore and collaborated with the colonial authorities on matters relating to Islam in the respective colonies.³   

 

 

 

By the end of the 19^th century, the Ottoman government recognized the importance of the wealthy Javanese Arab community of Batavia by posting a Consul to this city in addition to Singapore.

 For both the Ottoman government and Javanese Arabs the presence of the Consul in Batavia was mutually beneficial. The educational experiences of young Javanese Arabs in European-style Ottoman schools were unprecedented; there were practically no opportunities for such an education in Java as enrollment in the colonial school was restricted to those in the service of the government. However, there remained the older option of an Islamic education in the Hadhramaut and Mecca as exemplified in the lives of the infamous Sayid Oesman and the Batavian ulama Sayid Ali Alhabsji.

Javanese Arab elites strengthened their cultural position in relation to native Muslims and articulated a vision of Arab culture by claiming Istanbul as their politico-religious center. Intrinsic to the making of this notion of Arabness was the inculcation of a paternalism toward native Muslims. For Arabs, a sense of an Islamic mission civilisatrice, convinced its elites of their special and culturally exclusive role in native society. No better example of the institutionalization of Arabs’ leadership role in native society is to be found than the appointment of an Arab-Sayid Oesman-and not a Javanese, to the Dutch-created position of Mufti of Batavia.

The orientation towards Istanbul was only the precursor to complex developments in which the pattern of Arabs’ self-identification as leaders of native Muslims repeated itself. Whether Arabs elites called for the constitution of Arab culture in the model of modernist Islam or the reactionary defense of sayid authority, each of these movements directed Javanese Arabs –mostly born in Java and raised by Javanese Arab if not Javanese women-away from their tendency towards hybridity in daily life, political ideas, and religious beliefs.⁴ In this regard the challenge to sayid privileges by members of the reformist Islamic organization Al-Irsjad, officially established in 1915, ought not to be narrowly viewed as a simple importation of the tensions that historically existed between sayid and syekh (a competing social and religious elite claiming descent from reputable scholars) in the Hadhramaut.

 

REFERENCES

1. Souck Hurgronje, Ambtelijke adviezen, vol. 2, pp. 1684, 1698, 1701.
2. Bumi Manusia (Petaling Jaya: Wira Karya, 1983)
3. Lee, The British as Rulers, pp.269-70; Alsagoff, The Alsagoff Family, pp. 15-40.
4. Berg, Hadhramaut, p.110    

 

RELIGIOUS LIFE IN THE MALAYO-INDONESIAN WORLD 1850-1950: THE HADHRAMAUT CONNECTION

 

 

One of the most important destinations for Malay visitors to Arabia, and also an important point of origin for Arabs visiting Southeast Asia, was the southern tip of the Arabian peninsula: Yemen and the Hadhramaut. Indeed, this region was home to important sites of Islamic learning which attracted Malay scholars seeking to deepen their knowledge of the Islamic sciences. Moreover, many Arabs originating from this area emigrated to the eastern extremity of the Muslim world, established resident communities there, and served as a conduit for the transmission of Islamic ideas from West to East.

 

That Hadhrami Arabs played a crucial part in the eastward emigration of Arabs during the 19th century has long been recognised. Writing in the 1880s, L. W. C. van den Berg devoted a special study to Hadhrami colonies in the Netherlands East Indies, and in doing so acknowledged the primary Hadhrami profile of the East Indies Arab community. Subsequent scholarship has consistently confirmed that if we are to assess the role and influence of Arab immigrants in the Malay world during the colonial period, a primary focus should be placed on the immigrants from the Hadhramaut and the links which they maintained with their place of origin.

 

On the question of the Hadhrami contribution to religious life in the Malay world, surviving evidence is more limited. Nevertheless., this fact should not deflect scholarship from this important endeavour, given the undoubted influence which the Hadhramis had upon the emerging character of Malay Islam, supplemented by the numerical significance of Malays within the broader Muslim world.

Hadhrami society has traditionally attached great importance to religious belief, identifying it as a primary focus of life and social interaction. This is especially the case with the class of Sayyid (who claim to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammad through Husein), as well as middle levels in Hadhrami society. In this context it is not surprising that Hadhramis attached importance to the religious education of their children, especially the males [Van den Berg 1989:55]. Schools offering a broad menu of Islamic subjects were traditionally attached to the generous supply of mosques found in Hadhrami towns. Such schools provided instruction not only to local Hadhrami boys, but also to the sons of Hadhrami emigrants, many of them mixed race, who were sent from the Malay world back to the Hadhramaut to receive an instruction in Arabic and the Islamic sciences to ensure that they did not lose their heritage [Van der Meulen & Von Wissman 1964:89, 96]. This respect for the importance of education underlies the comment by Yazid b. Maqsam al-Sadafi who wrote "Greeting Hadhramaut! The followers of tradition, research and study know thee distinguished by judgement amid Barbarian and Arab, in days of Ignorance and Islam" [Stark 1936: 2033].

Also important to Hadhramis is the maintenance of and visits to the tombs of holy people, usually men. One of the most popular tombs is that of Ahmad b. 'Isa al-Muhajir, who migrated to the Hadhramaut in 952 AD and is regarded as the ancestor of the Sayyid group within Hadhramaut throuqh his second son 'Ali [Kostiner 1984:207]. In addition, the Hadhramaut landscape is dotted with the tombs of other holy men, which serve as important sites of pilgrimage for the local residents. But the most important tomb which provides the Hadhramaut with a genuinely international reputation is that of the Prophet Hud, which is surrounded by a substantial complex and which serves as a site of pilgrimage for Arab communities beyond the immediate Hadhramaut vicinity.

An important feature of Islamic practice in the Hadhramaut was the preponderance of the Shafi'i school of law. Indeed, van den Berg [1989: 55-56] observes that so complete was its dominance of the Hadhramaut that alternative schools of law, as well as other Islamic sectarian differences, were largely absent from the region. Moreover, he reported a total absence of non-Islamic minorities in the Hadhramaut, such as adherents of Christianity or Judaism. This contrasts starkly with neighbouring Yemen, where sizable Jewish communities had existed for centuries.

Hadhrami society had been very stratified for centuries. The group of Sayyids, as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, had come to represent the social elite who by birthright inherited a mantle of theological wisdom and unchallenged authority in the religious sphere. They exercised this authority in various contexts, such as leading ceremonies, serving as educational instructors in religious schools, and acting as mediators between parties in conflict. Their authority in this field was supplemented by the shaykhs, a group of religious scholars whose credibility derived from training rather than birthright. Below these two groups were the gabili or members of tribes, and the masakin or poor citizens [de Jonge 1993:76]. Though Hadhrami immigrants to the Malay world were drawn from all these groups, it is likely that a significant proportion was drawn from the Sayyids, who were thus well equipped to project a Hadhrami religious profile in the Far East.

 

The Hadhrami Impact on Malay Religious Life to 1900

 

The immigration of Hadhramis in significant numbers to the Malay world and, to a lesser degree, to East Africa, was due to a variety of factors. Serjeant [1988:149] attributes the underlying causes to the clash of great powers: the Portuguese domination of the Indian Ocean, and the Turkish conquest of Yemen. Other factors suggested by scholars include the inability of the territory of the Hadhramaut to support its growing population, continual warfare between the various Hadhrami tribes [Kostiner 1984:206-209], easier access by sea from the Middle East, and the increasingly prosperous environment of Southeast Asia [Roff 1967:4O], The effect of these changing circumstances was dramatic. From as early as the 17th century there was a great movement of Hadhramis, particularly sayyids, towards the east, with the first destination being the Indian sub-continent. The sayyids and sheikhs found upon arrival in their new locations that they immediately had considerable prestige in the eyes of the local populations because of their special religious status [Serjeant 1988:149].

 

Hadhrami sayyids arrived in the Malay world relatively early in the Islamic period in Southeast Asia. Hadhramis had settled in Malacca during its period of great prosperity in the 15th century, and in 1699 an Arab dynasty was installed in the Sultanate of Aceh [Serjeant 1988:149-150]. The founder of the Pontianak Sultanate in 1771 was a Hadhrami, Sayyid 'Abd Rahman al-Qadri. Another Hadhrami, Sayyid 'Ali b. 'Uthman b. Shihab became Sultan of Siak in 1782 [Kostiner 1984:221]. The first community in the Palembang area, which was to become an important centre of Hadhrami activity, was established from around the beginning of the 18th century.

Such initial settlements were to act as reception points for the much more significant waves of Hadhrami immigrants arriving during the 19th century. The two great early centres of Hadhrami immigration in the Netherlands East Indies, Palembang and Pontianak, were supplemented by various locations in Java which received large-scale Hadhrami immigration from around 182O [van den Berg 1989:74], The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 further stimulated the move of Hadhramis eastward. Population statistics provide an effective insight into the rapid growth of the Arab, largely Hadhrami, population of the Netherlands East Indies. In 1900 this community stood at 27,000 while by the beginning of the short period of Japanese rule beginning in 1942, the numbers had swelled to around 80000 [de Jonge 1993:74-75]. Though these numbers may seem insignificant in the context of the total population of the Malay world, the respect in which this immigrant group was held, especially in religious matters, meant that their influence far outweighed their numerical presence.

 

Though economic imperatives were a primary factor in attracting the Hadhramis to the Malay world, the sayyids among them were readily recognised by the local population as the highest ranking religious authorities owing to their line of descent from the Prophet [Serjeant 1988:152]. Many non-sayyid Hadhrami immigrants possessing less credible claims to expertise in religion benefited by association and were automatically accorded recognition as authorities in this field by local populations. As a result, a number of the Hadhrami immigrants became religious teachers and imams in the communities where they established themselves. By the late 19th century, settlements in Palembang and Pontianak had been supplemented by communities in Batavia, Ceribon, Tegal, Pekalongan, Semarang, Surababya, Sumenep (Madura) and Singapore Kostiner 1984:209], so Hadhramis were well placed to exert their influence on religious life in wide ranging locations throughout the Malay world.

 

The situation described by van den Berg in this regard in the 1880s is enlightening. He records that only around fifty Arabs were serving as religious teachers in the Netherlands East Indies at this time, with most of them being peranakan Arabs. The students of this group numbered approximately 1000. Sixteen Arab instructors were involved in teaching various aspects of religion - theology, jurisprudence, philology - to adult Indonesians, and one of the largest centres for the above-mentioned instruction was at Sumenep, where eight teachers were involved in providing religious instruction to 54O students, of whom around fifty percent were adults. Van den Berg also observed that in Garut, female teacher from Arabia was employed to teach religious subjects to female children [van den Berg 1989:103-1043.

In addition to the quiet contributions to the development of Malay Islamic life made by anonymous Hadhramis such as those who filled the above-mentioned positions as imam in various parts of the Malay world, we are able to trace specific literary contributions made by Hadhrami religious writers, sometimes with the assistance of Malay translators. For example, the Hadhrami author Ahmad b. Wasan b. 'Abd Allah Haddad b. Sayyid ‘Alawi, from the Hadhrami city of Terim which was famous as a centre of religious activity, composed a work on mysticism entitled Sabil al-hidayah wa al-rishad fi dhikr nubdah min fada’ il al-kutb al-haddad. This work was rendered into Malay in 1809 by a Malay scholar from Penyengat, Riau [Winstedt 1969:153].

An important location where Hadhrami immigrants made a significant impact on religious life in the Malay archipelago was in the Sultanate of Sumenep, under Sultan Paku Nataningrat, who was a great admirer of Arab and Javanese literature. This Sultan engaged the Hadhrami Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rayti as his teacher, and was so impressed with the results that he set about attracting Arab scholars to his court by way of providing allowances and facilitating theological and literary research [van den Berg 1989:108]. In this way, Sayyid Shaykh b. Ahmad Bafakih was engaged as an instructor for the children of the Sultan, a task which he carried out for twenty-five years before falling from grace after the death of Sultan Paku Nataningrat.

 

After 1900, another dimension is added to the Hadhrami experience. The substantial immigration continued and, indeed, increased in volume, and their various contributions by way of serving as imams in mosques and teachers of Islamic subjects in schools were also carried on. However, in the first decades of the 20th century a "boomerang effect" was in evidence with regard to the influence of Hadhrami emigres upon their original homeland because of developments in the Malay world. The sections which follow will focus upon the continuing Hadhrami contribution to religious life in the Malay world, as well as the return contribution by Hadhrami emigres to religious thought in their native land.

 

The Muslim modernist movement, which owes so much to the Egyptian writer and thinker Muhammad 'Abduh, had four primary goals as follows [Gibb 1947:33]:

 

1. the cleansing of Islam from corrupting influences and practices
2. the reformation of Muslim higher education
3. the reformulation of Islamic doctrine in the light, of modern thought
4. the buttressing of Islam against Western (Christian European) assaults

 

Of great significance to Muslims in the Malay world., be they Hadhrami immigrants or local Muslims, was the fact that the modernist movement challenged the exclusive right of established scholars to interpret the message of the Qur'an. Rather than calling on Muslims to unquestioningly follow the interpretations compiled over centuries of scholarship, the modernists challenged Muslims to use their critical capacity for rational judement in interpreting the primary sources themselves: the Qur'an and the Sunnah (the way of the Prophet).

 

Thus again we find that Hadhrami Arabs, though relatively small in number, were making a major contribution to the transmission of religious thought to the Malay world. In this case, however, it should be noted that the Hadhramis in question were drawing on Egypt for their ideas, and processing them in the Malay world; i.e. the Hadhramaut itself was not involved in this process initially.

 

Inevitably as time went by the Hadhrami community in the Malay world, consisting of immigrants and their mixed-race offspring, found itself faced with increasing assimilation to the local population. In an attempt to shore up their distinctive heritage, in 1901 a group of Arabs based in the Netherlands East Indies founded the Jamiyat al-khayr, for the purpose of maintaining Arab culture and language, opening their own schools, and formalising the process of sending Arab youth to the Arab world for their education.Among the teachers recruited in the Arab world by the Jamiyat al-khayr was Ahmad Surkati, a Sudanese who was a trained religious scholar, who arrived in the Netherlands East Indies in 1912 [de Jonge 1993:81].

 

However, Surkatl was arriving from the Arab world at a time when modernist, ideas were introducing a new dynamism to Islamic thought in the region, and he was to act as a vehicle for disseminating these ideas in the Malay world. Surkati was opposed to the traditional elitist role allocated to the sayyids within Hadhrami society, a role which translated into automatic deference to the sayyids, kissinq their hands in greeting, and accepting that the children of non-sayyids could not marry into the sayyid class. Such traditional conservatism represented exactly the kind of teaching which the modernists in the Arab world regarded as syncretistic and were determined to challenge. Moreover, the automatic acceptance of the sayyids as a source of religious authority paralleled the case throughout the Islamic world where centuries of accumulated dogma had been presented as a source of authority which should not be questioned; this too was under challenge by the modernists. Inevitably, Surkati and his supporters aroused the ire of the traditional forces among the Arab population in the Netherlands East Indies which had set up the Jamiyat al-khayr. Through manouverings by a qroup of sayyid opponents of Surkati, he was forced out of the Jamiyat al-khayr, and in response formed his own alternative grouping, the Jamiyat al-islah wa al-irshad, commonly known as al-Irshad.

 

Hadhramaut saw the British as an effective means of preventing the spread of the kind of modernist challenge to their authority which was taking place in the Netherlands East Indies. Many leading sayyid families, such as the al-Kaf, al-Attas and 'Aydarus families, sought and were able to persuade the British to prevent the formal importation to the Hadhramaut of organisations directly linked with modernist movements, be they in the Arab world or in the Netherlands East Indies. Sayyids in Singapore used their influence with the British in that location to assist in "quarantining" Irshadi influence and preventing it from entering the Hadhramaut. [Kostiner 1984:220-222].

 

Nevertheless the spread of religious thinking and ideologies cannot be prevented through legislation, and inevitably, with the regular traffic between the Netherlands East Indies and the Hadhramaut, information relating to the sayyid-Irshadi dispute in the Netherlands East Indies, and indeed the arguments on both sides of this dispute made their entry to the Hadhramaut proper. During her visit to Hureida in the mid—1930s, Freya Stark heard in detail about the far off dispute among Hadhramis in Java, which was presented to her, in a most passionately involved way from the sayyid point of view, by the Mansab of Hureida, Sayyid Muhammad b. Salim al-'Attas. After encountering further references to this dispute in other parts of the city, Stark described the sayyid-Irshadi polemic as "...the burning topic of Wadi ‘Amd" [Stark 1936:243]. Likewise, van der Meulen and von Wissman [1964:121] heard discussion about the same issue during their visit to Sewun, the largest town in the Hadhramaut, in the early 193Os.

 

With the arrival arid spread of ideas of social emancipation associated with the modernist movement, it was inevitable that it would only be a matter of time before Hadhrami society itself was to be subject to the social challenges and turmoil experiences in the Netherlands East Indies. Indeed, though in the 1940s the sayyids were still the most powerful element in the Hadhramaut proper, internal differences had appeared within the sayyid group between those with family contacts in the Netherlands East Indies and those without. Typically, those who were without family in the Malay world represented the most conservative points of view, were opposed to modernisation, tended to be pro-British and were often inclined to mystical practice [Kostiner 1984:224]. The final element which was to cause art undermining of the position of the sayyids came with the stirring of nationalist awakenings against British rule in the Hadhramaut itself. This nationalist dynamic was also directly linked to Hadhramis based in the Netherlands East lndies, who returned to the Hadhramaut in large numbers after the independence of Indonesia in the late 1940s and 1950s, owing to the Indonesian government's restriction on immigration and on financial remittances (muwasalat) by Hadhramis based in Indonesia to their compatriots in the Hadhramaut, which had been the mainstay of much of the economic activity in the Hadhramaut for generations [Kostiner 1984:228].

Thus, the Malay world had played an essential function in bringing about change in the Hadhramaut itself. The surge in modernist thinking, which characteristically had originated in the Arab world and moved to the non-Arab Muslim world, had happened in reverse in this instance. The geoqraphical periphery of the Muslim world, namely the Muslim states of Southeast Asia, had processed Islamic modernist ideology emanating from Egypt and had transmitted it to a part of the Arab world, namely the isolated regions of the Hadhramaut which had hitherto been relatively sheltered from dramatic and innovative developments in religious thought.

There can be no doubt that Hadhrami Arabs made a significant contribution to the religious life of the Malay world. This was especially the case in communities where there was a high proportion of very literate sayyids, such as Palembang and Pekalongan. The private libraries of sayyids usually consisted of manuscripts and books imported from locations in the Muslim world such as Egypt, Istanbul and Syria, and they thus drew on these important sources of classical Muslim thought in carrying out their various religious activities during the 19th century [van den Berg 1989:110]. Although the Arabs in the Netherlands East Indies were rarely aggressively proactive in undertaking the spread of Islam, their influence on the religious life of Indonesian and Malay Muslims should not be under-estimated. Indeed, had the Hadhramis not been present in such significant numbers and at crucial locations throughout the Malay world during the colonial period, the face of Islam in modern Southeast Asia may well have been very different.

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

-  Berg, L. W. C. can den. 1989. Hadhramaut dan Koloni Arab di Nusantara, Trans R. Hidayat. Indonesian Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies, 3, Jakarta:INIS.

-  Gibb, H. A. R. 1947. Modern Trends in Islam. Chicago: University of Chicago.

-  Roff, W. April 1970. “Indonesian and Malay Students in Cairo in the 1920s.” Indonesia (Cornell) (9):73-87

-  Stark, F. 1936. The Southern Gates of Arabia, a Journey in the Hadhramaut. London: John Murray.  

 

SHARING SWEET HAPPINESS AND BITTER GRIEF : ARAB HADHRAMI DESCENDENTS IN THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO

Arabs have lived in the Indonesian Archipelago for many centuries.  Arab traders came from the Red Sea and Persian Gulf to the Indonesian archipelago via the silk route (Persia-India-Burma-Malaya and China) even before Islam. After the advent of Islam, and particularly during the Abbasid period in Baghdad, traders and Muslim preachers came from what is now Iraq and the Gulf States.  The traders dealt mainly in spices, which they shipped from the Indonesian archipelago to the Persian Gulf harbours, and from there sent by caravan to other parts of the Middle East and the Mediterranean for points in Europe.

 

Some Hadhramis came to Indonesia by sailing ships in the 18th century. The Sultan of Pontianak in Borneo, from the Algadri family, and the influential Albashayban family of Cirebon on the north coast of Java, arrived during this period.

 

The next great wave of immigration occurred after the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869.  The Hadhramaut at that time was very poor.  The people there soon heard that many economic opportunities existed in the British colonies of the East - India and Malaya - and in the Indonesian archipelago, as well.  Hadhramis boarded the steamships stopping in Aden and began their journey eastward.

 

During the migrations of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Arabs from the Hadhramaut settled in South Sumatera, and the towns on the north and east coasts of Java. 

 

Throughout the centuries, the Arab settlers combined trade and religious work.  The Arabs, many of whom were descendants of the Prophet, were seen by the local population as holy men and authoritative in religious matters.  Some Arab descendants are, to this day, revered as saints. 

 

From the 19th century onwards, many Arabs traded in batik textiles. Arab batik traders collaborated in establishing the Sarekat Islam.  Formed in 1911, the organization promoted Indonesian commercial enterprise and. in particular, sought to protect the local textile market which was being undermined by the Dutch and their importation of textiles from Holland.  A number of Arab activists played key roles in the Sarekat Islam: Hassan Binsmit, Alim Algadri, Al-Aydrus, and Bajuneid.

 

Arab Indonesians also traded in horses.  My grandfather was among them. The horses were purchased wild from Indonesia's eastern islands and sold to Javanese, usually in auctions.  Once a family became wealthy from trading, they often moved into real estate.

 

 

 

TIES WITH THE HADHRAMAUT

 

From the perspective of the late 20th century with our easy global communication, it seems incredible that so much communication and movement of people between the Hadhramaut and the Indonesian archipelago did take place in centuries where travel and correspondence were so much more difficult.  The opening of the Suez Canal and the development of steamships represent a major landmark in communication between the two areas.

 

Many Hadhrami immigrants were still arriving in Java and Sumatera in the early years of the 20th century.  Others, many of whom had married Indonesian women, returned home to the Hadhramaut.  In general Hadhrami women did not migrate to the east.  The immigrant men instead married local women wherever they settled: Javanese in Central Java, Sundanese in West Java, Sumatrans in Sumatera etc.  Most wives were Muslim, although Arab men even married Chinese women.  The Arab men, particularly those descended from the Prophet, were very eligible bridegrooms!   Thus, the pure Arab immigrants or ulaytis took local wives.  Their children became muwallads through their Indonesian mothers.

Usually it was only the wealthy who returned to the Hadhramaut, since it was so expensive to return.  The villages in the Hadhramaut always expected their kin from Indonesia to bring lavish gifts and this required considerable wealth.

 

When persons left from Java to travel to the Hadhramaut, they used to pack considerable amounts of food to take with them, even conserved durian, because they thought these foods would be welcomed by their kin in the Hadhramaut.

 

Immigrants sent remittances back to the Hadhramaut, which was so poor in comparison to Java.  Usually an agent or wakala was used, since the post was nonexistent or unreliable at that time.  The recipients of the remittances used the money for daily subsistence.  It was difficult to send remittances during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia (1942-1945) and following independence in South Yemen in 1967.  These periods must have been difficult for the Hadhrami families who had become accustomed to support from their affluent Indonesian relatives.

 

THE ARAB DANGER

 

When Arab traders and preachers came to the Indonesian archipelago they usually married women from the local Muslim population.  The Arab migrants' piety accorded them much respect with the local people, and as a result of this status, they married the daughters of the local aristocracy.  Over time, the Arab migrants came to be considered native, or pribumi, and themselves sometimes even became the local rulers. For example, the Sultan of Pontianak in Borneo was an Algadri, and the Sultan of Siak in Sumatera was from the Binshahab family.    In the Dutch colonial system, the highest administrative position that could be held by a local person was that of the bupati; he was an official just under the Dutch provincial governor.  Several of the bupatis of Central Java in the 1700s were Arab descendants from the Albustom and Albasyaiban families.

 

But the Dutch felt threatened by the Arabs from the beginning.  They arrived in Indonesia with many of the same sentiments that led the Crusades, a hatred for the Muslim "infidels".  Although they were Protestant and the Portuguese before them were Catholic, their policy toward the Muslims was. the same.

 

Through the centuries the Dutch engaged in the strategy of "divide and rule".  In the early years they divided the peoples of the archipelago into two groups, Muslim and Christian.  The Arabs were grouped with the other Muslim subjects, and had the same rights.  During this period some Arab descendants became local political leaders and even sultans.

 

The Dutch continued to worry about the Arab community.  By the mid-19th century, feeling threatened by the Arabs' political role, the Dutch passed the infamous law IS163, which re-categorized the Arabs as a minority like the Chinese.  Thus according to the new classification, one had the European settlers, indigenous pribumis, and Vreemde Oosterlingen or "foreign Asians."

These same people (the Dutch) designed the system of apartheid in South Africa.  Their policy from this time in the archipelago was called Wijkenstelsel in Dutch, and it established a ghetto-like system.  Arabs could only live in certain parts of the city, needed a passport to leave their quarter, and the men had to wear clothes to identify themselves as Arab.  By World War I all public places (cinemas, trains, etc) were divided into three compartments: European, pribumi and "foreign Asians".  Of the other "foreign Asians", the Indians were insignificant and the Chinese very significant demographically and economically.   The Dutch clearly saw the integration of the Arabs as a political rather than economic threat to their colony.

Many of the Arab descendants were, in fact, against Dutch rule. Abdurrachman Azzahir led the Aceh war against the Dutch in North Sumatera at the end of the 19th century.  The Arab community of Batavia (now Jakarta) were the first supporters of the Pan Islam movement.  This movement, led by the Ottoman sultan, was opposed to all European empires.  A number of the Jakarta residents wrote anti-Dutch articles in Turkish newspapers at that time.  The Dutch tried to fight back by paying a well-known 'alim of Arab descent to make fatwas against the Pan Islamic and anti-Dutch movements.

 

Later, in the 1930's, the Dutch again tried to make the local pribumi elites anti-Arab by creating a stereotype of the Arabs as moneylenders. The tactic was typically anti-Semitic, with Arabs being east in the role occupied by the Jews in Holland, Russia and the rest of Europe.  The Arabs fought back by taking a strong stand against money-lending.  One of the leaders of the Arab community at that time, Hoesin Bafagih, wrote a play called "Fatima" about the Arab hatred of usury.  The play was performed in the major cities of Java and was very popular with the general public.

 

THE ARAB OATH AND THE FOUNDING OF THE INDONESIAN ARAB PARTY

 

Initially Dutch propaganda against Arabs had a negative effect on Arab relations with local pribumi elites.  In fact, Arabs were not allowed to join the early nationalist activities.  The Young Indonesia (Indonesia Muda) and other political organizations had taken the "Youth Oath" on October 28th, 1928, in which they dedicated themselves to one fatherland, one nation and one language.  Indonesians of Arab origin were not invited to join.

As a response, a group of us formed the Indonesian Arab Party (PAI) and took our own pledge of loyalty to Indonesia.  On October 4, 1934 in the Central Javanese town of Semarang, we declared ourselves as Indonesian, not Arab, citizens, and at one with the local nationalists in our opposition to Dutch colonial policy. 

Initially, we were an Arab Union (Persatuan) rather than a Party (Partai).  At that time the Hadhrami community of Indonesia was divided into two groups, the Alawi (sawid) and non-Alawi (al-Irshad, i.e. qabili and others).  We, the young generation, were against this system of stratification.  And we recognized that colonialism had added a new dynamic to these divisions.  The Dutch were thrilled to "divide and rule"; any force that would compromise the moral and political power of the Alawi Ulama was welcomed by them.

 

The basic disagreement between the Alawi and non-Alawi was over marriage rules.  For example, could a sharifa marry a non-Alawi? Many conservatives thought that sharifas should only marry savyids.

 

Ironically, many liberal interpretations of religion and marriage rules came from Alawis.  In about 1912, a leading Alawi, Abdullah Alwi Alatas contributed 50,000 guilders for the founding of the Al-Irshad reform movement.

 

The young muwallads who had been educated in local madrassahs could read Arabic, and maintained active contacts with writers and publishers in Cairo, especially from the journal al-Manar.  It was this group that took the lead in forming the Indonesian Arab Party (PAI) in 1934.  The founder of the PAI was Abdurrachman Baswedan, a non-Alawi.  The Party's Central Board was composed of people from all strata.  The new organization formally abolished the system of stratification.  The title "Sayyid" could no longer be used as a term of address, and, in accordance with the custom of the Indonesian nationalist movement at that time, Arab descendants should call each other "brother". Persons of all strata joined in.

 

The Japanese invaded Indonesia in 1942 and occupied the country until the war ended in 1945.  The new occupiers banned all political parties, including the PAI.  They tried to isolate the Arab descendants as had the Dutch, by treating us as foreigners and imposing foreigners' taxes on us.  We remained committed to the struggle for independence.

 

Following the Proclamation of Independence in 1945, Sukarno was named President and Sutan Syahrir Prime Minister.  Political parties were re-established.  Now Indonesians of Arab descent could belong to any party, so there was no need anymore for the PAI. 

 

HADHRAMI IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA

 

The basis of Arab identity is one's silsila or patrilineal descent.  Our names refleet this descent, and would be familiar today in the Hadhramaut. Most of the Arab families have been in Indonesia for many generations, however, and there has been considerable intermarriage.  We are proud of our Arab heritage, but we are also very much Indonesian.  We see absolutely no conflict between our Arab descent and our Indonesian citizenship.

In recent years the Indonesians of Arab descent have distanced themselves from small trade.  A number are wealthy businesspeople, or involved in real estate.  Since independence Arab descendants have educated their children in modern (secular) schools and many are now professionals such as lawyers or doctors.

 

Ironically, it has been difficult to dhange the colonial article 163 of the "Indische Staatsregeling" which categorized Indonesians of Arab descent as "foreign Asians" like the Chinese.  Thus, until today, every time the Indonesian government makes regulations for minority groups in economic and business fields, for instance, Arab descendants are included.

 

Several persons from Hadhrami families are now ambassaders, in parliament, and in the Cabinet of the Republic of Indonesia

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

-  Algadri, Hamid (1968) Oath of the Indonesian Youth of Arab Origin, October 4, 1934. Sinar Harapan October 25,28.

-  Berg, L.W.C. van den, 1886, Le Hadhramout et les Colonies Arabes dans l'Archipel Indien, Batavia: Imprimerie du gouvernement.

-  Souck Hurgronje, Christian (1889)

 

HADHRAMIS ABROAD IN HADHRAMAUT: THE MUWALLADIN

 

In reality ‘MUWALLADEEN’ is an innocent word, though many Yemenis are using it as a bad word.  You can see in public places many Yemenis using this word to discriminate against Yemenis born abroad, and either of whose parent is a foreigner.  MUWALLADEEN are those who were born in foreign countries. Our fathers left Yemen for many reasons, and they stayed in foreign lands for a long time.  I am sorry to say that our parents were better treated by the natives of those foreign lands than are in our native country.  Our parents inter-married with the locals, and the result is ‘MUWALLADEEN’.  People are different in their looks, behavior, etc.  thus those who are prejudiced against MUWALLADEEN must please cure themselves fro their disease. (YT Jan 2 1995, p. 12)

HOME OR HALFWAY HOUSE? PLACE, MOVEMENT AND MORALS

Whether one feels comfortable or happy being in a place is affected by many things: the ability to make a living, how one gets along with kin, the colour of one’s skin, the sensual experience of the place, even the sun.  A place, experienced as a totality, determines one’s well-being in numerous ways.  Muwalladin are extremely sensitive to this, having grown up elsewhere and finding themselves here often not by choice.  If dissatisfied, they easily and naturally think of changing the whole environment and moving elsewhere, voting with their feet.  Indeed, the ability to move is itself part of being comfortable in a place.

Many muwalladin, especially those who were brought to Hadramawat in their teens or after, expressly do not like being there, and constantly talk of leaving.  They are ‘strangers at home’ because home is not where the heart is.  It is rather, an alien and unpleasant place into which they have been inscribed, first of all by their very names.  They may remain for decades, marry and progenate, yet never fully come to terms with the place. They often say the people here are cold of heart.

For these reasons, muwalladin come and go a lot, and don’t stay long if they can help it.  Between the requirements of kin, their own desires and the current status of their passport and pockets, their movements appear erratic.  Their relativist attitude towards placeness in general, and this place in particular, Hadhramaut, puts them at odds with those of locals and migrants who originate from here.  The latter, usually male, may remain forty years abroad without ever returning, despite having a wife and offspring at home.  Nevertheless, Hadhramaut, as home to him, has an absolute value: the intention to return is ever-present.  For those from Hadhramaut, their movements are constantly thought of in relation to the homeland.  Concomitantly, these movements are subject to moral criteria and moralizing commentary.  They are far away, suffering privation, for the sake of others back home, they return to be with their family and ancestors, for an authentically religious life.  The muwallad, however, has other things to worry about.  He has neither the existential commitment nor the memories of the migrant.  His starting point in life is not Hadhramaut, but Mombasa, Pontianak, Singapore.

It is perhaps this fundamental difference in attitude towards movement which the saying we started with expresses: the muwallad does not come to the hand, and in this he is like the pig and the dog.  For those who moralize movement, the erratic motions of the muwallad are looked at askance.

Muwalladin often string together narrative of their experiences in this place in terms of their movements.  At the same time, however, these experiences are shaped by how others view those same movements.  Moreover, as a direct product of migration to the outside world, his reputation already precedes him, so to speak: it is coloured by how locals conceive of that outside world, and its relation to the homeland.

THE CLEAN LIFE AT HOME

Despite the long and varied history of migration in Hadhramaut, there exists a strong, rejectionist current of thought towards it.  This is epitomized by the line, constantly quoted to me, al-sindwa wa la Jawa, meaning it is better to stay home drawing water from the well all day for the fields, than go to Java.  Less well-known is the fact that it derives from a poem by the judge of Taris, Muhsin b. ‘Alawi al-Saqqaf, who used to rule on cases of conflict involving migrants to Southeast Asia.

THE JOURNEY OUTWARD

The Maqama dhim al-dunya, by Abdullah b. Abi Bakr Mawla ‘Aydid, is a work of rhyming prose disparaging the world.  The term dunya equates a number of things: it stands for the world outside Hadhramaut, the corrupt material world opposed to the hereafter, and it is a synonym of money, in Hadhrami Parlance.

THE RETURN JOURNEY

If Mawla ‘Aydid’s travels outside Hadhramaut are materially motivated, Ba Kathir al-Kindi’s to Hadhramaut, as described in the Rihlat al-ashwaq al-qawiyya (Journey of Strong Desires) are the perfect opposite.  The migratory life is a two way street, one leading to purity of religion and ancestry, the other to contamination.

U-TURNS

Although human situations and actions—including those of muwalladin-are replete with ambiguity and hesitation, these can hardly be expressed in a literature so beholden to the moral standard.  Yet occasionally, such things do seep through.

CAT AND MOUSE

Unlike the muwalladin many of those one meets do not have much control over where they are or can go, at some point in their lives.  The reasons why they are here are many.  Some are the victims of wars, like the Indonesians I met in Aden, some are brought back to lead morally healthier lives.

 

HARM AND HARAM: MORALITY, PREJUDICE AND A PERSISTENT LACK OF COMMUNICATION

What is puzzling is the persistence of Prejudice against muwalladin in a society fundamentally and continuously shaped by migration.  The muwalladin are neither exceptionally good people nor exceptionally bad ones, in the local scheme of things.

Perhaps the main shortcoming of the muwallad is the lack of skill in or attention to playing with such partitions in order to create comfortable niches for themselves.  Without such management, one’s movements are exposed and seen to be what they are – erratic.

 

THE ARAB – CHINESE CONFLICTS IN JAVA, 1912

THE CHINESE AND THE ARABS

 

Under the Dutch East Indies system of civil administration both the Arabs and the Chinese were put into the “Vreemde Oosterlingen” or Foreign Asiatics.  In respect of their civil status their place was between the European and the indigenous people.

As the Chinese made the majority of the “Vreemde Oosterlingen”, this could possibly explain their earlier settlement that pre-ceeded the Arabs.

In addition, Chinese migrants, due to more convenient distance and transportation were also encouraged by their fellow country-men activities in the colony.  A condition which probably did not occurred in the Arab migration.

 

Although Arabs’ rendez-vous in the East Indies dated back to the 10^th century, yet no one had encountered any Arab settlement in the colony(1), as result of their commercial relationship.

It was later in the 19^th century information about the Arabs in the colony were more disclosed.

 

In this respect such hidden situation was partly due to a kind of separation made within the category of the “Vreemde Oosterlingen” itself.  Most of the time the Dutch East Indies government referred to the “Chineezen en andere Vreemde Oosterlingen”, in which the latter comprised the Arabs, the Moors and the Bengalis.  While the Chinese formed the great numbers of the “Vreemde Oosterlingen”, the Arabs were the majority of the “andere Vreemde Oosterlingen”.

The opening of plantation and mining in the 1870’s in Outer Java islands attracted more and more Chinese labour migrants into the colony.  Many of them later came to Java and engaged in trading and commerce.

 

Observing the long-established peranakan Chinese in Batavia in particular and the more or less stable influential authority of their officers, many of those Chinese new-comers, known as singkeh or totok Chinese went to further eastern part of the island, and settled in Surabaya, Bangil, Pasuruan and Madura.

Despite outnumbering the Arabs in almost every main cities in Java, particularly in Batavia, Arabs settled in the city, it is interesting to note that no serious riots or disturbances occurred in Batavia, neither in the city, nor the in the outskirts.

This leads us to examine the characteristics of both non-indigenous non-Western communities in Java.

 

The Chinese were both urban and rural people.  Many of them were agriculturists for centuries, others were involved in medium-scale commerce and retail trading, through which they extended their mercantile activities to the remote hinterlands.

Unlike the Chinese, the Arabs mostly concentrated in the coastal towns, following their predecessors who were for centuries engaged in coastal trading and some were preoccupied with preaching for the Prophet’s followers.

This may explain that the Arabs in Java were urban people.  Despite their economic activities which led them to frequent rural areas, very few Arabs liked to settle in the village(2).

Generally speaking, both the Chinese and Arabs were involved in money-lending business, of which the Dutch public opinion suspected as one of the causes decreasing the indigenous’ welfare.  However, the Dutch might think Chinese money-lenders were less excessive than the Arabs(3), for which derogatory reference of the “woekeraar” mostly meant to them.

In terms of economic penetration into the rural indigenous life which deeply affected their economic welfare, the Arabs might not be considered the ‘leading actor’ causing decreasing condition, but it was the Chinese who were blamed for unfavourable facts.  As early as the 1850’s many Dutch colonists or even members of parliament in Holland sneered the Chinese as the “bloedzuiger der Javaans”, bloodsucker of the Javanese(4).

 

For the Dutch government the Chinese might be a dangerous element in the economy of the colony, despite its dependencies on the Chinese in revenue-farming practices and in mostly medium-scale and retailing trade.  Whereas the Arabs were considered threatening influence, particularly as they and the indigenous people shared the same religion.  Although only few of the Arabs migrated to the colony under the ideas of religious motivation.

 

Observing such ambivalent attitude of the Dutch East Indies government, it is not surprising that colonial prejudice was not ruled out in response to any action caused by those members of the “Vreemde Oosterligen”.

However, much to the Dutch dislike against those non-indigenous non-Western elements of the colonial society, the Arabs felt that of the two communities, they were more deprived of Dutch partial attitude and policy(5).  Furthermore, the Arab feeling against the Chinese could be expectingly sour and bitter, given the latter dominating role in the arena where the two were long rivalries.

 

It was suspected that such fierce economic competition nurtured unpleasant feeling among the Arabs, known as Arabs’ hatred towards the Chinese(6).  Seeing the Arabs were much welcomed in the indigenous society as both were the Prophet’s followers, and since the indigenous people were more sympathetic towards the Arabs, in contrast to their antipathy to the Chinese, yet the Dutch government considered the Arabs could have caused greater dangerous situation when there were actions that occurred in the colony, particularly in the cities.

 

The Arabs feeling against the Chinese was not unrequited.  The political awakening within the Chinese communities or the singkeh-totok in particular in the 1910’s, contributed to their excitement caused by the triumph of the October 1911 Chinese revolution.  Expression of such excitement to some extent was seen by other members of colonial society as “Chinese arrogance”.  In early February 1912 the Dutch government had been fussed by their New Year’s riots occurred in Batavia and Surabaya.

 

During the New Year’s riots that lasted for one week, economic activities in the city was practically suspended.  One of the most obvious problems was the increasing rice-price caused by shortage.  Not only the indigenous inhabitants of the city felt the harsh impact of such Chinese action, it also affected the provision of staple food in hospitals, military camps and prisons(7).  People obviously blamed those self-interested Chinese who closed their shops and storehouses for days during the riots.

However, other part could also take advantages from such situation.  Many Arab traders sold rice at higher price and tried to bid rice from the Chinese’s stocks.  Needless to say, no Chinese would allow such thing happened which could damage their dominant part in rice-trading(8).

The Malay-Chinese press suspected the Arabs getting frustrated as their plot to twist the rice crisis into the Chinese disadvantage, namely an uproar among the indigenous inhabitants blaming the Chinese, did not work.

 

Therefore, distrust, suspicion from Chinese side came together with frustration; deep bitterness nurtured within other side might break into unpleasant consequences.

 

It could be anticipated how panic overwhelmed members of communities, particularly helpless women and children.  The Chinese immediately closed their shops and storehouses, the city trading activities were eventually suspended.

To restore peace and order in the city, police and additional military force were deployed particularly in the Arab and Chinese neighbourhoods.  Surprisingly, the police report did not mention any material damages, though victims from the fighting factions were either killed or wounded.

 

 

Concluding Remarks

 

The first decade of the 20^th century in the Dutch East Indies observed the new era within the colonial society.  This was the time of awakening spirit of modernism directed to the founding of various nationalist movements.

As early as 1900 the Chinese had launched their first modern movement through the establishment of the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan.  Although the original characteristics of this Chinese association was more on cultural basis, it was later extended into political objectives.

 

Given the varieties within the Chinese community itself, owing to different background of their origins and languages, it should be noted that such varieties were even more obvious in the Dutch East Indies, divided into the peranakan and the singkeh-totok groups.

Being the earliest migrants in the colony and well-acculturated into the indigenous elements, in addition to their long-established relationship with the Dutch authorities, the peranakan formed their own particular group within the Chinese communities in the Indies.

 

The Dutch policy towards the Chinese also bore dualistic views deriving from the fact that those two Chinese groups kept their dissimilarity, not to say they even disliked each other.  Different approaches taken by the offices that dealt with the Chinese, namely the Department of Home Affairs and the Office for Chinese Affairs contributed to such ambivalences towards the Chinese(9).

 

It had also been long observed that the behavior, activities and attitude of those Chinese in East-Java or “Java’s Oosthoek” obviously be complained of.

In the case of conflict between the Arabs and the Chinese, the Dutch government admitted the fact that Chinese annoying behavior towards the Arabs by calling names and bantering, flared up the Arab hatred into destructive reaction.

 

Statement of reconciliation was signed by notable members of both communities, agreeing that the Chinese and the Arabs would not made further fuss over the past and not troubling each other.

 

The Dutch East Indies government might be satisfied with its effort in ending conflict between the two races, yet, in fact, the case was not closed yet.

In the following weeks, further complaints and critics were raised by the Chinese government through its Consulate in Batavia.  As more casualties were from Chinese side, particularly those were killed during the riots; this could be a good reason for the Chinese government to raise the subject into diplomatic embarrassment of the Dutch East Indies government.

Political situation in their home land neither helped nor paid specific attention towards the Arab grievances.  Despite the fact that the Turkish sultans might claim nominal authority in the Hadhramaut, the country of birth of the Arab majority in the Dutch
East Indies, they could do very little due to its weakening international position.

 

Moreover, the Arab-Chinese conflicts might create precedent disputes for further disturbances in Java, dragging greater massa and spread into wider scope due to the complexity of the problems within the colonial society.  Economic deprivation, social discrimination, religious fanaticism and racial tension, to name a few.

Disputes between the Arabs and the Chinese might not be extended into minority – majority conflicts, as both were minorities and their case was exclusively economic competition.  Yet, the fact that the Arab advantages in term of religious solidarity or brotherhood could be later on exploited in the riots, bearing the anti-Chinese characters.

 

 

 

References

 

1. Th. Brodgeest, “Hadhramaut en de Arabieren in Nederlandsch-Oost Indie”, Nederlandsch-Indie Oud en Nieuw, September 1919, vol. III, no. 5, pp. 158-159.
2. For example, there were only 147 Arabs living in the extensive outskirts of Batavia in 1905, compared to 74,370 Chinese; see Bijlagen A, cit.
3. See L.W.C. van den Berg, Hadhramaut dan Koloni Arab di Nusantara, transl. from Le Hadhramaut et les colonies Arabes (1989, Jakarta:INIS), pp.87-90; B.Th. Brondgeest, op.cit., p.190
4. See “Sedert Wanneer het Gouvernement zoo anti-Chineesch geworden?”, Tijidschrift van Nederlandsch-Indie, vol.I, 1857, pp. 169-171.
5. “De Chineesche Pers”, Koloniaal Tijdschrift, 1911-1912, p.620; “Chineezen en Arabieren”, De Indische Gids, vol. I, 1913, p. 107; Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia (1973. Singapore: Oxford University Press), p.92; in the case of Surabaya, see letter of the Resident of Surabaya to Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies, 7 November 1912 no. 537, in MGS 19 November 1912 no. 2569; for Cheribon see “Verslag nopens de Plaats gehad hebbende een Vechtpartyen tusschen Chineezen en Arabieren ter Hoofdplaats Cheribon”, in MGS 18 November 1912 no 2553, Arsip Nasional, Jakarta.
6. Letter of the Advisor for Chinese Affairs to Governor-General, 12 November 1912 no. 375, and letter of the Assistant-Resident of Bangil to the Resident of Pasuruan, 29 October 1912 no. 8200/54, in Agenda no. 32219/1912.
7. “De Chineesche Pers”, Koloniaal tijdschrift, 1911-1912, p.353.
8. “De Chineesche Pers”, op.cit., p. 333
9. See Mona Lohanda, op.cit., particularly Chapter VII on debates among the two offices regarding Dutch policy on the Chinese.

 

THE HADHRAMIS IN EAST AFRICA : IDENTITY, INTEGRATION AND RELATIONS

WITH HADHRAMAUT

 

Until the end of the last century, the most important culture and society in E.A. was that of the Swahili people. The Swahili people lived mainly in stone towns of various sizes, on the islands, estuaries and immediate hinterland of the E. A. coast - from Mogadishu to northern Mozambique. These Swahili settlements towns - though not unified under one political authority or state since their founding around the 7^th century - have nevertheless formed one unified culture and civilization, with Swahili, Islam,             a predominantly maritime mercantile economy and a stratification system amongst a multi-ethnic population, as the defining characteristics of the Swahili people. And up to the recent past, the Swahilis have had more in common with other peoples living in the Indian littoral than they had with peoples living inland from them.(J. Allen,p.247). It is this Swahili society that the Hadhramis have been dealing with for centuries - since its founding to the present - through trade and actual settling in Swahili towns.

 

The influence of the Arabs (mainly Omanis and Hadhramis) on Swahili society has been very strong. Indeed until recently, the very identity of the Swahili people and their cultures was talked of in terms of the Swahili being "Arabs" and their culture as having been "transplanted" from Arabia to the E.A. coast. This view is now passe and the current view is that the Swahili people and their culture have originated from Africa; that the culture has developed a distinctive character of its own, different from those in the interior and those in other parts of the Indian Ocean. And Swahili society has absorbed people from both the interior as well as from the across the Indian Ocean. Of those from across the Indian Ocean the Hadhramis have been the largest group and have had the deepest impact on Swahili society.

 

 

Swahili society was traditionally (a) economically linked to South Arabia amongst other parts of the Indian Ocean, (b) culturally had more in common features with coastal societies of the Indian Ocean than with societies in the interior of Africa, (c) was culturally open, flexible and accommodating society to outside groups (both from the Indian Ocean and from the interior). Hence it was not difficult for Hadhramis - an experienced migrating nation - to identify with Swahili society, to play an important economic, political and religious role in it, and to be quickly integrated in it. Because Swahili society looked more towards the Indian Ocean, the Swahili Hadhramis could easily link with Hadhramaut through economic ties (economic networks amongst traders) and through Islam, to the important Hadhrami centers of learning and religion.

 

Because these centers of learning were controlled by Sharifs in Hadhramaut, and because the Sharifs play a special role amongst Hadhramis everywhere, the Sharifs came to play a critical religious and intellectual role in Swahili traditional society. In some places and at different historical periods they achieved the positions of becoming local rulers (especially in the Comoro Islands). Since in traditional Swahili society particularly since 1700 identification with Arabian ancestry was considered to be a privileged and a sign of high status in Swahili Society. Hadhrami identification with Hadhramaut was not difficult and was not considered to be a contradiction to integration in Swahili society i.e. to be Mswahili. Hence links with Hadhramaut - economic, intellectual, religious and kinship links - were normal and were maintained strongly or weakly, depending on the need and role in society (e.g. strong for religious leaders and merchants and less so for others). The Hadhramis were thus completely at ease in traditional Swahili society - both fully integrated and at the same time able to identify with their Hadhrami ancestries as well as maintaining several types of links with Hadhramaut.

 

Under the modern situation - during the colonial period and also since independence - the Hadramis found themselves within a different socio-economic and political framework. Those who had been completely Swahilised since the long past, found themselves as part of the declining Swahili society. And the "new migrants" who came in at the end of last century and the first half of this century, found themselves being treated as "foreigners" by the colonial powers, and since independence they had to deal with independent states which were rather hostile to them. Under the new situation their role became very restricted. The religious leaders found their constituency restricted to the Swahili Muslims - and even these were cut off between Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia and Comoro - with mobility along the traditional Swahili coast becoming increasingly difficult.

 

 

Under the new situation the question of identity and integration took a different turn. Firstly the Colonial Government (the British) considered the "Arabs" as a "non-indigenous" group and therefore foreigners in the colonial territories. Secondly the independent states in EA (Kenya, Tanzania & Uganda) consider indigenous Africans as their primary citizens - "Africans" meaning people who belong to the indigenous ethnic groups by descent. Foreigners - Europeans, Asians, and Arabs (both of Omani and Hadhrami origins) are considered to have become citizens by "accident" or more likely by "convenience". They are thus not considered to be really true Kenyans, Tanzanians or Ugandans and therefore are seen to be less loyal to these countries and more loyal to their countries of origin. Hence the question of integration into the "new nations" was a difficult issue, since ethnic/racial identities were basic criteria for inclusion or exclusion as an "indigenous" Kenyan, Tanzanian and Ugandan.

 

 

 

There are two situations which are rather different (a) the Comoro Islands and (b) Somalia. Both these are entirely Muslim societies. While the Comoros are part of the Swahili culture and society, the Somalis are a pastoralist inland type of society.

 

In   the   Comoros   despite   a   major   coup   de   etat,    those   people   of Hadhrami   origin   -   particularly   the   Sharifs   -   have   continued to play a critical  role   in  Society.

 

In Somalia  on the other hand almost all people of Hadhrami origins, despite their full integration in Somali society, have recently become refugees - like many Somalis. They have returned to Hadhramaut.

 

 

The Hadhramis and the 19th century Arabization of Swahili Culture

 

According to J Allen, immigrants from Hadhramaut came to E.A. in large numbers from about c.1880 to c.1950 mainly because transportation was cheap and that Pax Britannica had established reasonable security both on the Indian Ocean and in E.A. Large numbers of dhows called at Mombasa -annual average of 200 dhows between 1907 and 1918, and 166 between 1918 and 1939. Almost half of these dhows were Arabian and the rest were Indian, Swahili and Iranian. "The flood of immigrants in this period must have been exceptional, and undoubtedly largely accounts for the high proportion of Swahilis who can substantiate their claims to Arabian ancestry." Allen estimates that between 1907 and 1947, there were at least about 160,000 Arab immigrants who came to E.A. Although, by modern standards of immigration this is not a large number, in this case however, the Hadhrami immigrants tended to concentrate on several key Swahili towns on the Kenya and Tanzania coast (and the Comoro Islands). Given the smallness of scale of these key coastal towns, the impact of the Hadhrami on Swahili society during this period was very significant.

 

According to J.Allen "The 19^th and early 20^th century Hadhrami immigrants made their mark in all" cultural spheres of Swahili society - architecture, dress, literature, vocabulary etc." about 1900 Swahili mosques began, for the first time, to have courtyards and to resemble Hadhrami ones in other ways; early in the present century women adopted the full-length black veil of Hadhrami women, previously unknown; Arabic terms invaded the works of 19^th -century Swahili poets, especially those of Pemba; and many non-religious Swahili terms of Bantu origin were replaced by others of Arabic origin"(JA,p.243).

 

Other scholars (B.G. Martin, R.L. Pouwels and A.A. Ahmed) have argued that Hadhrami influence on Swahili culture goes back to the 13^th and 14^th century. A.A. Ahmed has recently argued that what he calls the "Hadhrami scholarly tradition", goes back a long way in history and that its influence on Swahili society runs deep. By the 16^th century, "There were already small communities of Hadhramis in the Lamu archipelago, Zanzibar and the Comoro Island. Most notably the Mahdali and Abu Bakr bin Salim families. From the 16^th to 18^th century there was increased Hadhrami influence in East Africa. However the most rapid period of ' Hadhramization' took place in the 19^th  century."

(A. A. Ahmed, p. 5 & 6, 1994). The absorption of the 'Hadhrami scholarly tradition'

 

in Swahili society, has had considerable influence on Swahili religious and literary life; and this "Hadhramization" process was carried out mainly by the Sharif families, but also by the Mashaikh families.

 

There are also well known Sharif families who became rulers in various parts of E.A. - such as the Ba Alawi in Vumba Kuu as well as several Comorian Sultanates which were ruled by Sharif faimlies.

 

To sum up then, Hadhrami immigrants to E. A. have historically played a significant role in the evolution of Swahili society, culture and civilization - in commerce and trade, in political, religious, literary and intellectual spheres.

 

The earliest waves of Hadhrami migrants to East Africa (from the 7th to 16th centuries) were completely integrated into Swahili coastal communities/societies. The Sharifs (descendants of the Prophet) and the Shafi school of Sunni, are intrinsic parts of pre Omani Swahili culture in East Africa. Both the Sharifs and shafiism (the two are almost inseparable) came to E.A. from Hadhramaut. The Hadhrami people are also considered to be very hard working people, very intelligent, with no cultural arrogance, and always pre-disposed to marry locally (even if they brought their Hadhrami wives with them). Finally the Hadhramis migrated to East Africa in small groups, a continuous trickle, rather than waves of large groups, and so were easily assimilated. These attributes of the Hadhramis, made them the most adaptable immigrant people, and so were easily absorbed and integrated in the Shahili communities all along the coast. Thus the pre-Omani Swahili communities of the coast had Sharif families and other families who were originally Hadhramis, but who had been completely integrated into the Swahili societies and became Waungwan Swahili.

In the 19^th century, the Hadhramis, encouraged by the Omani government, migrated into Lamu. It is this "new" migrant Hadhrami community, which has played a strategic role in the economic development of Lamu in the nineteenth century, and still plays the same critical role today.

 

The Hadhramis like the Omanis, were considered as "strangers" by the Waungwan and lived outside the town proper. They were more numerous than the Omanis and by the end of the century they constituted the largest migrant group in Lamu. The Hadhramis were well known for their hard work, frugality and strong ambition to accumulate and become wealthy. The lower stratum of Hadhrami society were very poor and traditionally (i.e. in their own society) performed all kinds of work - from manual labor to artisanal work. The higher strata generally carried out small shop keeping, traded as middlemen as well as traders exporter/importer.

 

The Hadhramis, unlike the Asians, the Omanis and the Waungwana played a significant role in both the town and mainland rural economies. Unlike the others, they actually worked and lived in the rural areas. On the mainland and as the century progressed, "there was a growing number of immigrant Hadhrami Arabs around the towns nearest Lamu. These Hadhrami cultivators farmed their own land until they grew prosperous enough to own slaves". "Later in the century, settlements of Hadhrami Arabs and Bajunis created a class of resident rural wenyeji, an idea contrary to Swahili and Omani Arab way of life that was essentially urban". (Ylvisaker 1979) .

In Lamu town the Hadhramis established a market at Langoni which served the Comoros, the slaves and later ex-slaves, the Bajunis and other "stranger" groups living outside the Waungwana area. This market soon completely overshadowed the traditional Waungwan market since the population of this new part of the town became larger than that of the old town. The Hadhramis bought goods from the Indian Wholesale merchants in Mombasa and sold them in Lamu town as well as the mainland. They also bought agricultural produce from Bajun/Swahili village cultivators, from the slaves and other Hadhramis and then exported it to other coastal towns and to Arabia, the Gulf and India.

 

"In earlier days, the Waungwana, as the only literate people, manipulated the old Lamu market because they were the only group who could communicate with the buyers of Arabia, Persia and India. They knew the secret of foreign trade. Now the presence of the Hadhramis threatened all that. Firstly, the Hadhramis had a wider network of relations, especially with other Hadhramis all over the Indian Ocean. Secondly, they had more readily available cash than the Waungwana, who had to depend on the barter system. Thirdly, the Hadhramis suffered no social consequences from opening the market for every customer. All of these factors afforded the Hadhramis more freedom to maneuver the market". "The Waungwana had been interested in keeping Lamu in isolation; the Hadhramis, on the other hand, were interested in opening Lamu up to other East African peoples. This integration, accompanied by peaceful relations, was essential for the progress of the Hadhrami business. The decline of the Waungwana made the Hadhramis the strongest economic group in Lamu". (Zein 1974).

 

During the 19^th century then, the Hadhrami's economic role in Lamu was very extensive, both in the town itself and on the mainland. Unlike the other groups they were involved at the level of direct transaction of commodities at every level especially in the rural areas. They were numerically the largest "stranger" group which competed -successfully - with the other active groups, the Indians, the Omanis, and the Waungwana. By the 1860s, the dramatic and rapid economic growth of Lamu was forcefully opening up Lamu society, and it is within the context of these changes that both the Omanis and the Hadhramis were being absorbed and integrated into Lamu Swahili society. And with this dual process of economic development and cultural and social integrated Lamu reached its economic and cultural zenith around 1870. However in the 1880s, Lamu's mainland economy began to decline because of the abolition of slavery in 1890.

 

 

The Wider East African Context

 

The Hadhramis penetrated the interior - first with the caravan trade at the end of last century - and later with the Railway (especially in Kenya) - as traders while at the same time spreading Islam and playing an important role in the new Muslim communities which sprang up in the interior. They did well in this dual role -of traders and "preachers" - becoming wealthy traders and important members of the inland Muslim communities. The role of "preachers" was continually reinforced by full time preachers from the coast -Sharifs and others.

 

Along the coast the Hadhramis who came in during the second half of the 19^th century, were reinforced by a continuous flow of immigrants, particularly during WW II, when the immigration to and remittances from the popular Far East was stopped by the Japanese. And given the hardship of Hadhramaut itself during this period, most immigrants came to E.A., especially through Mombasa. Thus the Hadhrami community grew in number and became the largest and later the most important Arab group in E.A.

 

The economic role of the Hadhramis has been very important in the entire coastal areas of traditional Swahili societies - from Mogadishu to the Comoro Islands. If we look at the coastal areas of Kenya, where Hadhramis are more concentrated than other parts of E.A., they have tended to specialize in certain economic activities. Many poor Hadhramis, especially from the Masakiin strata, have started as stevedores and porters and later moved up to small shopkeeping of grocery corner stores. The Hadhramis have also focused on long distance bus and truck transportation throughout E.A. (occupying almost a monopoly position) , as well as the sailing dhow sea transport. They have also monopolized the cattle trade, including ranching (at the coast) and the butchery outlets in all the towns. In smaller towns like Malindi, they have also gone into extensive grain and fruit farming as well as dairy.

Mombasa has had the largest concentration of Hadhrami population in the whole of E. A. partly because this is the port where most of the immigrants disembarked at and also because since the beginning of this century, it has been the most important economic town in the whole of the E. A. coast. Thus most Hadhramis, throughout E. A. - at the coast or in the interior - have contacts of one type or another with the Hadhramis in Mombasa. Even today, if one wants to go to Hadhramaut, wants to send remittances, wants to export commodities, wants to set up a business there, or wants to buy property, it is in Mombasa that one carries out best any of these activities. Hence all Hadhrami networks in E. A. either start from Mombasa or end there. Similarly all major Hadhrami activities -such as the most important Hadhrami Mugaddams (Headmen/Chiefs ), Hadhrami welfare societies, Hadhrami political activities, and the most important and influential merchants - all are to be found in Mombasa .

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Hadhramis in Mombasa maintained their stratification system. But as in all situations of major social change, this was not adhered to very strictly. There was high mobility of people with some Masakiin becoming wealthy and some Sadah, Mashaikh and Gabail becoming poor. And although marriages tended to follow kinship ascription, there were many known marriages across the strata divide - with Seyyid women being married to non-Seyyids and Masakiin marrying into Mashaikh and Gabali clans etc. Despite these cross strata marriages, kinship remained a strong principle and networks tended to be based mainly on kinship. Networks amongst traders tended to be wider than the kinship networks although the two often overlapped.

 

The Seyyids in particular had, and still have, the strongest network, stretching across the coast all the way to the Comoro Islands. They control most of the mosques, the important Maulid ceremonies held in all villages, the important Lamu Riyadha Mosque and College, and the many Madrasas throughout the coast and the interior. Through the Tariqa Al-Alawiyyah, the Seyyid have not only maintained their own E. A. network in a very highly organized manner, but have also maintained their strong links with Hadhramaut, the Gulf States and other Seyyid chapters throughout the Indian Ocean countries . Although in general the Seyyids have kept out of politics - Hadhrami or nationalist - they have nevertheless maintained their high status as the ulamaa and religious leaders everywhere in E. A.

 

The situation of social change during the colonial period and since has brought about the inevitable conflict within the Hahdrami society of how to cope with the modem situation - especially the question of education. The educational system was controlled by the colonial government and was strongly associated with the missionaries and Christianity. Should the Hadhramis send their children to these schools? The Lamu Sharifs (the conservatives ) opposed these schools and modernity in general . The Mombasan ulemaa, led by Sheikh Al -Amin Mazrui (of Omani origin) were the "modernist" who argued for adapting to the new modern situation including going to school. And the debate raged and covered many issues - especially the question of Bidah. The modernist won and most Hadhramis sent their children to school. Thus the present day elite of Kenyan Hadhramis all went through the only secondary school for Arabs which was in Mombasa.

 

The Hadhramis formed important Hadhrami wide welfare societies early during the colonial period to cope with the problems of the immigrants and their employment. Later on these welfare associations became involved in political issues, and towards the end of the colonial period - the 1950s - Mombasa was an important arena of political activities and debates. There was on the one hand the nationalist struggle being waged by Africans and on the other hand there were the Swahili people who fought for a separate coastal strip independent of Kenya. This demand was based on the legal status of the Kenya coast as being part of the Zanzibar Sultanate and therefore a "British Protectorate", different from the colony of Kenya proper (which started from ten miles inland from the coast). The Hadhramis, who the colonial government had treated as a foreign group, had been forced to fight to preserve whatever rights they had within the colonial system - they were at the bottom of the ladder amongst foreigners (Europeans, Asians, Omani Arabs, Hadhrami Arabs ) . They were hardly distinguished, in terms of rights, from the indigenous Africans. The Hadhramis were soon divided between those who supported the Swahili demand for Coastal independence - mostly the younger generation (the integrationist) and those who wanted a smooth transition of Kenya as proposed by the British to become independent, including the coast. This latter group were mainly the wealthy traders who later aligned with the mainstream nationalist movement. The coastal "independents" were viewed, by the traders and older generation, to be radicals who are likely to disrupt the coastal economy. Ironically the nationalists Africans were considered by the traders to be "conservatives".

The Hadhramis have been described by many writers as people who are hard working, careful spenders (thrifty), risk takers, prepared to do all kinds of work, friendly, intermarries easily within local communities of any ethnic group, and assimilates easily to non-Hadhrami cultures. They have also been described as people who are "clannish", maintain strong Hadhrami identity, keep close ties to other Hadhramis, and maintain close links with Hadhramaut. They like to send their children to Hadhramaut for "the hard education" of how to cope with life, send remittances home, and invest in property/business in Hadhramaut. There are Hadhramis who fit in with the earlier description - these are what one would call the "integrationist". The latter description fits some Hadhramis who can be categorized -as "non-integrationist". In fact

most Hadhramis are caught up between these two extremes – of complete integration and loss of Hadhrami identity maintaining a Hadhrami identity and isolating themselves from the local communities. This is a theme of serious debate amongst the Hadhrams everywhere -especially amongst second and third generations "muwalladin" -those born outside Hadhramaut and who have not lived in Hadhramaut. This issue may not have been important in the traditional Swahili society, where to maintain a Hadhrami identity was not necessarily contradictory to being a Mswahili -at least not during the- first one or two generation during the "Swahilization process". However, during the colonial situation in E.A., the Swahili community was in steep decline and undergoing major changes, the colonial governments treated the Hadhramis as "foreigners", and indigenous Africans (especially after independence) would not accept the Hadhramis as "Africans" or indigenous. To be "African" or "indigenous" was necessary if one is to be "fully integrated" as a citizen of the new countries. Under these conditions, "identity and integration" poses serious problem. Firstly there is no "Kenyan" or "Tanzanian" society or "nation" to integrate to. Secondly, to be an indigenous Kenyan or Tanzanian, one had to belong, by descent, to the "tribal" societies of these countries. And this is considered to be an important racial criteria necessary if one is to be an indigenous Kenyan or Tanzanian. And Hadhramis cannot be indigenous - culturally or racially - and therefore as non-indigenous groups, can at best, occupy a marginal position in the nation, ever; if they are legal citizens of the countries. Indeed even the Swahili people, who are culturally Africans, and most of whom have African racial origin, have been viewed at best, with suspicion, but normally as "foreigners" and certainly as non-indigenous people (in Kenya only the Bajun, amongst the many Swahili group are officially considered an indigenous African tribe). Others are in that "political limbo" of non-indigenous citizens. Clearly therefore, the question of Hadhramis identity and integration, during the colonial and independence period, poses serious problems.

 

 

 

 

If under traditional Swahili society most Hadhramis immigrants have been integrationist, under the colonial period (and since independence) they have been forced to review this issue. Many have tended to maintain a strong Hadhrami identity, strengthened their links with Hadhramaut and Gulf States and kept a very ambiguous attitude towards the larger question of "full integration" in E.A.'s new nations.

The "Present"- East Africa Since Independence

 

The last 30 years since the independence of E.A. countries, there have been many changes in E.A. and in the Yemen. These changes have inevitably affected the Hadhramis, their identity and their links with Hadhramaut. Although this period is beyond the focus required by the conference organizers, the question of Hadhrami identity and integration in E.A. is a long process which is all the time adapting to changing forces in E.A., the Yemen and outside.

 

Firstly the Saudi Arabian and Gulf States petro-driven economies have expanded and attracted Hadhramis in large numbers from Hadhramaut itself and from those in E.A.(Kenya and Tanzania in particular). Remittances and investments by Hadhramis in these "Arab countries", as well as development policies by the "femeni Government, have transformed Hadhramaut into a highly desirable "place to retire to" by both wealthy and the not so wealthy -Hadhramis. It has all necessary modern infrastructure. Thus land and property value has become very high. For the E.A. Hadhramis, the petro-economies of the "Arab countries" has provided considerable employment for the younger generation (who could not easily find employment in E.A.) and has provided a serious uplift to the Hadhrami export/import traders. The young Hadhramis have been able to send remittances to E.A., build houses and start businesses, as well as build houses in Hadhramaut. On the other hand the wealthy Hadhramis in the Arab countries have provided capital and business backup to Hadhrami traders, especially in Mombasa, and thus enabled them to begin challenging the traditional Indian monopoly in the upper league of the import/export business. This situation has made the E.A. Hadhramis look at the Arab Countries and Hadhramaut itself as attractive places where one could go, work and live reasonably well.

 

The South Yemeni Government had developed a policy of trying to attract overseas Yemenis to invest their wealth in Yemen, providing attractive investment conditions. Indeed the Government has been trying to attract professionals from overseas to go back to the Yemen and work. This call has been backed by the recent well authenticated discoveries of oil and many other mineral resources in south Yemen - including the Hadhramaut. Thus Hadhramaut has indeed become an attractive country - potentially rich, in addition to being an attractive place to retire to.

However the recent unity between the two Yemenis and the subsequent civil war, has slightly spoiled the attractive and idyllic picture which was forming amongst the Hadhrami in E.A. This however is unlikely to deter Hadhramis from making their normal visits or investing in Hadhramaut.

 

On the other hand, the E.A. countries have been going through serious economic and political crises in the last thirty years. The "removal of the Arab government" in Zanzibar (1964), the expulsion of the Asians from Uganda 1973, the Idi Amin reign of terror in Uganda and the civil war, the deteriorating political and economic environment in Kenya, the economic crises in Tanzania and the collapse of the Somali government and the subsequent flight of the highly integrated Hadhrami as refugees - mainly through Lamu and Mombasa and back to the Yemen. All these events have created serious doubts and ambiguity about the future of the Hadhramis in the E.A. countries  (the Comoro Islands 'are an important exception).

 

The Yemeni Association of Mombasa which took care of all the Hadhrami Somali refugees (financed entirely by the Hadhrami community) has since assumed sudden importance and significance. In the past the Association was considered mainly as welfare for the needy in Mombasa and did not have much work to do. With the Somali crises during which people saw friends and relatives, wealthy and well known persons all reduced to the status of helpless refugees with all their properties and wealth gone, it was a sobering experience for the Mombasa Hadhramis (and also for those in Lamu and Malindi where the refugees had to be catered for before reaching Mombasa.

The Hadhramis in Somalia (and also in the Comoro Islands) were the most integrated group of any of the E.A. countries, mainly because the Somalis are a Muslim people with long standing relations with Yemen. Yet the collapse of the state set in motion such chaos that neither Hadhramis nor Somalis could put up with it - and all left the country as refugees, with losses of property and close relatives and friends. A similar situation happened in Zanzibar in the 1960, in Uganda in the 70s. Could this happen elsewhere - such as in Kenya or Tanzania? These questions thus must have raised serious doubts amongst the Hadhramis, about their future in E.A. Under these circumstances, perhaps their Hadhrami identity becomes more important than the desire to integrate in the host society? And if this is the case, shouldn't they make "insurance" plans, if they don't have one, or reinforce their "insurance" if they have one? To reinvest back in Hadhramaut or think of somewhere else? Unlike the Asians in E.A., the Hadhramis have never thought of Europe, North America, Australia as possible alternative places to immigrate or retire to. To the Hadhramis, Hadhrmaut has always been the only place to go back to!

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

-  Ahmed, A. A. “The impact of Hadhrami scholarship on Kenyan Islam” unpublished paper, 1994.

-  Bujra, A. S. “The Politics of Stratification”.

-  John Middleton, The World of the Swahili, 1992

-  Ahmed I. Salim “The Swahili Speaking Peoples of Kenya’s Coast 1895-1965.”    

 

THE HADHRAMI ROLE IN THE ECONOMY OF THE RED SEA AND THE GULF OF ADEN C. 1830 TO 1910

 

People from Hadhramaut played a significant and often neglected role in the profound alterations experienced by the nineteenth century economy of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Adem, treated here as a single region.(1)  Developments directly or indirectly linked to the introduction of the steamship were mainly responsible for these changes, notably in the aftermath of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.  After outlining the nature of these changes.

ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION

The first steamship to travel the length of the Red Sea, the Hugh Lindsay in 1832, entered a maritime world whose underlying patterns had been set for centuries.  Most fundamentally, coastal and high seas sailing had developed distinctive vessels and schedules largely because of the seasonal cycle of winds and the nature of the coastline.  Cabotage and ocean-going vessels met at certain points, especially at Jidda, which served as the entrepot  for the entire region.  There, cabotage boats brought coffee and sorghum from Yemen, wheat and other goods from Egypt, and sorghum, leather goods, honey, clarified butter and slaves from Africa.  Relatively few of these commodities entered the holds of bats coming from India, whose cargoes of cloth. , sugar, rice, and salt, the latter as ballast, were exchanged largely for specie.  The ocean-going ships nevertheless depended on the services of the smaller vessels, which carried cargo, passengers and ballast between ship and shore.

 

This maritime world changed gradually and unevenly as European steamships superseded large sailing ships in long-distance trade.  With their enormous capacity for passengers and cargo, steamships demanded new and specialized port facilities, and port traffic no longer ebbed and flowed so much with the seasons.  New ports throughout the Indian Ocean stood at the center of more hierarchical transportation networks, and the ports themselves were often ruled b Europeans.  But his technological, economic and political transformation did not occur either suddenly or unambiguously.  In the Indian Ocean as a whole, sailing ships did not give way completely in the face of the supposedly technologically superior steamer.  Indeed, it was the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 which had a greater impact than the steamship in itself.  Moreover, European domination over the construction and operation of steamers was ever absolute, as the example o the Parsis from India demonstrates.

During the decades after 1832, European rule followed steamships in only a few enclaves long the Red Sea, and the new technology had a greater effect in extending the sway of the Ottoman empire and its Egyptian breakaway province.  British military ventures occurred in intense but sporadic bursts of activity, such as the occupation of Aden in 1839, and the Abyssinian Expedition of 1867-68.  Italy and France entered the scene at a later stage, establishing themselves in the Horn of Africa.(3)

Ottoman, Egyptian and European governments constructed and improved ports and urban facilities for the accommodation of steamships and the new traffic that they brought.  Thus Jidda possessed large new quays by 1869, built at considerable expense and in the space of a few months, while older quays had been renovated.  Ponds that had made landing difficult were filled in, and a levy built and lined with large stones.  Work was also undertaken to dig and enlarge the narrow channel which formed an entry for the port.  These building works involved intense but irregular patterns of activity, moving somewhat unpredictably around the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

The evolution of the Muslim pilgrimage also shaped the impact of the steamship and the Suez Canal on the maritime and urban economies of the Red Sea.  As steamship passages became available, more Muslims made the pilgrimage, and more arrived by sea.  Of the pilgrims arriving by sea, an increasing proportions travelled by steamship, and they began to come in large numbers from South and South East Asia.  A great increase in urban services was required, especially in Jidda, although these demands fluctuated sharply with the Islamic religious calendar, and from year to year.  Pilgrims required more accommodation, greatly stimulating building activities.  In contrast to the dilapidated houses of the early nineteenth century, Mecca’s buildings were undergoing extensive remodeling and expansion by the 1880s.  A massive sanitation campaign was also undertaken, especially in response to cholera epidemics.  

On shore, both Hadhrami and other Yemeni specialized in porterage and dock work.  In Jidda, the Hadhrami were reputed to be the more successful of the two groups.  Some men who had begun life as porters even became wealthy merchants.  On the other side of the Red Sea, Shaikh Ali Yahya al-Yamani arrived from Aden in the new city of Port Sudan in 1906, and managed within two years to obtain a contract to supply dock workers from the impoverished communities of Yemen’s southern mountains.  He held the contract till 1932, and was reputed to have become the richest man in the city.   It is not specified whether any of these harbour workers were Hadhrami, however.

 

The Hadhrami as Financiers

Hadhrami traders became some of the wealthiest financiers in the entire Red Sea region by the end of the nineteenth century.  In the late 1830s, Botta noted that the main and most prosperous merchants of the Tihama coastal plain in Yemen were from Hadhramaut.  In 1840, French observers noted the wealth of Hadhrami merchants in Jidda.  By the 1880s, Hadhramis had begun to challenge the predominance of Indians in providing capital in Hijaz, not only in Jidda but also as moneylenders in Mecca.  Across the Red Sea in Suakin, the richest merchants in the 1890s were Hadhramis, commanding more wealth than the Indian, Egyptian, Sudanese, or Ethiopian town dwellers.  In 1878, the most important merchant in the Somali port of Berbera was a Hadhrami.

The sources of Hadhrami capital are not entirely clear, but there are some straws in the wind.  A few poor Southern Arabians in the transport sector accumulated capital from wages, trade on their own account, and smuggling.  The Hadhrami who became financiers in Mecca often began their careers in the porterage business on the overland routes between Jidda and Mecca.  And, as noted above, the African slave trade was a lucrative source of capital accumulation.  Other Hadhrami made money in the coffee trade of Yemen, where the Hadhrami were reported to be the chief inland purchasers in a Dutch consular report of 1873.  Arab purchasers were said to buy the coffee when still on the trees, and to deal with harvesting and preparation themselves.

Arab traders also owed some of their growing prosperity in relation to their main competitors, the Indians, to the policies of Ottoman and Egyptian authorities.  In 1858, an official monopoly over Jidda’s valuable salt exports went to a local resident, making it extremely difficult for Indian merchants to obtain a return cargo for their boats.  Four years later, the Ottoman government prohibited the importation of Indian tobacco into Turkish ports on the Red Sea.  And in the 1870s, Indian traders in Aden complained to the British that official policies had aided Arab merchants on the Somali coast to the detriment of their Indian counterparts.  British attempts to favour Indians led to strong Hadhrami reactions.  British authorities, acting on behalf of an Indian ship-owner, in 1858 seized a boat that had hoisted the Turkish flag in place of the Union Jack.  Hadhrami and other Arab residents of Jidda responded by attacking Europeans and European protégés, as well as the warehouses where Indian goods lay in storage.  This said, relations with Indian merchants were sometimes close.  One Gujarati merchant, for example, bought the produce of Arab pearl-fishing boats.(4)  Some Arabs first entered business as agents for, or employees of, Indian merchants.

 

Conclusion

Many aspects of Hadhrami participation in the booming trade of the Red Sea region remain to be teased out, but it is hoped that this paper at least gives some indication of the importance of their activities.  Wherever there was money to be made in the Red Sea, the Hadhramis seem to have been there among the leaders.  The reasons for Hadhrami ability to outdistance competition, however, remain in large part to be discovered.

 

References:

 

1. Malecot 1990, for the notion of the two as one region.
2. Ochsenwald ????; Serjeant and Bidwell 1982, pp. 70-1
3. Hollis 1941; Thompson and Adloff 1968.
4. R20/A/439, Schneider o Secretary to the Government, Bombay, 24 Feb, 1875.

 

 

HADHRAMI TRADE AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE

 

The intertwined technological and political changes at the moment of the incorporation of India into the British Empire radically changed the rhythms of economic life in the Indian Ocean.  These changes can be summed up in terms of fire-power, modern capitalism, modern colonialism and the industrial revolution.  The Hadhramaut is however a very small and statistically insignificant element in the Indian Ocean basin and it is generally recognized that the Hadhramis made a disproportionately great contribution to the development of the Indian Ocean as we know it today.  The most recent form of this contribution can be traced back to a seeming contradiction: on the one hand, the Hadhramis profited from the transformation of the Indian Ocean which resulted from the growth of the British Empire while on the other hand their success can be traced back to the temporal extension of an outmoded way of life, only marginally modified to adjust to changed realities. 

For a long time the Hadhramis in the homeland lived off income from the Diaspora, but trade also played a role, not only in generating income, but also in maintaining contacts.  In the end, it was in fact the very existence of the Diaspora that made it possible for the traders to continue to exist, as their contacts guaranteed that a network was open to any potential merchants.  The Hadhrami traders continued to deal in traditional products, like spices, dates, wood and also continued to play a part in the local coastal trade, complementing their ocean-faring activities.  Although the British looked upon this trade benignly, it was not part of the real trade of the British Empire, but very much a side show.  In fact, it is amusing to reflect that for a long time, neither the Hadhramaut nor one of its closer partners, Hyderabad, were officially truly parts of the British Empire.  Each was attached to the Empire, but itself a sovereign entity, which the British preferred not to acquire, as it did not suit their interests.  And yet both benefited from the connections, and were to suffer with the demise of the Empire, albeit in different ways.

The industrial revolution played a great role in changing the face of the European imperial role in the Indian Ocean.  Not only the products, but also the very means of transport, and the means and purpose of control and trade were completely transformed.  While this is true of the great and economically important trade connections, it did not apply to Hadhrami trade, which continued in its own path, adjusting to the changing political – but not economical – climate.

The British originally captured the port of Aden to serve as a coal bunkering station on their communications routes to India, and the port grew exponentially after the opening of the Suez Canal, which brought Britain closer to India.  At the time of the conquest of Aden, the British authorities were not very enthusiastic about the idea, and the port grew far faster than appreciation of its role did.  The British Imperial Government did not have much use for the hinterland of Aden, let alone the desert wastes of the Hadhramaut.  As a sea-faring nation, however, the British were marginally more interested in maintaining some semblance of peace along the coast than in trying to subdue all the tribes in the interior.   The result of the presumed benign neglect was the tacit acceptance of the emergence of certain leading political powers in the coastal areas which might conceivably be more amenable to British advice than other powers further afield.

Local traders along the southern coast of the Arabian Peninsula had been trading with Indian and African merchants since long before the Portuguese, Dutch and British came, and Arab traders from Mukalla, Shihr and al-Hami continued to sail to ports on the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa and the Subcontinent, long after steamers dominated the sea in the Western mind, and even after the Western empires were dissolved.  While they continued to sail in their small wind-driven vessels, the steaming frigates of the British Empire added East Africa to the empire, and after the First World War Tanganikya was added as well, so that neighbouring Oman and its island trading emporium were both integral parts of their network.  Trade had always been the life blood of the Indian Ocean and world trade was the life blood of the British Empire.  Without actually joining the empire, the Hadhramis were benefiting from the Pax Brittanica.

Of the village of al-Hami, just beyong Shihr on the coast, the Arab sea-faring historian Bamatraf once noted that the people of al-Hami “were the people with four vocations: sea-faring, trade, fishing, and agriculture.” In fact, the traders and sailors would only count the first two, and dismiss the latter two as inappropriate professions.

It was necessarily the fact that even the Adenis grew to appreciate European –as opposed to oriental – imperialism, after the experience of the Ottomans, although this was clearly an issue – witness the events of 1551 when the Adenis revolted against the Turks and turned the city over to the Portuguese, so that the Turks were obliged to recover it.  The difference was of course the transformation of the trade patterns with British domination of the Indian Ocean: the Hadhramis found that their boats were not targeted by pirates or customs officers, and their wares did not compete with those being protected or coveted by the British, so that a symbiotic relationship emerged, under which the Hadhramis profited, as their major trading partners were part of or appendages of the British empire.  The shift to the coast can be directly related to the efforts of the British empire to pacify the region, as the new empire offered many advantages, and the local sailors and merchants were quite willing to take advantage of them.  As the overall political and economic situation deteriorated, they were increasingly on their own, but this was not an unusual position, as they were doing as they had always done.

Thus the trading history of al-Hami began roughly when the British conquered India, and came to a close at independence, when the traders dispersed, and people from al-Hami are to be found in Kenya, Tanzania, Oman, and the Gulf, as well as Aden and Sana’a.  They profited directly from the British Empire, without competing with it.

This long experience led the Hadhramis to have more confidence in coming a bit closer to the British empire, especially as the trading climate of the 1930’s encouraged people to think consciously about trade within closed spheres, the chance of Hadhrami trade being adopted into the British Empire on a grand scale was quite attractive to those who thought about such things.  While British trade interest could have been very great, as the market was small and the trade carried on a small scale, the reaction of the Hadhrami traders was the opposite.  In the 1930’s,  British colonial economic policy was justified using two mutually contradictory trains of thought (1) that the commonwealth should guarantee economic self-sufficiency for its members and (2) that the Common wealth should serve as a vanguard in the effort to break down trade barriers.  Insofar as each played a role in supporting trade within the empire, the logic was consistent and the interests of the Qa’itis, the merchants and the British identical, but for completely different reasons.

The unexpected commercial collapse of peripheral Hadhrami trading with independence was thus actually just the long term logical consequence of developments that followed on British activity in the 1930’s, which was yanked into a completely different track by the results of the second world war.  While Britain won the war, the Empire lost it, rather unexpectedly.  If events had followed the path that Britain was plotting out in its own interest, the Hadhramis would have benefited exactly an anticipated, because the Indian Ocean had become a British sea, and they were adept at trading in that sea, and had not expected that they – as traders – would be pushed out of it.

Another major feature of the change in proportion of Common wealth trade will have been the appearance of a n independent Indian government which used tariffs and other barriers to protect local industrial development.  Another will have been the changed political world as the Commonwealth replaces the empire.  The great accomplishment of the south Yemeni traders was to be able to adjust to this transformation, and continue to trade with their sailing vessels, and to make profits.  Just as Aden continued to prosper as a major port despite the decreasing relevance of the Commonwealth, and even the disappearance of some of the major factors in the Commonwealth trade, in a peculiar kind of isolation, the traders of the Eastern protectorate managed the same small feat, overcoming the adverse winds, by plying their trade in the time honoured fashion.

The niche occupied by the Hadhramaut enabled its traders to demonstrate that the basic principles of capitalism – trade, etc – were already sufficiently present in the Hadhrami trading community that the Hadhramaut was able to continue with its traditional economic focus until the Marxist regime brought it to an end.  And even more curious is that the community continues to be successful in the modern world, with members of the community continuing their way of life from Oman, Kenya, Tanzania, Kuwait, and the Republic of Yemen.

What made the Hadhrami experience unique was that the small-time piecemeal trading system of the world before the British conquest of India went on, and continued, and was strengthened within the empire without this being even considered to be a relevant part of imperial policy.  The result of the fact that the Hadhramaut had a small, very active, population was able to assure that that prosperity went a long way, without changing their way of life remarkably, as they were obliged to do so after independence.

 

 

 

DUTCH COLONIAL POLICY PERTAINING TO HADHRAMI IMMIGRANTS

 

While seeking ‘the ring of the prophet Solomon’ (cf. Van den Berg, 1887: 45), as fortune in Arab circles is often called, many Arabs during the course of history settled in the area which is now called Indonesia.  As early as the thirteenth century, traders of Arab origin called at Sumatra.  Marco Polo mentions Islamic converts among the local population of Perlak as a result of the regular visits of Saracens.  In 1347 the well-known Moroccan traveler Ibn Batuta met “a number of compatriots and coreligionists” during a stay at the island (Morley, 1949:154). In the centuries to follow the number of Arabs must have gradually increased both at Sumatra and the other islands.  In the fifteenth century, small groups of Arabs lived in most of the important coastal places of the Indonesian archipelago (Van der Kroef, 1955: 16). They traded and played an active role in the spread of Islam.  Some Arabs succeeded in acquiring a great deal of influence in the coastal areas.  They married women of the local nobility and obtained leading positions at the courts.  Several Islamic trading states that arose on the north coast of Java in the sixteenth century were ruled by persons of Arab descent (De Graaf and Pigeaud, 1974).  At the end of the eighteenth century, Arab fortune hunters founded their own states in Sumatra (Siak) and Kalimantan (Pontianak) (Van der Kroef, 1955: 16).

After the arrival of successively the Protugese and the Dutch, the number of Arab immigrants gradually decreased.  The international trade was dominated by Europeans, although trade initiatives for the Arabs were still possible, especially at the regional and local level.  At the beginning of the nineteenth century, no more than 621 Arabs and Moors, as Muslims from Coromandel and Malabar were called, lived on Java.  “Among the Arabs”, according to Raffles, were “many merchants, but the majority are priests” (Raffles, 1817:63, 75).  In the second half of the nineteenth century, after the gradual opening up of Java and the so-called Outer Islands for the world-market the number of Arab immigrants again increased, particularly after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.

As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the great majority of the Arab immigrants originated from Hadhramaut.  The second largest group consisted of Hejaz-Arabs, but their number pales into insignificance when compared t the Hadhramis.  Only rarely did migrants from other parts of Arabia find their way to the Indies.  The Hejaz-Arabs did not usually stay long in the archipelago.  Most of them travelled to and from Mecca and Medina with pilgrims.  Among the Hadhramis, however, the number of settlers was very high.

Together with the Chinese, who formed the greatest immigrant community in the colony, the Hadhramis controlled the intermediate trade although each group concentrated on certain products.  For the Hadhramis these included clothing, construction materials, furniture, gems, perfumes, and horses.  Quite a number functioned as money-lenders, rack-renters, or ship owners. 

Among the Sayid, descendants from the prophet Muhammad via his grandson Husein, many acted as religious leaders and preachers.  In some areas, the sayid were treated as holy men.  According to Snouck Hugronje sometimes the affinity with the prophet was abused (Gobee and Adriaanse, 1959: 1564, 1592).

Although economically the Arabs were generally most successful in their new environment, at times they were discontented with the way that they were treated by the colonial government.  Until virtually the end of its existence the population of the Netherlands-Indies was legally divided into four categories: Europeans; those who had the same rights as the Europeans; natives (inlanders); and those who were on an equal footing with the natives.  Those who were on a par with the Europeans were the local Christians and, after 1896, also the Japanese; those having approximately the same status as the natives included everyone who was not a European or a native and who was Muslim or ‘Heathen’.  The last category of inhabitants was usually called vreemde oosterlingen or Foreign Orientals.  They consisted of Chinese and other Asian immigrants, such as Moors, Tamil, Bengalese, and Arabs.  Initially, this category was much larger and more differentiated.  For a long time it also included Malays and minorities of neighbouring islands.  However, in the second half of the nineteenth century, indigenous minorities were demoted in the category ‘natives’.

The intermediate position of the Asian immigrants in the colonial society was in fact consolidated and reinforced by the special legislation designed for them.  It extended and hastened the racial segmentation of the colony.  In particular the Chinese and the Arabs have repeatedly protested against the discriminative measures.  They refused to be treated as third-rate citizens and asked for the same legal status, the same freedom of movement, and the same privileges and possibilities as Europeans.

Although in principle there was one policy for all Asian minorities, in practice they were often treated differently.  Both the interpretation and the application of the stipulations varied from group to group and even from person to person, depending on the colonial interests in general and the personal preferences of the particular government official.  This situation often resulted in a certain degree of jealousy and antagonism between the different ethnic groups who for that reason seldom united together to regulate common interests.

The quarter and pass system

Even before the coming of Europeans in the Indonesian archipelago, Asian foreigners lived in their own quarters under their own leaders in the trading towns.  It is not clear whether this type of settlement arose spontaneously or whether it was imposed by the local rulers; presumably both factors played a part.  At first, the administrators of the Dutch East Indian Company did not empathically concern themselves with the place of residence of Eastern foreigners, at least not everywhere.

A strict maintenance of the quarter system only came into being at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the government observed that its officials on Java had “an inclination” to “amalgamate vreemde oosterlingen […] among the Javanese population.” This was found “unsuitable”, and the government demanded that the “ancient custom to concentrate such foreigners without exception. (1) Although the government expected to promote the settlement of foreign Orientals in existing and new quarters with this measure, in practice it led to their expulsion from the interior.

For a long time and in many places, the Arabs lived in separate quarters together with other foreign Muslims.  In Batavia this quarter was called Pekojan, after the Koja’s or Moors who, until the start of the nineteenth century, outnumbered the other Muslim minorities.  After 1880, however, the number of Arab immigrants gradually increased and Pekojan ultimately became a real Arab quarter.  This development took place in other cities.  The constant growth of the Arab community in the Indies is also apparent from the establishment of new quarters, the ranks of the quarter-masters, and the composition and salaries of the quarter officials.

At first, the heads of the Muslim quarters were officially called “Heads of Foreign Orientals, not being Chinese”.  Later on one reads more and more that they are named “Head of the Arabs and Other Foreign Orientals” or in short “Head of the Arabs”.  As the number of Arabs in the foreign Muslim quarters increased, so did the positions awarded to their leaders.

Owing to the continual influx of Hadhrami immigrants in the second half of the nineteenth century, the quarters became overcrowded.  The Arabist Van den Berg (1887: 49) who often mixed with Arabs writes that “the Arab quarters, with few exceptions, are dirty, and offer no attractions to European visitors; the interior, also, of the houses is wanting in all they appreciate”.

The official reason for concentrating Foreign Orientals in separate quarters and for restricting their mobility, was, as mentioned before, their supposed harmful influence on the material welfare of the original inhabitants.  This open-hearted, naïve population, it was said, should be protected from these outsiders by minimizing contacts.  The Arabs were, without doubt, seen as the most harmful group.  In government reports up to the beginning of this century, Arabs are often referred to as usurers, swindlers, and parasites.  Along with the disastrous influence on economic development, administrators criticized time and time again the role of the Arabs in the religious and political field.  They were seen as fanatical propagandists of the Islam and as supporters of pan-islamism.  Both factors would have an unfavourable effect on the mentality and disposition of the local population, which in the long run might undermine the Dutch authority.  In short, government officials assumed there was every reason for taking such a strong position against the Arabs.

The distrust of the Arabs was based on stereotypes.  In reality their economic behaviour hardly differed from other foreigners and well-to-do locals.  Also their influence in religious matters was greatly exaggerated although particularly in the countryside the sayid were highly esteemed, graves of prominent Arab leaders were often venerated as holy places, and the Arabs as Muslims felt themselves far above the indigenous adherents the Islam, local hadjis were far more important for the spread and deepening of Islam in nineteenth century.  During the nineteenth century, the number of hadjis rose from several hundreds to several thousands per year.  Some of them stayed in Mecca for some time and returned as religious teachers.(2)

Also the allegations about pan-islamic activities were mistaken, in particular by Snouck Hurgronje (Schmidt, 1992: 49-143).  The Arab minority was not really interested in pan-islamism, but used it to express its grievances against the quarter and pass system, and to improve its status as third-rate citizens.  Until far into the nineteenth century, the Arabs in the Indies were deprived of means and contacts to change their societal position.  Evasions, law suits, and petitions, hardly produced any positive results.  The rise of pan-islamism, the strive for more political unity among Muslims all over the world, offered in that respect more promising prospects.

 

The protests (or agitation as it is called in Dutch reports) of the Arabs via pan-islamic channels has greatly contributed to the adaptation and eventual abolition of the quarter and pass systems.  In 1894 Snouck Hurgronje, who feared the consequences of pan-islamism, pleaded in one of his advices to the Governor-General for “relaxation and reduction of the existing directions with regard to the issuing of passes” which had to be asked for each new route (Gobee and Adriaanse, 1959:1534). In the following years, he became increasingly convinced that the restrictions should be lifted.  In 1904 he writes: “The Arabs here have the feeling of people, for whom the entrance to a house is open, but who are not allowed to go further than the narrow and musty corridor and who only come into touch with the other inmates, when these go from one room to the other” (Gobee and Adriaanse, 1959: 1581).

Although Snouck was one of the most prominent advocates of the abolition of both the systems, he was not alone.  Particularly in the Netherlands, the discomfort with the way vreemde oosterlingen were treated increased.  First, because of the international dimensions (also China worried about the way its subjects were discriminated in the Indies).  Secondly, because the systems did not function anymore.  An official investigation had made clear that the obligation to live in quarters was circumvented on a large scale due to the absence of up to date registers and that the system of passes had become unfathomable as a result of the many requests. 

The dissolution of the quarter system took more time.  Although the colonial government insisted that the whole population would profit from the beneficial influence of the Asian foreigners, the quarters were maintained as long as possible.  From an administrative point of view this was easier, and the opinion persisted that Foreign Orientals would be a harmful influence, in spite of the rhetoric about liberty and progress.  For these reasons the government adhered to a contradictory policy of residency; they intended to open a lot of new quarters.

Initially, many government officials wanted to perpetuate both systems for the Arabs as they considered the negative effects of the repeal of restrictions to be greater than the positive ones.

 

The drafter of the new bill, however, insisted on a uniform regulation for all categories of Asian foreigners.  Otherwise, the Arabs “might make their neglect known to others as a measure against the Mohammedan religion.(3)

Immigration policy

While in the course of the nineteenth century the mobility of vreemde oosterlingen was increasingly limited, paradoxically the admission to the country showed the opposite development.  Except for a few years the colonial government, tried to prevent the immigration of Eastern foreigners as much as possible until 1866.  After the colony was opened up for private enterprise, however, the immigration conditions were relaxed considerably.(4)  In practice every Asian foreigner who could legitimize himself and who was without evil intent was allowed to enter the colony for six months.  When an individual wanted to stay longer or settle down for good, it was sufficient to show a satisfactory means of support.  Of course, both the temporary and the permanent immigrants were required to adhere to the residence and travel regulations.  Thus, the restrictions of movement within the country were at odds with the lenient rules of entry.

This liberal immigration policy was extended into the present century.  Starting in 1911 there were almost no differences in conditions between Western and Eastern immigrants as far as Java and Madura were concerned, although the formalities newcomers had to fulfill had increased.(5)  The number of ports of disembarkation was limited and all (except for the Dutchmen) had to pay an entry fee.  In addition immigrants had to be able to demonstrate that they were in the position of earning a certain income (in 1913, 25 guilders a month).  The first immigration term was prolonged to two years.

 

The special authority of the Governor-General had unexpected and radical results for Hadhrami immigrants.  Almost from the beginning, his power to refuse admittance to economically undesirable persons was used to minimize the immigration from Hadhramaut.  In 1908 the governor had pressed for an immigration ban for Arabs.  Because of their “usury” and “fanatical propaganda” he considered them as “disruptive elements”.  They were “of no use […] for national prosperity.”(6) To counterbalance the generosity shown to Arabs already settled in the country to move freely, it was necessary to bar immigrants from the Arab countries.

Both the Foreign Secretary and the Council of the Indies did not agree with this proposed exclusion.  The council considered Arabs no more harmful than other vreemde oosterlingen.  Moreover, in their opinion the Arab community had, in contrast to the Chinese, never disturbed the public order and security.(7)  From 1912 a “sharpened control” for the admittance of Hadhramis was introduced, which meant that every immigrant from a nationality which could be banned on the basis of the existing conditions should be stopped at the border.  As result of this, only 748 Hadhramis were allowed to enter between 1912 and 1917.(8)

In 1918 the admittance of Hadhramis was further impeded.  The authority of the Governor-General to bar undesirable individuals was now used to exclude the whole group.  In a secret letter, regional and local government officials and immigration commissions were urged to obstruct the immigration as much as possible. Awaiting the decision of the immigration commission, newcomers were lodge in immigration sheds.

The exclusion of the Hadhramis was, again, to a high degree the result of the ideas of Snouck Hurgronje, the most important advisor in Arab Affairs to the Governor-General.  Although he was a fervent advocate of revoking restrictive measures for the Arabs as far as travel and residence were concerned and he advocated their integration wiyh the rest of the population, he was from the beginning a stubborn champion of a ban on immigration from Hadhramaut.  How contradictory these stand points may appear, they spring from the same considerations.

 

Although the Hadhramis were aware of the more rigid application of immigration rules in the previous years, this regulation came as a most unpleasant shock.  It threw the Arabs off their balance.  One could not believe it, but weekly the Arab colony was confronted with the consequences of the new policy.

The indignation was so great that the internal divisions which troubled the Arab community in those days were temporarily pushed aside (De Jonge, 1993).  What ascerbated the resentment was the unequal treatment of the Hadhramis in comparison to the Chinese and Hejaz-Arabs.  The “higher and rigorous stipulations” imposed on the Hadhramis in every respect, were seen as extremely unjust, and the accusation that they were “harmful elements” was considered a grave insult.  They expressed their displeasure with the secrecy of the immigration measures and were of the opinion that the whole community had to pay for the mistakes of a few.

From different groups, pressure was exerted on the government to revoke the unjust regulation.  In several quarters the Arabs started an agitation against their leaders who were considered accomplices of European officials.  Said Ismail bin Abdullah Alatas, the Arab member of the volksraad, a pseudo-parliament, went on tour among the Arab quarters in Java to inform himself of the discontent, and to gather information about persons who had not been admitted.  Initially, he asserted that he could not believe that the government had proclaimed a ban on immigration on the Hadhramis and blamed narrow-minded civil servants for the unrest.  Later on, he had to admit that the facts indeed pointed to a complot against the Hadhramis.  After his return he asked the Governor-General for an explanation.  The leaders of the Sarekat Islam, the first large scale nationalist movement in the colony also supported the Hadhrami s by denying that the influence of the Arabs on the economy differed from that of the Europeans and Chinese.  They argued that investments of the Arabs benefit the population, while the profits of European enterprises are often send abroad.  Moreover, they perceived in the measures an anti-Islamic tendency.(9)  Both the  foreign and local Arab press cried out against

the discriminating treatment.  Even Great-Britain, that after World War I considered the Hadhramaut to be in its sphere of influence meddled in the affair.  It considered all Hadhramis as “protected British subjects” and demanded that these could enter the Indies without difficulties.(10)

 

Also within government circles the policy came under attack.  In particular, the office for Arab and Native Affairs vehemently opposed the exclusion of “our most faithful and loyal subjects”.(11)  At the beginning of the century, the office still favored the exclusion of Hadhramis, but due to “substantial changes” at home and abroad, such as emerging nationalism in Asia, it later declared itself against a policy that did not respect individuals.

In the first half of 1919, the Director of the Civil Service asked all residents in the archipelago by letter whether they were of the opinion that it was necessary to refuse admittance to Hadhramis because of economic reasons.  All except two thought that there were no longer any important reasons to discrimate against the Hadhramis.  One should not interpret this to mean that they had become more progressive.  They uttered the same old prejudices against the Arab minority, but most saw the inconsistency of the policy.  One of them wrote: “in any event hundred Hadhramis often do less wrong than one Dutch social-democrat”.(12)

 

 

 

In the middle of 1919, as a result of the protests and recommendations, the special immigration conditions were migitated, Immigrants who came in order to marry or to become a business partner, thus most of the immigrants, were allowed to enter immediately.  Two months later, at the particular instance of the Foreign Secretary, who wanted to avoid a conflict with the British, the secret conditions were completely withdrawn.(13)  Snouck reluctantly agreed although he still thought that for religious and political reasons the immigration of Hadhramis should be restricted as much as possible.(14)

Concluding remarks

Although the Arabs in the Netherlands Indies had the same, unequal position as other vreemde oosterlingen, in practice they encountered more discrimination.  This exceptional position was the result of several factors.  First, the Arabs minority was seen as more being damaging than other foreign trading groups to the welfare of the population at large.  Secondly, the government was apprehensive about their influence in religious maters.  Thirdly, after the rise of pan-islamism it was thought that the Arabs would undermine Dutch authority.  These ideas did not reflect he actual situation.  There are no indications that the economic policies of the Arabs were different from those of the Chinese, Europeans, or local inhabitants.  And the role of the Arabs in the process of islamization paled into insignificance when compared to that of local hadjis.  Pan—islamism did not take root as a political construct and was only exploited to put pressure on the government to end the discriminative stipulations.  In fact, both lower and higher civil servants were guided to a large degree by persistent prejudices concerning the Arabs.  Beyond a doubt it seems that above all the Arabs reacted to the results of the quarter and pass system.  These same systems fostered what the government thought the Arabs were capable of doing.  Thus what the government tried to prevent by these restrictions actually resulted in stimulating these practices.

 

 References :

 

• Staatsblad van Nederlandsch Indie (henceforth Staatsblad NI)

       1835 no. 37.

• 28 June 1919/16.
• ARA, Vb. 22 September 1908
• Staatsblad NI 1872 no. 40
• Staatsblad NI 1911 no. 138 and 1912 no. 10
• ARA, Vb. 27 November 1908/50.
• ARA, Vb. 27 November 1908/50.
• ARA, Vb. 27 November 1919/16.
• ARA, Vb. 28 June 1919, 16
• ARA, Vb. 10-2-1921, X1.
• KITLV, H885.
• ARA,Vb. 5 September 1919, no. 22
• ARA, Vb. 1 August 1919/111.
• ARA, Vb. 1 August 1919/11 and Vb. 21 June 1920/46.

ISLAMIC MODERNISM IN JAVA”THE EARLY YEARS OF AL-IRSHAD, 1914-1922

Jam iyah al-Islah wa’l-Irshad al-‘Arabiyah (al-Irshad) was established by Hadhrami migrants in Java in 1914.  Today it remains an active organization, run largely by descendants of Hadhrami migrants in Indonesia.

The Arab Society for Reform and Guidance (Jam ‘iyah al-Islah wa’l-Irshad al-‘Arabiyah; henceforth al-Irshad) was established by Hadhrami merchants in Batavia in 1914.  Apart from an interval during the 1940s when it was forced to disband, it has existed continuously since them.  Today it is one of the oldest Islamic organisations in Indonesia.  It comprises over 100 branches throughout the archipelago, consisting of around 50,000 members.  Its major activity is the operation of kindergartens, primary and secondary schools.  Other activities include the running of hospitals.  The leadership of the organization remains largely in the hands of men of Arab descent, although the branch leadership in some areas has now passed to ethnic Indonesians.(1) 

Previous scholarship has tended to ascribe the origins of al-Irshad to a power struggle within the Hadhrami migrant community in Java.  It is argued that the founders of al-Irshad (Irshadis) wanted to overthrow the traditional dominance of the sayids(2) within Hadhrami society, and that al-Irshad was their vehicle for doing so.  Al-Irshad has thus been described as ‘an Association which was formed to rally and unite the non-Sadah in their conflict with the Sadah and ‘[a]bove all..an emancipation movement opposed to the discrimination of the syekh by the sayid.  These scholars acknowledge that the Irshadis promoted the ideas of Islamic modernism, but suggest that this was for largely pragmatic reasons.  R.B. Serjeant goes so far as to ‘doubt if they were modernists in any real sense’.

The present-day leaders of al-Irshad dispute this version of their organisation’s history.  They argue that an undue focus on the conflict between al-Irshad and the sayyids has left unexplored the more significant aspects of the organisation’s history, such as its educational activities and its active role in the Indonesian Islamic movement.  They also resent the suggestion that the organisation’s vision was restricted to the Hadhrami community and that ‘the Irshadis were mainly interested in relations with their own centre, i.e., their position within the Hadhrami social hierarchy’.  On the contrary, they argue that the organization has always viewed Indonesia as its primary field of activity, and its main aim has been spreading the ideas of Islamic modernism within the Muslim community in Indonesia.

 

ORIGINS

The circumstances of the establishment of Al-Irshad are fairly well known.  The early history of the organization is intertwined with that of an earlier body, Jam iyah Khayr (Benevolent Society), from which it formed a breakaway group.  Jam iyah Khayr was established by Hadhramis in Batavia in 1901.  Dominant among its founders and leaders were sayyids of the Bin Shahab and Bin Yahya families, but it also received support from other sayyid families and from non-sayyids.  Its first chairman was a non-sayyid, Shayky sa’id bin Ahmad Basandid, and non-sayyids occupied the post of vice-chairman.  Jam ‘iyah Khayr was the first organization in the Dutch East Indies to establish Islamic schools along modern lines.  Its first school was established in Batavia in 1905.  In contrast to traditional Islamic schools it featured graded classes and incorporated into the curriculum non-Islamic subjects such as mathematics, history, geography and English language.  The aim was to provide Muslim, particularly Arab, youth with an education which would enable them to progress in the modern colony.(3)

Jam’iyah Khayr suffered from a lack of qualified teachers, a problem which beset the Arab schools in the Indies for many years.  In 1910 it was decided to bring teachers from overseas to work at the school.  The majority was Sudanese, but they included on Tunisian and one Moroccan.  They had various educational backgrounds, but shared a common commitment to the goals of Islamic modernism, and in particular a commitment to the reform of Islamic education.  With the arrival of these enthusiastic young teachers, Jam ‘iyah Khayr was able to expand rapidly.  Jam ’iyah Khayr schools were opened under their leadership in Batavia (Pekojan, Krukut, Tanah Abang), Bogor, and Surabaya.

STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION

The Al-Irshad constitution (al-qanun al-asasi) adopted in 1915 consisted of ten articles, and provided the organization with a simple western-style structure.  Although it was supplemented by a set of internal regulations (al-qanun al-dakhili) in February 1919, this formal structure remained unchanged during the period under review.  Membership in the organization was open to any Muslim living in the Dutch colony, whether Arab or not, provided that he was male and at least eighteen years of age or married.  The constitution allowed for a four-man executive consisting of a president, secretary, treasurer and adviser.  The executive was to be elected at an annual members’ meeting.  No sayyid was permitted to become a member of the executive.  The constitution specified that the organization was based in Batavia, and made no provision for the establishment of branches.(4)

In practice the structure of the organization was more complex than the constitution suggested.

Funding for al-Irshad came from three main sources: school fees, voluntary donations, and the compulsory contributions of members.  The largest portion of the organizations funds came from the members.  Every member was required to make a monthly contribution to the organization in accordance with his means.  This requirement was strictly enforced, with a debt-collector being appointed to collect the contributions (additional incentive was provided by the fact that he was paid a commission of 5% of the sums he collected).(5)

The executive gave its highest priority to the al-Irshad schools.  A committee (hay’ah al-madaris) was established to oversee the day-to-day operation of the schools, the membership of which was determined at the annual general meeting.

Following its initial success in Batavia, al-Irshad spread quickly to other Arab centres in Java.

 

Activities

The sources reveal very little about the activities of the branches of the al-Irshad during this period.  It is clear, however, that priority was given to the development of schools.  Other activities undertaken by different branches include night classes for adults, public lectures and publishing ventures, culminating in 1920 with the establishment of the al-Irshad Press and the publication of the organisation’s first newspapers.

The final realm of al-Irshad activity for which we can adduce evidence is publishing.  Few publications, if any, were produced in the name of the organization during this period.  But several leading members were involved in publishing which was closely identified with al-Irshad.  In early 1920 a new phase of al-Irshad publishing began with the establishment of the Matba’ al-Irshad (Al-Irshad Press) in Surabaya. (6)The establishment of the Press allowed the production of newspapers and magazines which promoted the views of al-Irshad.

It appears that the only other periodical published in al-Irshad circles during this period was a monthly magazine entitled Al-Shifa’.

Aims and Ideology

From these publications, and particularly from Al-Irshad, we can begin to piece together the ideology of al-Irshad.  The basic premise which underlay many of the articles in Al-Irshad was that the Mulims in general and the Hadhramis in particular, found themselves in a state of backwardness (muta’akhir) and ignorance (jahi)

The fundamental cause of the backwardness of the Muslims was their deviation from the true religion.  Islam had been corrupted by innovations (bida’) and superstitions (khurafat).  For the Muslims to achieve progress, Islam must be stripped of these accretions and returned to its original form.  This could be accomplished by returning to the Qur’an and the sayings and deeds of the Prophet (Sunnah al-rasul) as the sole sources of Islamic law.  At the same time they must not reject the achievements of the modern world.  Rather they should pursue study of modern sciences in order to catch up with the more advanced peoples.  In this respect the Hadhramis should follow the example of the Japanese and the Chinese in the Indies, who had achieved progress through the adoption of modern education.(7)

A distinctive feature of al-Irshad ideology was the emphasis placed on the principle of the equality (musawah).  This theme occurred repeatedly in articles in Al-Irshad and also formed the basis for several pamphlets published during this period.  This stress on equality was a reaction against the privileged status which sayyids had enjoyed in Hadhrami society for centuries.  Based particularly on the Qu’anic verses ‘ The Believers are but a single Brotherhood’ (Innama al-mu’minun ikhwah) and ‘ Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Alllah is (he who is) the most Righteous of you’, the Irshadis argued that true Islam required the equality of all believers and distinguished between them on the basis of their actions, not their descent.(8) There was no place for a privileged aristocracy.

It is worth noting, however, that the Irshadis were also influenced by models which were a lot closer to home.  Al-Irshad has often been compared to the Indonesian Muhammadiyah, a modernist organization founded in Yogyakarta in 1912 which was also devoted to the establishment of modern-style Islamic Schools.  The aims and ideology of Al-Irshad were clearly influenced by the example of THHK.  Evidence of this influence is the fact that the aims of al-Irshad as listed in the 1915 constitution (quoted above) were closely modeled on the aims listed by THHK in its own constitution.(9)

Background of members and leaders

There is disappointingly little data available on the people who became members of al-Irshad during the period under review.  We have no records of membership numbers. Let alone detailed membership lists.  The best source of information is a British document known as the ‘Suspect Arab Index’.(10)  This is a file which was developed in 1919 by the British Consul General in Batavia, W.B. Dunn, who sought to compile a database on all Arabs involved in al-Irshad.  It is a problematic source, not least because the information it contains was largely provided by Sayyid ‘Ali bin Ahmad bin Shahab, a strong opponent to the orgainsation. Insofar as the biographical data it contains can be checked, however, it appears to be accurate.  The file lists 170 Arabs with links to al-Irshad: 123 members, thirty-two supporters, two founders, eleven teachers in al-Irshad schools, and two individuals described as agents for the British who infiltrated the organisation for intelligence purposes.  It is impossible to say what proportion of the total number of al-Irshad supporters this figure represents, but virtually all of the leading figures from this time are included.  Al-Irshad was dominated by first generation migrants from Hadhramaut to the Indies.  The dominance is particularly marked when we compare it to the contemporary estimate that only about 30% of the Arabs living in the Indies were first generation migrants, the other 70% being locally born.(11)

The profile which emerges of the ‘average’ al-Irshad supporter, then, is a man who was a first generation migrant from Hadhramaut, around forty years of age, probably well established as a merchant and possibly also a money lender or property owner.  This average member can be compared to the leadership of the organization during the same period, for whom more detailed information is available.   The leaders possessed some previous experience in Islamic organizations.

The leadership of al-Irshad during this period can be described as middle-aged entrepreneurs, self-made men who had lived in the Indies for a long time and had acquired a stake in the colony.  They were well-established In the Indies, respected in its society, and justifiably proud of their achievements.

Finally, it is worth noting that the background of these men differs markedly from that of the teachers at the al-Irshad schools.  The teachers during this period fall into two main categories.  The first group were those who were brought to the Indies (mainly from the Sudan and Egypt) specifically in order to teach.  The most outstanding of these was Shaykh Ahmad Surkati.  The second group were graduates of the al-Irshad schools, generally Java-born Hadhramis who would teach for a few years before taking up another occupation.  Teachers in both categories tended to be young; their average age at this time was under thirty years.  Rarely had they lived in Hadhramaut.  It is clear, therefore, that they formed a distinctly different sociological group from the leaders and members of al-Irshad during this period.  It was the cooperation between these two groups which provided al-Irshad with its strength during these early years.

 

Conclusions

The men who established al-Irshad were among the most powerful, wealthy and respected Hadhramis in the society of the Dutch East Indies.  They had left Hadhramaut in their youth and had since built a stake in the Indies.  Their attention was firmly placed on the progress of their community in the Dutch colony: there is little evidence that they were interested in reform in Hadhramaut, and few of them appear ever to have returned to Hadhramaut.  Believing that traditional Islamic Schooling was no longer sufficient, they promoted modern-style education which incorporated non-Islamic subjects into the curriculum.  Schools were established under the umbrella of al-Irshad in the major centres of Hadhrami population in Java, and were open to Arabs as well as non-Arabs.  In running the schools, the founders of the organization formed a coalition with young teachers from other countries of the Middle East, who brought to java a knowledge of and commitment to the beliefs of Islamic modernism.  The operation of these schools which was the main purpose behind the establishment of al-Irshad.

Although its primary concern was the operation of its schools, al-Irshad was also committed to the promotion of Islamic modernist principles in the wider Muslim community.  This was viewed as necessary in order to overcome the perceived backwardness of the Muslim peoples.  These principles were promoted in al-Irshad newspapers and pamphlets, and also though holding public lectures and night classes for adults.  One aspect of this activity was the vigorous promotion of the principle of the equality of all Muslims, and the concomitant opposition to Hadhrami customs which upheld the special status of the descendants of the Prophet.  These customs, such as the kissing of the hands of the sayyids, were regarded as archaic and degrading in the modern world.

That al-Irshad was primarily an educational organization should not be surprising.  The reform of education was a major concern of modernist Muslims from ‘Abduh onwards.  Schools similar to the al-Irshad schools were being established around the Islamic world at this time.  Perhaps more importantly, a growing awareness of the importance of educational reform characterized not only the Hadhramis in the Indies, but also the Chinese and Indonesian communities.  The early twentieth century witnessed a mushrooming of reformist educational organizations among the different peoples of the Dutch East Indies, such as the Chinese Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan and the modernist Muhammadiyah. It is only to be expected that the Hadhrami residents of the Indies, who lived, intermarried, traded and competed in the same society, should form part of the same movement. 

It is true that al-Irshad was ideologically opposed to customs signifying veneration of the descendants of the Prophet.  But it would be wrong to interpret this opposition as a conflict over power, or to view the organization as a ‘bastion of the anti-sayid(12) during this period.  The leading Irshadis were men of power, wealth and influence in the society of the Indies, whose world-view was shaped by that society.  They had no need to struggle with sayyids for power in Java, and they were little concerned with the situatins in Hadhramaut.

It is the belief that al-Irshad has been misunderstood due to a tendency to assume that social relations between Hadhramis in the Dutch East Indices replicated those in Hadhramawt.  As early as 1886 L.W.C. van den Berg observed that one of the key differences between the Hadhramis in Hadhramaut and those in the Indies lay in the relations between the various elements of Hadhrami society, with the sayyids in the Indies enjoying a vastly lower level of prestige and influence than those in the homeland.  Yet more recent scholars have neglected this finding and continue to assert that ‘[i]nternal social relationships reflected those in the homeland’.  I would like to suggest that a greater understanding of the Hadhramis  in the Dutch East Indies will only be attained when scholars devote as much attention to the social conditions prevailing in the Indies as has been dedicated to the social conditions of Hadhramaut.  This suggestion may well be applicable to the study of other communities of the Hadhrami diaspora too.

 

Refrences

1. Pimpinan Pusat Perhimpunan al-Irsyad al-Islamiyyah, ‘Direktori Organisasi Kemasyarakatan’, Jakarta, 1992.
2. Sayyid(in the sense used here) refers to descendant of the Prophet.  The Arabic plural is sadah.  Non-sayyid Arabs in the Indies were universally referred to as shaykh.
3. Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1973, p.59.
4. Qanun Jam’iyah al-Islah wa’l-Irshad al-Arabiyah: al-Asasi wa’l-Dakhili, Surabaya, 1919, pp.12-14.  This publication contains Arabic, Malay and Dutch versions of the constitution.  I have used the Arabic version and thus pagination here.
5. ‘Notulen’, p.12.
6. Naji, ‘Tarikh Thawrah’, p.117, 133-4.
7. ‘Hajatuna ila al-kulli wa tanzim dakhiliyah madarisina’, Al-Irshad, no.36, 24 February 1921, p.2.
8. Qur’an 49:10; 49:13.  These translations are from ‘Abdullah Ysuf ‘Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Qur’an Amana Corporation, Brentwood Maryland, 1993.
9. Nio Joe Lan, Riwajat 40 Taon dari Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan – Batavia (1900-1939), Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan, Batavia, 1940, p.7.
10. IO, R/20/A/1409, Dunn to Balfour, 27 September 1919, no. 117.
11. ARA, Schrieke to Governor-General, 18 March 1921, no. C/62 geh. Exh. 7 June 1921 no. 58, found at ARA, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, A-dossiers 1919-1940, A29 bis I: Corr. Over Arabieren in Ned-Indie, folder 2.
12. De Jonge, ‘Discord and Solidarity’, p.81.

 

HADHRAMI RIVALRIES AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: WORLD WAR I AND ITS AFTERMATH

 

 

In relation to the overall research on the modem history of Hadhramaut and the diaspora, a comparatively large number of studies exists on the 'Alawi-Irshadi conflict, namely the open split in the Hadhrami community which occurred in Indonesia in 1905 and then spread to Hadhramaut itself.

 

However, this was by no means the only, nor even in all cases the main cause of factionalism. Although British and other sources postulated it very clearly as such, and most later studies have rather uncritically followed that approach,¹ a closer reading of these same sources suggests that rivalries between the Qu'aiti and Kathiri Sultanate, as well as between various factions within the Sultanates, were the basis of further significant divisions, with each faction trying to rally support not only within the Hadhrami community but also outside. In order to mobilise these potential allies for their cause, the players adopted those arguments most likely to appeal, such as the alleged anti-British, pan-Islamic, pro-German etc. stance of their respective adversaries. The most "popular" argument seems to have been the denunciation of opponents as "Alawis" or "Irshadis", as this conflict was well known outside the Hadhrami community, even when other issues were at the heart of certain cleavages. Thus, the Sultans, while themselves of qabili origin, at various times sided either with the Irshadis or the 'Alawis.

 

 

Thus, Hadhramis attempted - and, given the relative international insignificance of the community, to a surprisingly large degree succeeded - to involve the British and Dutch as the main imperial powers they were exposed to, in addition to the Imam of Yemen, the Ottomans, the (non-Hadhrami) Muslims of South East Asia and, to a lesser extent, other regional and imperial powers such as the Al Sa'ud, Germany and Italy. Furthermore, through contact with (mainly Egyptian) Arabic language newspapers, most notably the Cairene modernist paper al-Manar, the support of an international Islamic audience was sought. This latter fact, as well as the above mentioned "popularity" of the 'Alawi-Irshadi conflict as a way of explaining conflicts to outsiders, has most likely helped to foster the prevailing socio-religious interpretation of the conflict in terms of the struggle between modernist reformers (al-lrshad and its followers) and traditionalist,sanctimonious Sayyids desperately defending their previous monopoly in the field of religious learning.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hadhramaut in the early 20th century and the conflict of 1905

 

In 1882, the first treaty between Britain, established in Aden since 1839, and the Qu'aiti rulers of Mukalla and parts of the Hadhrami interior was concluded. It obliged the Qu'aiti not to sell or mortgage his territory to outside powers, and to accept British advice in his dealings with them. In 1888, this was supplemented by a full Protectorate Treaty. These agreements consolidated a situation that had evolved over the second half of the 19th century and had been marked by the ascendance of the Qu'aitis over the former rulers of Hadhramaut, the Kathiris. A number of local forces had fought to gain and secure their political power, often with the aid of finance and weapons gained abroad, most notably in Hyderabad, where the Qu'aiti Sultans occupied the highest military ranks, but other Hadhramis had made their fortunes as well. The search for British support in order to gain the upper hand in local disputes can be traced back until at least 1842, and over the following decades Britain was engaged in discouraging Ottoman attempts to gain control over the ports of Shihr and Mukalla, although it refused as yet to become directly involved.

 

By 1888, however, the international situation had changed in so far as Germany and Italy had entered the competition for new territories. By 1885, Germany had established control over East Africa and when the former Kassadi ruler of Mukalla was deported to Zanzibar in 1881, before too long rumors reached Aden that he was conspiring with the Germans in order to secure his return. In the more immediate vicinity, the Ottomans had, in 1849, re-conquered the Yemeni Tihama and since 1872 had, although with varying fortunes, re-conquered highland Yemen, and tried to extend their influence to Hadhramaut, not least through offering their assistance to the Kathiri Sultan. While these developments explain the new quality of British involvement, the Qu'aiti's motives were partly the fear of a return by the Kassadi, partly the rivalry between Qu'aitis and Kathiris. The treaties enabled 'Awadh b. 'Umar, since 1888 sole Qu'aiti ruler (since 1902 he was recognised as Sultan by the British) to strengthen his position not only vis-a-vis pretenders from his own family, namely his nephews Husain and Munassir b. 'Abdallah, but also against the Kathiris. Thus, in 1918 and after further internal fighting, the British became a party to an agreement between the Qu'aitis and Kathiris, whereby the Kathiris recognised Qu'aiti suzerainty and the British protectorate in exchange for the recognition of Kathiri rule over specified parts of the interior (see map at the end). Thus, the Kathiris, many of whom had close links with the Southeast Asian diaspora and were dependent not only on incoming remittances but also the import of foodstuffs and luxury goods, were forced to accept Qu'aiti control (and thereby taxation) over the coast.²

 

Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the above mentioned split between Sayyids ('Alawis) and non-Sayyids (organised since 1914 organised in the Jam'iyat al-Islah wa-l-Irshad) had occured over the recognition of Sayyid prerogatives. It is now commonly agreed that this challenge to the time-honoured Hadhrami interpretation of religious prescriptions also reflected social and economic changes within the emigrant Hadhrami community, challenging the Hadhrami system of social stratification and in particular the position of the Sayyids. This split occured, it is worthwhile repeating, within a section of Hadhrami society, Sayyid and otherwise, which had started an initiative of mainly educational reform and was originally centred around the Jam 'iyyat al-Khair in Jakarta (founded in 1905). This might well have been influenced by Indonesian reformers, and to have continued initiatives, in Hadhramaut and possibly abroad. Another likely source of inspiration was the contact with the (pan)-Islamic reform movements in Istanbul and Egypt through newspapers and private contacts, possibly during the annual pilgrimage. Thus, the strict dichotomy that is constructed by much of the existing literature between Islamic reformers or modernists and traditionalist Sayyids seems to be somewhat questionable, and it might be more useful to speak, after 1905, of competing reform movements, as well as traditionalists.

 

Although the Irshadi-'Alawi divide becomes the major theme of subsequent interpretations of Hadhrami politics in Indonesia and Hadhramaut, it seems that the old divisions continued to play a major role in internal politics. It is in this light that the search for external allies should be seen.

 

Developments in Hadhramaut

 

During World War I, Aden was something of a backwater, which became even more isolated after the Ottomans advanced on Lahej in July 1915. Although the main British goal had been to keep Aden, the situation in the protectorate was observed somewhat nervously. On the other side of the protectorate border, the relationship between the Ottomans and Imam Yahya of Yemen (r. 1904-1948) never was an easy one. In 1911, the Ottomans recognised the de facto independence of the Imam. Still, formally Yemen remained part of the Ottoman Empire until 1918. They controlled somewhat separate spheres, the Ottomans the South and West of Yemen, the Imam the North and East. Furthermore, he exercised certain legal powers even in the Ottoman sphere by appointing judges. Throughout the war, the Imam and the Ottomans co-operated in order to avert any potential extension of British rule and to extend their own spheres of influence southwards.

However, it is more than likely that both conducted separate propaganda campaigns and were appealed to either jointly or separately by groups vying for external support.

 

Although Hadhramaut was not drawn into the war, it was, because of its rather fragile bonds with Britain, carefully watched and at times wooed by these rivaling forces. Besides immediate interest in Hadhramaut, the connections of the Hadhrami community with India and the Far East seem to have provided a major headache for the British, and some hope particularly for the Ottomans. Thus, it seems likely that the war, and hopes for greater influence, made outside powers more approachable for the Hadhramis. Therefore, the fragile international situation, which, as far as the Middle East is concerned, continued somewhat beyond 1918, provides the major explanation for the international interest in what could, by all standards, otherwise have been regarded as a minor local conflict.

 

 

 

It seems that the religious traditions and possibly questions of social stratification have been discussed in Hadhramaut since at least 1906 under the influence of traders from Java, questioning, among other things, the visitation (ziyara) of tombs, which was disparagingly called by a correspondent of al-Manar quburiyya.

These discussions were, however, by no means limited to non-Sayyids, as the example of Sayyid Abu Bakr b. Shihab (1846-1922), on of the first and leading leading Hadhrami literary and religious reformers along the lines of the pious forefathers (al-salaf al-salih, short: salafi) shows. A long-standing-employee of the Nizam of Hyderabad, Abu Bakr might have been influenced by Indian reform debates. Furthermore, it seems not unlikely that already in the 19th century reformist ideas were discussed in Hadhramaut.

 

However, the British archives, mainly based on correspondence with leading figures in the Qu'aiti Sultanate, give much more emphasis to the continuation of the struggle for political supremacy, between as well as within the two Sultanates. With Aden beleaguered by Ottoman troops, it has to be borne in mind that the Qu'aiti Sultan, anxious to obtain British weapons and loans, probably exaggerated the influence of the Ottoman and Yemeni propaganda amongst his opponents. On the other hand, Arabic letters in the British files show that such contacts were indeed sought and established, unless one takes them for forgeries prepared by the Qu'aitis.

 

The most important internal division seems to have been the continued fight between the Qu'aiti and Kathiri sultanates. Not only pro-Qu'aiti sources, but also a pro-Kathiri voice shows that the Kathiris were, in principle, willing to approach the Imam in case the British refused to acknowledge their claim to full sovereignty in, and rightful possession of Hadhramaut. Sayyid Abu Bakr b. Shihab, during a visit to Aden, already expressed this opinion to Colonel Jacob in January 1914, doubtlessly hoping to convince him of the Kathiri cause. Over the next years, rumors about Imamite propaganda in Wadi Hadhramaut, disseminated apparently through dervishes, letters and personal contacts, were a recurrent theme in messages from the Qu'aiti Sultan to Aden.³

The Ottomans, and particularly 'Ali Sa'id Pasha, the commander of the Ottoman troops in Lahej, were also trying to rally support by arguing against foreign rule and distributing somewhat exaggerated accounts of Ottoman victories, allied defeats, and anti-British up-risings in the colonies. Draft agreements about the submission to Ottoman rule circulated in Hadhramaut amongst the tribes. A key figure in the contacts with the Imam as well as with the Ottomans seems to have been Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman b. Ubaidallah al-Saqqaf (1883-1956), another leading religious figure and a historian. 'Abd al-Rahman reputedly received significant payments by the Ottomans in return for his services. After the war, al-Saqqaf, who was sometimes described as the Mufti of Hadhramaut and who had an interest in Shi’ite law became, at least in the eyes of British observers, connected with the Imam, whom ne himself reports to have visited. In view of the fact that a branch of the Saqqaf family seems to have lived in Sana'a, these contacts and interests seem perhaps less surprising. However, later in the 1920s, al-Saqqaf seems to have shifted sides again, turned against al-Rabita al-'alawiyya in Batavia which reportedly supported the Imam and attempted to negotiate a settlement between Irshadis and 'Alawis. Although the motivation of this course of action remains somewhat unclear - it could have been rivalry with the al-Kaff founders as well as genuine conviction - it certainly illustrates that Sayyids could, and indeed did, change their views and enter varying alliances.

 

However, in a letter to the Al Umar, as-Saqqaf shows a very clear awareness of the political priorities of the Wadi merchants. While one of the main reasons for the continued Qu'aiti-Kathiri conflict was the Kathiri desire for control over a port, they nevertheless had to accommodate the status quo until definite help was in sight. Thus, while entertaining relations with the Ottoman governor in Sana'a as well as with the Imam, they did not want to sign any formal agreement acknowledging Ottoman suzerainty. Such a document, they argued, would jeopardise their already frail relations with the British authorities who exercised control over trade with their colonies and - through the British-Qu'aiti alliance - over the ports of Shihr and Mukalla. The realism of such calculations was proven in late 1917 and 1918, when a joint Qu'aiti and British blockade of trade between Wadi Hadhramaut and migrants in India, Singapore and Indonesia caused a food shortage in Hadhramaut and served as a British "stick" for the Kathiris to abandon contacts with the Ottomans and sign the 1918 treaty with the Qu'aiti.

 

Finally, one should also mention 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Sa'ud, the Wahhabi ruler of Najd and reviver of the Wahhabi polity. According to Sayyid Muhammad b. 'Aqil, who was a staunch opponent of the Irshadis, they had obtained Ibn Sa'ud's support. The latter had, b. 'Aqil claimed, demanded the submission of the Qu'aiti government under his authority, thus denouncing British protection and defending Islam. Although the pro-Sayyid source raises certain doubts as to the accuracy of the report, which might have been an attempt to discredit the Irshadis even further in British eyes, it seems not entirely incredible in the light of previous Wahhabi incursions into Hadhramaut and the general aggressive expansionism of the Sa'udi state. If the Irshadis as salafi reformers were looking for support, Ibn Sa'ud would certainly have been one possibility even if one takes his - even in Hadhrami reformist eyes - radical approach to questions such as the veneration of saints etc. into account. On the other hand, certain Sayyids such as Muhammad b. 'Ali (or 'Alawi) al Saqqaf actively promoted the case of Ibn Sa'ud's rival, Sharif Husain b. 'Ali of Mecca, although the familj seems to have sided with Ibn Sa'ud after the latter had ousted Husain in 1924.

 

It would, however, be an oversimplification to view Hadhrami politics during World War I only in terms oi the Qu'aiti-Kathiri divide. Although the British information on internal quarrels among the Qu'aitis is somewhat scanty, probably due to the co-operation with and reliance on official Qu'aiti channels such as the Sultan and his Wazir, Sayyid Husain b. Hamid al-Mihdar, it seems safe to assume that internal rivalries within the large Qu'aiti family in Hadhramaut and Hyderabad continued. Furthermore, there seem to have existed other families outside Hadhramaut aspiring to the rule of Mukalla and seeking British support.

 

Most likely of more significance were frictions between the Sultan and local Sayyid notables, which are reported by Little for 1919-20, but were probably the result of a somewhat more long-term development. The Sultan, reportedly under the influence of emigrants to India and the Far East and possibly on the basis of his own links to India, as well as influential Indian traders, showed interest in certain economic developments, such as the extension of the harbour, the investigation into possible natural resources, agricultural improvements etc. The request to the British High Commissioner for Egypt to lend the Qu'aiti Sultan a geological surveyor, and the subsequent mission of Little and Heald to Hadhramaut provides but one example. At the same time, Sultan Ghalib seems to have favoured a lenient application of the shari'a and even been "willing to relax it where excessively severe". However, Little registered that "local opinion, probably instigated by the Sayyids, is against any change", including other, unspecified, "reforms and improvements". And once more, the apparent loyalty of Sayyid al-Mihdar raises the question as to whether there existed a unified front of Sayyids or whether these were divided among themselves.

 

The society seems to have provided basic teaching infiqh, Arabic and religious sciences mainly for "the benefit of their sons who did not know any Arabic".     These were probably children of rich emigrants who were sent to Hadhramaut during childhood and puberty in order to become acquainted with the homeland of their fathers, or else children of recently returned emigrants with foreign wives.

 

Although it is not quite clear whether the society in question is the same, both instances show certain similarities. In both cases, leading Sayyid-families confronted each other over the issue of educational reform and the quest for power. Both incidents can further be interpreted as attempts to establish new political entities, in the first case by bin Talib (and possibly al-Saqqaf), in the second by the Al Kaff.

 

The last political variable in Hadhramaut were the tribes. The Jam 'iyyat al-Haqq incident illustrates that their allegiances shifted, depending on questions of political expediency and advantage. Generally, their aim was to preserve as much independence as possible from the two states.

 

Developments in Indonesia

 

Meanwhile, it seems that the situation in the Far East had also become far more complex than the discussion of the Sayyid-Shaikh divide would suggest. In part, the developments reflected internal dynamics within the diaspora, in part possibly the situation in Hadhramaut, although van den Berg claims that bad relationships between families in Hadhramaut did not preclude co-operation abroad, only vice versa. Once more, a word of caution concerning the British sources seems to be in place. The most important officials concerned with Hadhramis, the British Consul-Generals in Batavia, W.N. Dunn and his deputy, Crosby, as well as Lee Warner, "Agent of His Majesty's Government at Mokalla, for the duration of the War, under the superintendence of the Political Resident at Aden" (since 12.3.1918) and later intelligence officer in Singapore, seem to have relied mostly on information provided by Sayyid 'Ali b. Ahmad b. Shihab, at least in the early 1920s. The reliability of his information, and the question of whether he was using his privileged position as informant of the British in order to further particular interests, was raised more than once.

 

A number of allegations become apparent in the British sources, mostly stemming from pro-Sayyid informants and the Qu'aiti Sultan. All of these centre around the split between the Sayyids (or 'Alawis) and the Shaikhs (all non-Sayyids), or, in organisational terms, of the Jam 'iyyat al-Khair and the Jam 'iyyat al-Irshad. The participation of Sayyids in the Jam 'iyyat al-Khair, which has recently been recognised by some researchers, but has long been more or less overlooked, is not even mentioned as a possibility in these sources which emphasise the rivalry between Sayyids and Shaikhs. Sultan Ghalib of Mukalla, possibly under the influence of his pro-'Alawi Wazir al-Mihdar,⁴ made his position clear in a number of letters to the British Residency in Aden. He expressed his concerns about the anti-Sayyid movement, which he later accused of Bolshevism and banned from his territories. Furthermore, he asked the British to provide him with weapons and to stop the Irshad-activities in Singapore. Ghalib's actions might also have been linked with the association of Kathiris with the Irshadi-movement, since his stance seems somewhat at odds with his otherwise reforming approach.

 

The British allegations seem to link two separate, although interrelated, issues to the 'Alawi-lrshadi conflict, namely the support for the Germans, the Ottomans or for the Allies during World War I, and the question of the Caliphate, at least until 1924.

 

British sources suggest that similar discussions took place amongst Hadhramis in Indonesia. The Turkish embassy in Batavia and Indian Muslims, as well as Hadhramis with Indian connections, seem to have been amongst the prime propagators of a Turkish Caliphate, protesting, often at the same time, against the Allied policies towards Turkey, for example the conditions of the peace treaty of Sevres.

 

To sum up the overwhelming British view up, could then an equation be made with pro-German Shaikhs, Irshadis, Kathiris, Turks and Indian Muslims on the one side and pro-British Sayyids, allied to the Qu'aiti Sultan, who supported Sharif Husain on the other? Where does this leave the following information, obtained through Sayyid 'Umar b. 'Abdallah al-Zem (?), an envoy of Sultan Ghalib who was sent to Surabaya to mediate between Sayyids and Shaikhs? He came to the conclusion that the Irshadis did not generally harbour anti-Sayyid feelings. Members of Jam 'iyyat al-Irshad maintained towards the British Consul General that "this body has not taken on a political character" and "approached His Majesty's Consulate General with protestations of loyalty and with the complaint that their enemies have maligned them to us". Was this only an attempt to regain the favour of the British? And how can it be explained that Sarekat Islam, the Muslim nationalist party, was reported to support the Turkish claim to the Caliphate in one case and the aspirations by Sharif Husain in the other?

 

Without being able to provide any coherent picture, possibly a number of local groups existed, sometimes calling themselves al-Irshad, sometimes perhaps only being labelled as such by outside observers with their own, often quite separate agendas.

 

It seems that Hadhramis since the late 19th century, and indeed until the conclusion by the two Sultanates of an Advisory Treaty with Britain in 1937, were highly successful in rallying outside support for their respective positions without compromising much of their independence. Although the only actual support, for the Qu'aiti Sultan and later for the Sayyids, came from Britain, a number of other outsiders, such as the Ottomans and later the Turks, the Imam, the Sharif of Mecca and Ibn Sa'ud sought contact with and offered support to various Hadhrami groups. This search for allies was greatly facilitated by the regional and the international situation, which gave Hadhramaut as well as Hadhramis abroad a certain importance. The rivals and potential supporters of certain Hadhrami groups on the Arabian Peninsula, the Ottomans, the Imam, Sharif Husain and Ibn Sa'ud were themselves interested to expand their respective spheres of influence, political and religious. After all, this was a historical juncture at which not only a new regional order began to emerge, but also questions of pan-Islamic dimensions ranked high on the agenda. Which interpretation of Islam was best suited to meet the challenges of Western expansionism and modernisation? What course should be taken with regard to the Caliphate, and which political and religious leader was best suited to perform the task? Hadhramaut with its high religious prestige and connections with the important Indian and Far Eastern Muslim communities promised to be not only a comparatively wealthy, but also prestigious ally. Even if attempts at outright submission, such as initiated by the Ottomans, were frustrated, it was useful to foster good relations in order to avoid Hadhramaut siding with one's opponents.

 

While it is thus not very difficult to discern the motives of the external players, the analysis of the Hadhrami groups they were dealing with seems to raise more questions than it answers. As I have tried to show in this paper, 'Alawis and Irshadis can no longer be automatically linked to Sayyids and Shaikhs, but rather to different views about a number of religious, educational, social and political questions. Furthermore, the division between Sayyids and Shaikhs does not seem sufficient to explain the political choices of the various players. A closer analysis of local political and economic networks and alliances, as well as of the religious and educational ideas of Hadhramis at home and abroad seems necessary to gain a more accurate picture. While some research has been conducted into the links with India and Hyderabad, it would also be vital to learn more about the contacts within the Arabian Peninsula, as well as with Egypt and East Africa, not only in economic but also in religious terms. Much more information is thus required until a more satisfactory account of modern Hadhrami history will become possible.

REFERENCES

 

1. S. Bujra, Political Conflict and Stratification in Hadhramaut, Niddle Eastern Studies 3;4(1967), PP. 355-375 AND 4;1 (1967), PP. 2-28.
2. F. the paper by Christian Lekon and Ingrams (A Report…), pp. 70-78.
3. R/20/A/1408, Sultan Ghalib to James Bill, 19. Moharram 1333 (8.12.1914), Ghalib to Walten, 4.5.1916, Walten to Secretary to Government, Bombay, 13.5.1916, Report by Sayyid’Alawi b. Bubakr El Jifri (1916), p.3, CO 725/7, 7^th Aden Newsletter 19.8.1925.
4. Al-Bakri al-Yarfi’I (op.cit.), vol. 2, pp. 321-324.

 

Migration in wadi ‘Amd and wadi Daw’an after the World War II. Economical and cultural affects.

 

 

 

Migration of the population is one of the factors affecting the modem economic, cultural, and demographic situation changing the outlook of countries and continents. There is no surprise that this phenomenon attracts the scholars' attention and is the subject of concern of governments and international organizations. This issue must be of great importance for the third world states as the adequate picture of the background of this process may help to solve many problems of their economic development, provide effective social services, etc. Unfortunately the existing schemes of migration are often too local and are not true for the non-industrial societies. Besides, the process is described mainly from the economical point of view, having meanwhile various ethnographic, anthropological and cultural consequences that affect, in their turn, all the spheres of the social life.

 

Despite being the most fertile part of the Peninsula, the country never relied completely on its agriculture, and the prosperity of Yemen for centuries has been depended to a great extent on the economic ties with the outer world. The earliest witness of such kind of relations is the incense trade due to which the incense kingdoms of Arabia Felix earned their wealth. As mentioned by H.Ingrams "it was eventually the people in Egypt, Greece and Rome who paid for the temples in Sabota" (Ingrams 1966: 347).

 

It is unknown whether a considerable migration took place in the ancient times, but gradually this process had been developed, accompanied by the growth of the local population and changes in the social and economic life. It was in the first centuries AD when the collapse of the incense trade and wars, as well as the changes in the demographic picture, damaged the local economy and forced the Yemenis to search another sources of leaving, one of them — emigration outside the region.

The unfavorable demographic situation has lasted until today and still Yemen remains the most densely populated region where some one third of the total population of the Arabian Peninsula lives (Ingrams 1963: 4).

 

After the collapse of the incense trade and decay of the wealthy kingdoms of the South Arabia the Hadhramis had to rely only on the internal resources of their own country. Since that time the agriculture there has been carried just as it was, and the principles of irrigation systems used in wadi Hadhramaut have been almost unchanged at least during two thousand years. It seems that it was in the incense times when these systems reached their highest level of development. It is particularly clear when comparing the results of excavations of the ancient irrigation systems near Hureidha (wadi 'Amd) (Caton-Thompson 1944: 9-16), or the remnants near Meshhed (wadi Daw'an) with the irrigation constructions that are in use today.

 

 

 

 

 

During the XXc., Hadhramaut faced the rapid growth of the population that doubled every 50 years. The average density of population in Aden protectorate in 1949 was 2 per square kilometer, comparing with that one in Aden Colony — 410 (Review of economic conditions in the Middle East 1951-1952 // Supplement to World Economic Report, 1949-1950 1973: 43). Meanwhile the majority of the 650,000 inhabitants of this part of the country were concentrated in the fertile valleys and towns. In this sense Hadhramaut may be considered as one of the most densely populated region in the South Yemen. All this threatened the fragile balance between the number of the inhabitants and the natural resources and economical capacities of the land.

Normally the most probable ways to meet the demographic changes are :

 

• to develop the local living standards, and
• to bring adequate balance in the number of the inhabitants with the available resources.

 

In Hadhramaut the possibilities of the internal development of the economy, especially of the agricultural facilities are limited. The arable territory itself is restricted; meanwhile the use of fertilizers and machinery as well as water supply from the artesian wells began to practice in this region only during the last 25-30 years. For a long time the second way remained the most appropriate solution. So, no wonder that for centuries Hadhramaut has been known as a major source of the outward migration, and today the temporary emigration of the Hadhramis outside the country remains crucial element of the economical and cultural life of the region.

 

Even in the XXc. in many respects the inner Hadhramaut remains the terra incognita for the Europeans and sometimes more data relating the migration processes in the region was available in the traditional centers of attraction of the Hadhramis — Java and Singapore than in Hadhramaut itself. Though the emigration of the Hadhramis outside their country has been well known for a long time, still there is no detailed investigation of this problem. Besides that there is little information concerning the number of the emigrants in certain districts of Hadhramaut, directions of the emigration, amount of the remittances from abroad, cultural and ethnographic consequences of this process. In this respect the period after the WW II is poorly studied, especially because of almost total absence of official data and statistics dealing with this issue that makes this work extremely difficult.

 

Statistics

 

The shortage of static data and the roughness of those data when they are available seem to be the common feature in this region. The only official data concerning different spheres of the economical development of Aden Protectorate and the Aden colony, relate to the period 1948-1951; after the 1951 ~ the figures deal only with the Aden colony. Even in the World's surveys of economic developments in the Middle East (issued by the United Nations) the data dealing with the situation in Aden Protectorate is fragmentary; since 1958 the statistics of the Aden Protectorate is absent (Review of economic conditions in the Middle East 1951-1952 // Supplement to World Economic Report, 1949-1950 1973: 45; Review of economic conditions in the Middle East, 1951-1952 //Supplement to World Economic Report. 1973: 16).

In most of the cases statistics reflecting the dynamics of the demographic process in Hadhramaut seems to be based no more than on rough approximations. The unsettled political situation, the constant rivalry between the tribes and Hadhrami states in the first half of the 20^th century made any static investigations extremely hard. Even after the Ingrams' Peace that settled down the conflicts the census was still impossible because of the difficult natural conditions in the Inner Hadhramaut and financial issues. No census of the whole area has ever taken place (Clarke, Fisher 1972: 288). Official statistics reflecting the number of people moving in and out of the area is absent too.

 

The only figures dealing with the amount of the population in the middle 60s estimate the approximate number of the inhabitants in the region in the interval of 1.2 to 1.5 million inhabitants (Clarke, Fisher 1972: 288) that can only help to understand the common features of the dynamics of migration.

 

So, almost a complete absence of static data dealing with the demographic process in wadi Hadhramaut after the WW II obliges to find out other sources of the information, one of them — interviewing of the informants.

 

Analyses of the information, received from the informants during the field works in this region combined with other data available can shed the light on the problem of migration. The present study of the problems of emigration is based on interviewing settlers in two adjacent wadis of wadi" Hadhramaut ('Amd and Daw'an) performed between January-April in 1988-1989. It was the older generation who was considered as informants and who witnessed and could preserve in their memory information about the events that took place 30-40 years ago. Interviewing of the local population seems to be rather reliable. This method was used as one of the sources in other kind of investigations as well. Normally the Hadhramis keep their oral tradition information about the events, personalities and genealogies of the remote past, so the events of the last few decades are well preserved in the common memory.

 

The interviews with the informants, static data available, scholar literature and the direct observations during the field works in wadi 'Amd and wadi Daw'an enable us to reveal the complex background of the emigration process and its reasons and consequences there after the WWII.

 

The interviews dealt with the questions of cultural, economical and geographical and ethno-linguistic character. The list of the informants to great extent included the former muhagirin, who emigrated in former times or their relatives.

 

The interviews and direct observations force to make a conclusion that in most of the cases the migration is rooted in economic considerations. The narrowness of the domestic market and natural resources, in this certain case — the agricultural capacities, was and still remains one of the main reasons-of this process. The dearth of arable land, insufficiency of water supply and the dependence on weather conditions for the agricultural production create serious obstacles to the economic growth. The lands of the valleys are restricted by natural borders and the jol (the stone plateau above valley), so during the first years after the WW II the cultivated, irrigated and potentially productive land did not increase and was some 110 thousands of hectares in Aden Protectorate (Review of economic conditions in the Middle East 1951-1952 // Supplement to World Economic Report, 1949-1950 1973: 45; Review of economic conditions in the Middle East, 1951-1952 // Supplement to World Economic Report 1973: 16). It is likely that it has not increased until now too.

 

The local economy needs changes in the inherited forms of land cultivation, introduction of new methods of agriculture, fertilizers and machinery. This has been undertaken only in the last 25-30 years. Extension of the pumping schemes in Queiti and Kathiri States in the early 60th has little changed the situation in agriculture, especially after the decay of the well-irrigation caused by the lowering of the level of the underground waters in the last few decades.

 

Professions

 

Another point concerning the process of emigration was that one dealing with the occupation of the muhagirin abroad. The normal list of professions mentioned by the informants included that of builders, traders, carpenters, (unskilled?) workers, cooks, servants, car drivers. The most prestigious professions listed by the informants seem to be that one of merchant that corresponds with the available information mentioning that "in the South-East Asia Hadhramis find their occupation as seafarers or traders, reaching sometimes a prominent position and influence in their host society" (Clarke, Fisher 1972: 288-289).

Among completely new occupations of the muhagirin from wadi 'Amd and wadi Daw'an was named the profession of car drivers (that spread especially after the appearance of the road connecting wadi Daw'an and Mukalla), that was not character before the War.

 

Social behaviour

 

The emigration has very long tradition and seems to be not a compelled step, but a long standing element of the behavior and psychology of the local population, and "even in those days when the people were content with the barest necessities young men were compelled to emigrate in search of living" (Mansfield 1973: 179). The ordinary observations let us know that little has been changed in the traditional psychology and social behavior of the inhabitants of wadi 'Amd and wadi Daw'an since the Ingrams' times when, as he noticed, "...perhaps seventy per cent of the population of the inner Hadhramaut cannot get over a repugnance to manual labor that is contrary to their habits and dignity. The people of Wadi Hadhramaut themselves jokingly say that their only industries are tea drinking, marrying, and making poetry, and to do these things satisfactorily requires money" (Ingrams 1966: 354). On the contraries, being abroad the muhagirin apart with the Chinese and Jews are the most active element in the economical life of their host countries (Ingrams 1966: 43) The informants mention the cases when the muhagirin managed to push the indigenous population from the vital spheres of the economy penetrating trade activities, banking services, and, sometimes, mass media, as it was in the 60th.

 

From the beginning of the fifties with the growth of the wealth of the oil rich states appears another form of the economical influence of the emigrants in wadi 'Amd and wadi Daw'an. Along with the direct remittances to their relatives at home wealthy muhagirin, still remaining abroad, began to invest money in the local infrastructure i.e. building of roads, hospitals, siqayas (reservoirs of drinking water situated normally by the roads), schools, irrigation systems, mosques, provide direct donations to certain people. The most popular explanation of this phenomenon is that the emigres — it does not matter what kind of prosperity they reached - in any case are regarded abroad as alien element and these investments may be some kind of insurance for the case if they lose their money and prosperity abroad. Any time they can come back and be adapted by their fellow citizens as they made a lot for their "little motherland" - a village or a small part of the wadi where they were born; at the same time it seems to be some kind of model of the behavior caused by the tribal self consciousness, inherited from ancient times, that obliges its members to make all they can for their tribe or a family.

 

Massive emigration caused some demographic problems. As the Hadhrami women in the 40s - 60s, as it was in former times, never went abroad they outnumbered men, that in its turn, made the marriage and amount of mahr comparatively low. Later on it became more expensive. So, as a rule, the emigration aims to meet not only the financial needs of the family, but to provide the necessary sum of money for the mahr as well.

 

Directions of the emigration

 

The economic and political situation in the country and in the outer world affects this process. Normally the muhagirin tend to leave areas of poverty for areas of perceived wealth and opportunities. The informants named three main directions of the migration :

 

1. l) Emigration abroad; 2) Migration into the big cities in South Yemen - Aden, Mukalla, Shihr, 3) Traditional micro migrations within the wadi Hadhramaut itself.

 

The West Indies - Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore — was mentioned as the main migrant destination before the WW II that can be explained by the religious reasons, traditions, as well as by existing family ties (Clarke, Fisher 1972: 288-289). Before the WW II the population in Hadhramaut to a great extent depended on remittances from Indonesia, Singapore, India, and Zanzibar. Some seventy thousand Hadhramis migrated only to Java before the War where besides the sources of making money they find a political stability that they were lacking at home (Ingrams 1966: 349). The World War II practically stopped the contacts between Hadhramaut and Hadhrami diaspora in the Far East, India and the Eastern coast of Africa. After the War these ties revived for a short period of time, but later with the growth of independent States in Asia this source of revenue has greatly declined again (Mansfield 1973: 179, Ingrams 1966: ix.).The main

source of the financial aid that allowed the Hadhramis to exist was received from overseas, so it is hard to underestimate the consequences of such kind of development.

 

After the war, deterioration of the situation in East Africa, political changes in West Indies, forced the Hadhramis to find other directions of the outer migration. It was in the 50s, when Kuwait and Saudi Arabia faced the main flow of the muhagirin. The growth of the oil-wealth of these countries was accompanied by the growth of the number of the muhagirin there that increased several times during the fifties. This process "was accompanied by the appearance of the shanty towns inhabited by the foreign workers — Yemenis, Hadhramautis, Omanis, etc." (Mansfield 1973: 153), most of whom were engaged as servants and unskilled workers.

 

 

Since the end of the World War II the towns began to attract the growing numbers of migrants from overpopulated rural areas that was caused by several reasons. The urban areas, with their infrastructures provided modest industry, trade and service activities and the later gave jobs and money for the migrants. On the contrary, the inner regions that could little suggest their inhabitants. The handicraft in the wadis, such as carpentry, pottery, weaving, blacksmith's work, building activity had a secondary character, aimed to meet only the very modest needs of the local market, while the agriculture remained the millstone of the local economy.

 

 

In the 50s Aden was rather popular among the emigres from wadi Daw'an. In the city concentrated almost a quarter of the 850,000 population of the western part of the

country.  Natives of the two wadis worked there as temporary workers and after a short period of stay they come back to their homes. The Aden's population had risen from 148,000 in 1953 to total of 200,000 in 1959 due to a constant stream of migrants seeking asylum and work there, a good number of whom were the Hadhramis (Tufnell 1961: 27).

 

Urbanization process was also encouraged by constructing of new roads in the Inner Hadhramaut (road connecting wadi Daw'an and Mukalla), providing intensive development of trade. Meanwhile almost all the economic activities in Hadhramaut in the 40th and 50th were concentrated on the sea side and another center of attraction of the migrants from the western Hadhramaut in the 50s was Mukalla — a port, which along with Shihr served the inland towns of the wadi Hadhramaut.

 

After the Palestine war of 1948, almost the entire Yemeni Jewish population moved to Palestine. There were 7,000 who emigrated from Aden alone (Mansfield 1973: 169-170) among them traders, gold and silversmiths, handicraftsmen. Immediately the free economical and social spaces were filled by the migrants from the eastern part, many of them were from Hadhramaut. The season migration completed the picture of the types of migration in wadi 'Amd and wadi Daw'an it is possible to mention, for example migration of bee breeders from wadi 'Amd to Qatn, builders from Tarim to the upper reaches of these two wadis as well as migration of the Bedouins in dry seasons.

 

Language

 

Among the entire complex of the effects of emigration changes on the linguistic level seem to be one of the most obvious.. Formerly the languages of the host countries actively penetrated Hadhramaut. The first travelers in wadi 'Amd and wadi Daw'an pointed out the great influence of the Malay culture; the Malay language was spread to the extent almost as Arabic. If in the 30s in 'Amd, Hureidha, Hagarein and Qatn a lot of people spoke Malay language even though D. van der Meulen "was often proposed to converse in Malay instead of Arabic" and sometimes Swahili could be heard (Meulen, von Wissmann 1964: 44, 89, 194, 204). Such words as batik, rijsttafel, ruti have been absorbed by the local dialect and are not regarded now as loan words by the native speakers. At the same time the linguistic situation seems to be strongly changed after the War. Now, when the cultural and economical ties with Indonesia weakened none of our informants, who belonged to the old generation, could speak Malay. On the contrary, some elements that are character to the Arabic dialects of the Persian Gulf manifest in the local coin.

 

To sum up, the migration process in wadi 'Amd and wadi Daw'an may be considered as a model of the total situation in Hadhramaut as a whole. Despite being hardly accessible region for the Europeans, Hadhramaut never existed in the complete isolation and had very tough ties with the outer regions - affecting different spheres of life there. In great deal these ties were preserved due to the emigrants who played prominent role in the economical, religious, military, and cultural development in their host countries, never loosing the ties with Hadhramaut.

Normally the emigration helps to meet the needs of the local population and supplies the region not only with the movable assets in the form of goods, securities and cash, but habits and skills as well. At the same time the long-term out-migration reduces the perspectives of the economical development of the region as it draws out the most qualified and energetic forces, that negatively affect the economic situation in the wadi. Besides that almost a complete reliance on the remittances from abroad makes the agriculture and local handicrafts economically unfavorable; import of the goods and food becomes more advantageous and the local goods are forced out from the Hadhrami market as it was happening with the traditional handicrafts. "Builders and plasters, dyers and weavers, gold and silversmiths... will be lost in a few years as cheap machine-made goods pour from the factories of the western world," wrote O.Tufnell in the end of the fifties (Tufhelll961:26).

 

On the other hand, the long standing traditions of the emigration turned Hadhramaut into society in which human movement become vital element not only in the local economy, but important part of the life style and culture of the region, bounding it with the outer world, making it a chain of the whole human civilization.

 

REFERENCES

 

-  Bochow, K. H.; Stein, L. Hadhramaut. Geschichte und Gegenwart einer sudarabischen Landschaft, Leipzig, 1986.

-  Clarke, J.I.; Fisher, W. B. Populations of the Middle East and North Africa. A Geographical Approach, London, 1972.

-  Ingrams, H. Arabia and the Isles, London, 1966.

-  Mansfield, P. The Middle East. A Political and Economic Survey, London, 1973.

    

THE HADHRAMIS AND THE POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE LATE 18TH CENTURY AND 19TH CENTURY MALAY STATES

 

Most of the Arabs who are settled in Malaysia today trace their roots from Hadhramaut. a piece of land situated at the southern extremity of the Arabian Peninsula. Arabs of whatever origin, at least until recently, however, were perceived by Malays as the descendants of the Prophet, a genealogical link which elevated them to a noble ancestry, supernatural powers and an inherited missionary role. With the title Sayyidir Shaykh added to their names, they reaffirmed their distinguished status which gained them a special respect as direct inheritors of the wisdom of Islam and possessors of an unexampled piety and religious merit.¹

 

The most effectual factor in the Malays' respect for the Arabs, however, stemmed from the feeling of indebtedness to the community which had contributed to and influenced the development of their civilisation which was brought about by the process of Islamisation. The continuing authority and respect the Arabs enjoyed were also contributed to by their hard work, sincerity and commitment to bringing into about social change in the Malay community, and their capability of adapting themselves well to the society. Arab religious scholars, especially their first few generations, were a prominent feature in Malay life, as were Arab entrepreneurs. Apart from these, the authority and respect secured by the Arabs was also derived as a result of their prominent role, since the early days of their presence, in the politics and administration of the Malay states.

The political and administrative roles played by Arabs were noticeable virtually in all the Malay states, with their history of dominant involvement particularly evident in Kedah and Negeri Sembilan. The role they played, however, was nothing new because they had a long history of such involvement dating from the establishment of the Melaka Sultanate. In this kingdom, one particularly important political event which involves an Arab, as related by Sejarah Melayu, was the subversive role played by Maulana Jalaluddin, an Arab leader from the "land above the wind" in helping Raja Kassim and Seri Nara Diraja to topple Sultan Abu Shahid. In the Melaka Sultanate, Arab religious scholars and Arabs who married into the high officials cass or the Pembesar and the royal family were categorised as part of the upper strata of its privileged class. Apart from Melaka, another early Malay kingdom where Arabs are known to have exerted a substantial political influence was Sulu. In Acheh, apart from the Chuliahs, the Arabs had also always been an important element in the development of its political history. Towards the end of the 18th century, Arabs were able to exert political influence in several Malay Sultanates and they were even successful in carving out empires in Siak (Sumatra) and Pontianak (Kalimantan).

 

The prominence of the Arabs in the politics and administration of the Malay states resulted in their role being viewed with prejudice by the British when the latter established their colonial administration in Malaya. This prejudice stemmed from their suspicion of the capability of the Arabs to exert religious and political influence among the indigenous Malays which was viewed by the British as a potential threat to their administration. In Penang and Singapore ever since they established their rule, even though the British treated the Arabs, like the Chinese, as partners in their economic ventures because of their hard work and entrepreneurship, their cautious approach when dealing with them was obvious. This approach, positive to the Chinese, and rather cautious when dealing with the Arabs, was that pursued by Francis Light in the early days of Penang where to him they were treated as "good friends and dangerous enemies".²

 

The religious and administrative influence of the Arabs, however, was well-established before the establishment of British administration in the Malay states with their influence most institutionalised in Kedah. The Arabs' influence in the state and its origin from the arrival from Sana^’a in Yemen of an Arab alim, Shaykh Abdul Jalil al-Mahdani in 1122AH/1710AD who was appointed as religious teacher to the Sultan. Apart from being a religious teacher, during the reign of Sultan Muhammad Jiwa Zainal Azilin Muazzam Shah II (1710-1778) Shaykh Abdul Jalil was instrumental in the introduction of Kedah's Thirteen Laws. When he was appointed as the Mufti of Kedah, Shaykh Abdul Jalil was also responsible for formulating regulations for the Sultan and his officials based on the regulations of the Caliphs and Ministers of the Abbasid Caliphate.

 

Apart from their role in dominating its religious administration, in Kedah the Arabs were also significant in the political development of the state, which is visible even to the present day. Arabs' political involvement in Kedah may be traced back to the early eighteenth century, when the families of al-Jamalullail, al-Shahabuddin, al-Aidid and others began to settle in the state. Politically, the most influential of these families was the family of al-Jamalullail. The earliest member of the family said to have settled in the state was Sayyid Ahmad bin Sayyid Hussain Jamalullail who came to Kedah from Hadhramaut in 1148AH/1735AD. His influence in the state was further widened following his marriage to Sharifah Aminah al-Qadri of the Hadhrami al-Qadri family. The family's most significant political role in the state, however, was played by Sayyid Ahmad's son, Sayyid Harun Jamalullail, an influential figure in the Kedah court who was awarded the district of Arau in 1212AH/1797AD.

 

The political role played by the Arabs in Kedah was further intensified when the state was invaded by the Siamese. Following the invasion the Arabs rallied behind the Sultan against the occupying power. During the twenty one years (1821-1842) of Siamese occupation, they were actively involved in the struggle to free the state from the invaders. In the struggle against the Siamese, the Arabs also played a significant role in the resurgence of religious militancy with its call for Islamic unity in order to free the state from the occupation. This resurgence led to the efforts by Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin Halim Shah II and other Kedah princes to regain possession of the state and took on the character of a jihad (holy war) against a power which was not only non-Malay but kafir (infidel) in nature. During their two decades of struggle against the Siamese, Kedah princes and the Arab leaders joined hands in their resistance which attracted the attention of Malays everywhere. Arab merchants in the Straits Settlements and even some Europeans lent covert support, and h was probably about this time that the Penang-based Red Flag society was formed as a rallying point for Islamic opposition.

In 1240AH/1824AD, a military campaign was launched against the Siamese, headed by Sayyid Zainal Abidin, Sultan Ahmad's half-Arab nephew, popularly known as Tunku Kudin, who managed to recapture Kuala Kedah, though it was retaken by the Siamese, resulting in his own death. The defeat did not deter the Kedah royal family and another attack was planned assisted by an Arab, Shaykh Abdul Samad who had just returned from Makkah. In an unsuccessful offensive launched in 1244AH/1828AD Shaykh Abdul Samad was killed. Apart from being actively involved in launching attacks against the Siamese, Arabs in Kedah also played a prominent role in conducting its foreign contacts during the occupation. One of the Sultan of Kedah's trusted Arab emissaries was Shaykh Abdul Kadir Mufti bin Shaykh Abdul Jalil al-Mahdani who fled with the Sultan following the invasion. One of Shaykh Abdul Kadir’s assignments on behalf of the Sultan of Kedah was his mission to Bengal to demand money owed by the East India Company for the lease of Penang.

 

Throughout the Siamese occupation of Kedah the Arabs were actively involved in various efforts to regain the state's sovereignty. In addition to supporting the Kedah royal family in its military struggle against the Siamese, the Arabs were also actively involved in an effort to regain Kedah's sovereignty through diplomatic means. Kedah finally regained its independence not through war, but through negotiation, which was actively conducted among others by Sayyid Hussain Jamalullail. The loyatty of the Jamalullail to the Sultan and their contribution to the state s polrtics was rewarded when in 1843, with the approval of the Siamese, Sayyid Hussain Jamalullail, whose father, Sayyid Harun Jamalullail had earlier been appointed Penghulu (District Chief) of Arau, was made Suhan of a newly created state, Perlis. The family of Jamalullail was the only Arab family to rule a Malay state, and is the ruling family of Perlis to the present day.

 

Another state where the Arabs played a significant role in domestic politics and administration was Negeri Sembilan. Contrary to their role in Kedah where Arabs contributed to regaining the sovereignty of the state from Siamese occupation, in Negeri Sembilan they were responsible for bringing about British intervention. Prior to the intervention, the most prominent Arab of Hadhrami descent in 19th century Negeri Sembilan's politics was Sayyid Sha'aban bin Sayyid Ibrarum al-Qadri. As in other states, Arabs were highly respected in Negeri Sembilan and being an Arab ensured Sayyid Sha'aban an easy access to the Malay royal families, and he soon became son-in-law of Raja Ali after marrying, in turn, two of the latter’s daughters.

 

In 1832, Raja Ali was declared Yam Tuan Besar after successfully overcoming challenges by other contenders for the position. Following his success, he appointed Sayyid Shaaban as his heir-apparent with the title Yam Tuan Muda. Sayyid Sha'aban was more than a son-in-law of Raja Ali, being also his trusted adviser. The appointment of Sayyid Sha'aban was contested by other Negeri Sembilan chiefs and the middle of the 19th century Negeri Sembilan saw widespread intrigue and tension in the state as a result of the power struggle. Following a dispute over the building of a stockade to collect tolls at Simpang, which was the point where Sungai Rembau joined Sungai Linggi, war broke out arid Sayyid Sha'aban was forced to retreat to Melaka by the combined forces of the ruler of Linggi, Dato' Muda Muhammad Katas. Even though Sayyid Sha'aban made several attempts to regain his post, until his death in early 1873, it was of no avail. His death marked the end of an early attempt by an Arab to dominate the politics of Negeri Sembilan. Although Sayyid Sha'aban failed to achieve his ambition to become ruler, his influence was deeply felt. One of his sons, Sayyid Hamid by one of the daughters of Raja Ali's, was in the 1870s appointed as Yam Tuan Muda.

Sayyid Sna'aban and Sayyid Hamid were not the only members of Sayyid Ibrahim’s family to hold positions of power and authority in Negeri Sembilan. Another member of the family who also played a prominent role in the state's politics was Sayyid Abdul Rahman bin Sayyid Ahmad al-Qadri, Dato' Kelana of Sungai Ujong (March 1873-January 1880). He was Sayyid Ibrahim’s grandson and a British protege, and the adversary of the conservative Dato' Bandar Kulop Tunggal. Sayyid Abdul Rahman was the Negeri Sembilan chief who was instrumental in bringing about the British intervention in Negeri Sembilan when on 21 April 1874 he together wrth Dato' Muda of Linggi signed an agreement of friendship with Andrew Clarke, Governor of the Straits Settlements. The signing of this treaty implied that their territories were put under British protection. Their action of putting their respective territories under British protection was resented by other chiefs of Negeri Sembilan, who under the leadership of Yam Tuan Antah struggled against the British, who they feared would deprive them of most of their power.³

 

Arabs who were believed to have a connection with Hadhramaut also had a long history of influence in Perak, where all the four great posts of the state, except for that of Temenggong, nave been at least at one time held by them. These Arabs were also accepted as part of the Perak royal family and were addressed as Tengku. One of the earliest Arabs to have been trusted with the highest post in Perak was Sayyid Abu Bakar who during the reign of Sultan Iskandar (1752-1765) was appointed Bendahara. In 19th century Perak, successive Arabs had also been holding the post of Orang Kaya Besar, the last holder being Sayyid Jaafar. The last Perak great post held by them was that of Orang Kaya Menteri Sri Paduka Tuan. The earliest known appointee was Fakih Yusoff who was appointed to the post during the reign of Sultan Muzaffar Shah (1728-1754). During his reign two Arab brothers, Sharif Hussain and Sharif Abu Bakar, were also appointed to the post, the latter then being promoted to the post of Bendahara.⁴

 

The Arabs were also found to have been actively involved in Selangor’s politics particularly when the Civil War of the 1870s in Kelang was fought between Tunku Kudin and Raja Mahadi. Several Arab leaders were involved in the conflict by supporting the warring parties. One of those who were actively involved in the war was a warrior of Hadhrami origin from Pontianak, Sayyid Mashhor bin Muhammad al-Shahab who supported Raja Mahadi. On the side of Tengku Kudin during the war an Arab, Sayyid Zain was appointed by him as his chief of staff.

 

Despite the fact that the Arabs had played an active role in the politics of the Malay States, varying in intensity from one state to another, their role gradually reduced when the British administration in these states became increasingly dominant following the intervention. Even though now Arabs are no longer an influential factor in the politics of the Malay Sultanates, compared to their role in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, they have managed to retain Perlis as the only Malay state where the Sultan is of Arab descent until to the present day. After Malaya achieved independence and the Arabs were increasingly identified as Malays, they continued to play an active role in the political process which was now channeled through the mainstream Malay political parties. Similarly, in religious administration from the early 20th century the prominent role played by the Arabs was gradually taken over by Malays who began to exercise their authority upon returning home after completing their studies in Makkah and Cairo.

REFERENCES

 

1. William r. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, Kuala lumpur; Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1980, p. 41; W. H. Lee Wamer, “Notes on the Hadhramaut”, The Geographical Journal, Vol. LXXVII, No. 3, March 1931, p. 220.
2. P. Clodd, Malaya’s First British Pioneer. The Life of Francis Light, London:Luzac & Company Ltd., 1948, pp. 55-56.
3. M. Gullick, “The War With Yam Tuan Antah”, JMBRAS, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1954, p.5.
4. , p. 143.